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Abstract 
 
The research is divided in seven sections where the problem of the interpretation 
and applicability of Art XXIII GATT to the Laws and Practices under the Anti-
Dumping Agreement is examined. Chapter I identifies the problems, raises the 
research question and gives an overview of the current state of the matters under 
observation.  
In Chapter II the general theory of interpretation is studied and subsequently applied 
to Art XXIII specifically, taking into account the meaning, scope, historical evolution 
and current interpretations of Art XXIII. Chapter III revises the theory of coherent 
interpretation of Art XXIII in connection with the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
specifically. The constitutional structure and principles of the WTO are questioned, 
dissected and supported to decant a handful of fundamental principles which shall 
inform the rest of the interpretation applied in the research. This chapter takes the 
interpretation from an abstract perspective to a material view of a coherent 
interpretation of both Art. XXIII and the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
 Chapter IV revises the facts, laws and practices of Anti-Dumping being used as a 
protectionist measure in disguise both using procedural and substantial arguments 
which are illustrated in the laws and practices of seven countries. The findings in 
Chapter IV lead to Chapter V which questions the legitimacy and validity of 
considering the possible applicability of Art XXIII to the anti-Dumping Agreement as it 
is currently implemented by the WTO membership. Those reflections lead to the 
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consideration and mention of Competition as a public good in international trade in 
Chapter VI, which is a key element for the final findings of this research.  
The conclusion of this research is inclined to suggest that in order to keep the legal 
system of the WTO functional, a stronger economic constitutional approach that 
allows for the application of art XXIII in situations subversive to the principles of free 
trade is necessary. The adaptation of a theory of an economic constitution is 
proposed.  
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THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF GATT'S ARTICLE XXIII TO 
ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE 
 
 
I. PROBLEM OUTLINE 
 
This research proceeds from two observations and one question: 
 
Observation 1: Art. XXIII is not being interpreted to its full potential. 
 
This research aims to find clarity in the role of Art XXIII of GATT in the different 
circumstances where it can be applied. This includes situations of breach and non - 
breach of the WTO agreements. The question to be considered will take into account 
the meaning and interpretation of Art XXIII and its interaction with other provisions 
under WTO law. Despite a number of studies focused on this provision; its nature, 
scope, the legal theory that supports it and its practical application are still the 
subject of much debate1. As the WTO agreements expand their coverage of areas of 
trade, the nullification and impairment provision seems to be out of place and its 
relationship with ordinary and extraordinary complaints, as well as with the rest of the 
agreement, continues to be an interesting question.  
 
Observation 2: The Anti-Dumping Agreement is being abused. 
 
Anti-dumping was created as a trade remedy to correct the distortions created by 
dumped goods in the importing market. This means that Anti-Dumping measures 
emerged with the purpose to be a relief to unfair trade2. Anti-dumping measures 
                                                          
1
 PESCATORE P. “The GATT dispute Settlement Mechanism- Its present Situation and its prospects, J.W.T, No. 1 
1993 at 5-19 and the debate in detail in SPITZER F. “The non-violation complaint in WTO Law”. Juristische 
Reihe TENEA/www.jurawelt.com.V.56 p.1 -48. 
2
BARCELO J. “A History of GATT Unfair Trade Remedy Law- Confusion of Purposes”. Cornell Law Faculty 
Publications. Paper 517. 1991. p. 312. 
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were designed with the ―basic idea that it is illegal to sell a product in a foreign 
market for either less than some construed cost or at a lower price than on the 
product‟s domestic market if the imports materially injure a domestic industry in the 
importing country‖3. Originally, anti-dumping regulations emerged as part of 
competition legislation in the form of anti-trust4. This was because, internationally, 
dumping was understood as a form of anti-competitive conduct (specifically, 
predation - lowering prices with the aim of eliminating competitors). 
Many observations indicate that the Anti-Dumping Agreement is in fact being used 
with mercantilist5 and protectionist6 purposes by the different participants in world 
trade. This is caused partly by the focus given to the injury caused to competitors 
rather than the injury caused to competition7.The countries have found a way to 
legally undermine the Agreement‘s purpose and avoid complying with their 
obligations by indirectly balancing a percentage of the tariff removals or reductions 
with a correlative anti-dumping measure8 or another non-tariff trade remedy9. This 
defeats the original purpose of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
                                                          
3
 WEINRAUCH R. “Competition Law in the WTO. The rationale for a framework agreement.”Neue Juristische 
Monografien- Band 25.NWV. 2004. p. 59. 
4
MESSERLIN P. & REED G. “Antidumping Policies in the United States and the European Community”. The 
Economic Journal, Vol. 105, No. 433, (Nov. 1995). p. 1565. 
5
 GOWAN P. “Industrial Development and International Political Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism” in 
ANIEVAS A. “Marxism and World Politics: Contesting Global Capitalism” Routledge, 2012. P131. 
6
DEBROY B and CHAKRABORTY D. (Eds). “Anti-Dumping: Global Abuse of a Trade Policy Instrument”. Academic 
Foundation. 2007. pp. 20-29. 
7
“(…) under an injury to competition standard, something more would be required. A complainant might have 
to show that the price cutting arose out of genuinely predatory motives - for example, that it involved below- 
marginal-cost prices (money-losing even in the short run) by a dominant firm in a concentrated industry. (…)An 
anti-dumping policy aimed solely at predatory dumping would apply an ‘injury-to-competition’ test of dumping 
injury, in line with antitrust goals. Thus, dumping ‘unfairness’ would refer to predatory actions threatening the 
competitive process itself. (…)GATT anti-dumping law has not acknowledged his basic distinction between 
injury-to-competition and injury-to- competitors. Instead it is a hybrid of antitrust and safeguard policies, 
awkwardly resting on a confused notion of ‘unfairness.’ Early commentators on dumping seemed 
automatically to associate the practice with predatory motives, but in modern application anti-dumping 
measures have almost exclusively burdened non predatory dumping” [Emphasis added]. Supra BARCELO. pp. 
313-314. 
8
 This practice has been found to reach its political goal, which is to keep domestic firms in trade, but it also 
has been found to reduce welfare and distort aggregate trade. See BOWN C. “Taking Stock of Antidumping, 
Safeguards, and Countervailing Duties, 1990–2009”. Policy Research Working paper 5436. The World Bank 
research Group Trade and Integration Team. 2010. P3. See also,  
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Question 1: Can the application of Art. XXIII unlock the values of the Anti-Dumping 
agreement? 
 
The first question that arises is whether Art. XXIII can be applied with a view to 
provide a corrective to the domestic use given to the Anti-Dumping Agreement which 
is currently subversive of the principles of the WTO. 
 
The exercise of answering this question is the key debate presented in this research. 
In order to find out if its application to the Anti-Dumping Agreement is possible, this 
paper shall explore a legal account of Art XXIII in both case law and academic 
interpretations, plus a report of the use of Anti-Dumping in different trade systems, 
the economic models and theories behind it and its material consequences. Once 
the current state of affairs is established, the next relevant question for this research 
arises. This is the question of whether the current legal understanding of Art XXIII 
can be applied to Anti-Dumping measures and on what terms. 
 
This study is constructed upon, but not limited to, a legal review and analysis Art 
XXIII; and an economic analysis that compares economic models and policy to 
determine when Anti-Dumping may be subject to balance by the application of Art 
XXIII. In this exercise, the presence of key issues such as competition in 
international law, are not only unavoidable, but indispensable to reach an answer to 
the fundamental question mentioned above. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
RUHL K. “Anti-Dumping in the Aggregate” *preliminary and incomplete+ New York University Stern School of 
Business. 2012. Available at 
http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/research/seminars/seminar_ruhl_030212.pdf p. 22.  
9
 Anti-Dumping Duties coexist with other trade remedies such as Safeguards and Countervailing Duties. All 
these remedies are sometimes used to block competitive importers illegitimately distorting their original 
purpose. The combined use of trade remedies has been shown to destabilize the markets, have a great impact 
on trade flows and affect welfare negatively. See supra BOWN C. p. 31. 
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The Anti-Dumping Agreement was chosen as an illustration of the possibilities 
locked in Art XXII, especially because in the application of this Agreement it is 
possible to clearly detect how a WTO agreement can be interpreted and applied in a 
manner that is subversive of fundamental principles. This Agreement has been 
extensively used by the membership with different standards of compliance. The 
more heterogeneous this application becomes, the less transparency and 
predictability remains for exporters, who are then dependant on the behaviour of the 
administrative authorities of each country. The Anti-Dumping Agreement is indeed a 
key instance where there is a problem and hence, where there is a possibility for Art. 
XXIII to play a correcting role for the anomalies found in its application and 
interpretation. 
 
The Anti-Dumping Agreement is the primary applicable set of rules that discipline 
anti-dumping measures and it is routinely applied independently of any other 
standard. This means that the relationships of Art XXIII with the Anti-Dumping 
agreement have not been much considered. 
 
One hypothetical scenario is that article XXIII is interpreted in an extensive manner, 
so that the Nullification and Impairment provision becomes applicable to even the 
minor administrative faults committed by the importing country in the application of 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement. This possibility means that Article XXIII could absorb 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement and diminish its content beyond the extent that was 
intended by the contracting parties. This is plainly unacceptable because the 
provision of Art XXIII could never eclipse and annul the agreements reached on anti-
dumping. 
 
The idea of this study is to explore the meaning of Article XXIII in depth and to 
explain it in relation to its possible application to the anti-dumping actions by local 
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authorities10 without prejudice to the remedies contained therein. This would result in 
a theoretical and practical idea of the coherent application of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement and its relations with Article XXIII. In addition, this would serve as an 
example of the potential integration and applicability of Article XXIII to other WTO 
provisions.  
 
Therefore, it is pertinent to ascertain whether Article XXIII can be applied by the 
adjudicators of the WTO to the cases of abuse of anti-dumping measures and if so, 
what the scope of the provision is. This entails defining in detail three key aspects: 
a. Interpretation of the provision contained in Article XXIII. 
b. Analysis of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, cases in which Anti-Dumping is 
being applied beyond its trade remedy purpose. In addition, its current 
application in specific economies and internal remedies in the law and 
practices of those members.  
c. Possible applicability of Article XXIII to measures taken within the terms of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
The competition issue emerging from the inadequate use of anti-dumping as a 
protectionist measure must certainly also be taken into account, in two ways: 
a. Competition issues generated directly from the application of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement. 
b. Competition issues generated in the normal course of trade which are not 
regulated by any of the WTO agreements. This is a very delicate and 
controversial matter as there are several provisions in the DSU preventing 
any interpretation to add or diminish from the content of the negotiated 
agreements. However, it is plausible to explore whether the economic 
                                                          
10
 Especially administrative actions and actions related to calculation of margins. Some of these have been 
treated by the Appellate Body (Zeroing) but the scope for detrimental administrative actions is so overarching 
that in some events some of these actions could be subject of challenge through Art. XXIII. 
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rationale of free trade underpinning the WTO agreements itself require some 
degree of fair competition to be viable at all.  
This study will be dedicated to constructing a plausible interpretation of Article XXIII 
and to use that interpretation to project the interaction of the nullification and 
impairment provision with the Anti-Dumping Agreement as a sample of the 
interaction of Article XXIII with the WTO agreements. It is also intended to question 
whether it is possible to include competition considerations in the context of 
nullification and impairment. If this scope is wide enough to cover agreements like 
the one on anti-dumping, a harmonious interpretation between the Non-Violation 
nullification and impairment provision and the Anti-Dumping Agreement will be 
attempted in view of the problematic trade outcomes of the measures allowed by the 
latter. 
More specifically, this research is aimed at establishing the events in which the 
nullification and impairment complaint is applicable with a degree of clarity11 
depending on the source of the benefits found to be covered by the provision. 
Hence, this investigation will mention the applicability of nullification and impairment 
claims to benefits generated in GATT as a general proposition but that have been 
approached outside the WTO context. More specifically, it will traverse the issue of 
competition in an international context as a pivotal matter arising in relationship to 
the subject matter.  
The first step must be then to determine the meaning of the provision contained in 
Article XXIII in order to produce an acceptable interpretation that enables its 
applicability. Secondly, the Antidumping Agreement will be reviewed in the context of 
its current application by specific countries and the economic consequences of that 
application. Then, the possible application of Art XXIII to Anti-Dumping measures 
that nullify or impair benefits for the Members shall be explored and finally the 
consideration of competition in the trade context in connection to the issues raised 
by Anti-Dumping and Nullification or Impairment of benefits shall be subject of 
revision.  
                                                          
11
 To GATT and provisions contained within the WTO Agreements.  
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1.1 GATT’s Article XXIII applicability in the current WTO system 
The nullification and impairment provision contained in Article XXIII of GATT has not 
been a frequently used part of the agreement. Despite the fact that in a handful of 
cases it has been applied by the pre-WTO panels12, there is scarce case law to 
extract an interpretation from them. However, the provision is still a valid part of the 
regulatory body13.  
The understanding of the content of the Art XXIII agreement has remained obscure 
during the whole existence of the GATT and there have been few interpretation 
attempts that give it meaningful application. Further, those attempts are rather 
isolated and come from academics rather than consistent reports from the panels or 
the Appellate Body, leaving the matter still unresolved and making it hard to use the 
provision as a valid argument in WTO litigation. 
The scope of the Nullification and Impairment provision is not clear; in fact, most of 
the contents and meanings of the provision are not clear, which makes them difficult 
to apply in a specific case.  
On the one hand, the Nullification or Impairment provision has been understood in 
such a restrictive manner that it is practically inapplicable. It has failed to be properly 
invoked by complainant parties or it has been interpreted too restrictively by the 
WTO panels and Appellate Body. On the other hand, allowing an overly extensive 
                                                          
12
 BISD 37/86 Panel Report EEC- Oilseeds I, 1990; WT/DS135/AB/R Appellate Body Report on EC- Measures 
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products, 2001; GATTCP.4/39 Working Party Report on The 
Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, 1950; BISD 1S/53 Panel Report on Treatment by Germany of 
imports of Sardines, 1952; BISD11S/95 Panel report on Uruguay- Recourse on Art XXIII, 1965;L/5776 Panel 
Report on EC Citrus 1985; L/5778 Panel Report EEC Production Aids Granted on Canned Peaches, Canned 
Pears, Canned Fruit Cocktail and Dried Grapes 1985; BISD 35S/116 Panel Report on Japan Trade in Semi-
Conductors; BISD 37S/786 Panel Report United States Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar and Sugar 
Containing Products Applied Under the 1955 Sugar Waiver and Under the Head note to the Schedule of Tariff 
Concessions; WT/DS44/AB/R Appellate Body Report Japan Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film 
and Paper, 1998; WT/DS163/R Panel Report on Korea Measures Affecting Government Procurement, 2000; 
WT/DS50/R Appellate Body report on India Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products, 1990; WT/DS62/AB/R Appellate Body report EC Custom Classification on Certain Computer 
Equipment 1998. 
13
SPITZER F. “The non violation complaint in WTO Law”. Juristische Reihe TENEA/www.jurawelt.com.V.56 p.1. 
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interpretation of Nullification and Impairment claims would tend to undermine and 
limit the WTO agreements in an unacceptable manner outside GATT, despite the 
heavily negotiated details of their wording.  
In the system of the WTO that has a rule-oriented dispute settlement process, all 
disputes have to be either adjudicated or mediated, but political intervention has 
been reduced to a minimum by the very structure of the system which has been, by 
consensus, shifted from a power-oriented approach towards a rule-oriented one, 
supported by the most powerful players in the economic field such as the United 
States and the European Union14.  
  
1.2 The Anti-Dumping Agreement in light of The Nullification and 
Impairment Provision. 
The Anti-Dumping Agreement has an economic rationale on its own. This rationale is 
underpinned by an economic theory which gives Anti-Dumping measures an 
economically coherent justification and a place in the scheme of free trade. The Anti-
Dumping Agreement is then articulated based on the principles that fit within the 
logic of free trade. In the event that its application is discordant with its economic 
rationale, the question of whether Art XXIII can be used to protect the economic 
rationale is a valid one.  
In the last two decades, after the Uruguay Round, there have been a growing 
number of anti-dumping measures implemented both by ―traditional‖15 anti-dumping 
users and ―new‖ users16 of the measures17 due to the shift from national-based 
implementation to sector-originated complaints. These industries are also likely to 
lobby and force their governments to negotiate export restraints with dumping 
                                                          
14
 BREWSTER V. “Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law” Virginia Law Review 
Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 2006), p. 251. 
15
United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa and the European Community. 
16
All other users of AD measures, predominantly developing countries. See below: Ch. 4.1 Historical 
Background of Anti-Dumping. 
17
PRUSA. “On the spread and impact of Anti-Dumping” Canadian Journal of Economics Vol. 34 No.3 p. 592. 
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countries rather than get the prices of the imports to reflect the costs of production 
because that is an easier way to control foreign competition18. 
Furthermore, it has been corroborated that users of anti-dumping measures are 
producers in consolidated sectors with a dominant position in the market19. These 
sectors are mostly heavy industry and manufactured raw materials such as 
chemicals and metal products20 as the statistics from 1995 to 2012 show: 
 
Figure 1: Split by industry, Anti-Dumping cases from 1995-2012 were dominated by the Metals and Chemical industries, 
being industries with large, dominant market players were able to use their influence to institute an investigation. 
21 
Anti-dumping investigations increased by more than 50% amongst the members of 
WTO between 1995 and 2006 in comparison with the period between 1990 and 
                                                          
18
 Supra PRUSA 603. 
19
 DE BIEVRE & ECKHARDT. The Political Economy of Anti-Dumping Reform” European Centre for International 
Political Economy, ECIPE. Working Paper No. 3/2010 p. 3. 
20
 MESSERLIN P. “Measuring the Costs of Protection in Europe: European Commercial Policy in the 2000s”. The 
Peterson Institute for International Economics. Washington D.C.  
21
 Statistics are drawn from the WTO website: www.wto.orgby AntiDumpingPublishing.com: 
http://www.antidumpingpublishing.com/info/Free-Resources/Anti-Dumping-Statistics.aspx 
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199422. Developing countries have been responsible for greatest significant part of 
this increase23.The massive rate of increase in the number of measures imposed by 
developing countries, compared to the increase in the measures imposed by 
developed countries, is all the more proof that developing countries have become 
active users of anti-dumping in the first twelve years of the WTO24. Even though the 
trade remedies were carefully negotiated between the countries to give them certain 
prerogatives, their original purpose was never to render null the tariff reduction or 
become an obstacle to trade, less so to be a protectionist tool for national authorities 
against foreign competitors. 
1.3 Relevance 
The nullification and impairment tool has been left out of use for different reasons25. 
After the Uruguay Round and the establishment of the WTO as a formal institution, 
its applicability became more arcane and difficult. An enquiry of its interpretation and 
its possible applicability to one of the most sensitive areas of trade remedies can 
shed light not only on the correct interpretation of Article XXIII of GATT, but also 
provide a tool to improve the current situation of anti-dumping in international trade.  
The analysis of Art XXII and the Anti-Dumping agreement have always been 
pursued by the academy separately. In other words, there is limited literature on the 
interpretation of Article XXIII and abundant writings on the application and effects of 
anti-dumping measures in international trade. However there have not been 
sufficient attempts to spot points where the provision in Article XXIII can be applied 
to anti-dumping measures, regardless of whether they are compliant with the Anti-
Dumping Agreement or not.  
                                                          
22
YILMAZ M. “Trends in the use of Anti-Dumping measures during the first twelve years of the World Trade 
Organization” Available at www.mfa.gov.tr/data/Kutuphane/.../dergi-%20AD%20trends.pdf p. 9. 
23
 Supra YILMAZ p.9. 
24
 Supra YILMAZ p.9. 
25
 Caution in the interpretation and application of the provision has been suggested in the Panel Reports 
(Japan-Film para. 10.36) where it is suggested that Art XXIII is treated as an exceptional measure giving 
deference to the agreements actively made by the Members, and in the academic literature because of the 
dangers that it poses as an easy escape from the obligations imposed by the General Agreement. (See supra 
PESCATORE P.). 
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This raises questions about the application of remedies contained in the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, and what exact benefits are acquired by Member States that 
could be claimed in a hypothetical nullification and impairment complaint in WTO 
litigation. Those questions have been addressed extensively in this study and some 
conclusions have been singled out in application of the ut res magis valeat quam 
pereat principle. The anti-dumping law and application of it in the four most important 
emergent economies is studied in detail in order to draw some relevant conclusions 
from the regulations and practices in connection with the applicability of Article XXIII. 
Also, besides the application of Article XXIII in the Anti-Dumping Agreement in the 
current status quo, a hypothetical interpretation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in a 
broader scenario where there are more considerations of competitions in 
international trade is taken into account. The Anti-Dumping Agreement as an 
expression of specific reciprocity is analysed and the possibility of an economic 
constitution that guides the actions of the WTO is explored.  
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II. INTERPRETATION, SCOPE, CASE LAW, HISTORICAL REVIEW, EVOLUTION 
AND CURRENT STATE OF ARTICLE XXIII. 
 
Every legal system has developed guidelines to interpret the law and the system of 
international law is no exception26. Interpretation, as a holistic exercise intended to 
understand the rules has been defined as: … ―one integrated operation which uses 
several tools simultaneously to shed light from different angles on the interpreted 
text; these tools should not be seen as watertight compartments, or a series of 
separate sub operations but, rather, as connecting (even overlapping) and mutually 
reinforcing parts of a whole, of a continuum or a continuous and multifaceted 
process that cannot be reduced to a mechanical operation and which partakes as 
much of art (the art of judgment), as of science,(the science of law)”27. 
The interpretation of the WTO provisions in a holistic approach is even more 
significant because of the binding idea of single undertaking, where the agreement is 
accepted as a whole despite its possible contradictions in terms and tone due to the 
different times and conditions in which the different WTO agreements were 
concluded. Therefore the interpretation of the WTO agreements cannot be 
mechanical, not only due to the very nature of the WTO agreements as described 
above, but also because the principles of interpretation of international law contain 
an inherent mandate of judicial creativity. In other words, the principles of 
interpretation of international law help understand why a rule is to be given one 
interpretation and not another28. 
There are a number of schools of thought that give heavier weight to a particular 
aspect of the interpretation process which results in different outcomes from the 
same provisions. A number of their ideas are pondered by the GATT panels and the 
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Appellate Body in the interpretation of Article XXIII, especially regarding literal 
interpretation. Some academics have also approached other schools of 
interpretation to provide functionality to the provision. Nonetheless, literal 
interpretation is the starting point in conformity with the structure provided by the 
Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties. 
The Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties has been a stable source of 
interpretation guidelines and it must be used in order to interpret international 
agreements in which the WTO agreements are included. The Vienna Convention of 
Law of Treaties was, in fact, a codification of the customary international law that 
was drafted in 1969 and entered into force in 1980. Since the bases of the Vienna 
Convention are not only the uses of customary international law but also general 
principles of law, it is considered that even though some countries have not yet 
adhered to it, they are still bound by its substantial content29. 
The meaning of the provisions to be interpreted is put under the test of the plain 
meaning of the words. That is endorsed by Article 31 of the Vienna Convention30 on 
the law of treaties which gives priority to this method of literal interpretation31. In the 
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words of the Appellate Body: a “treaty interpreter must begin with and focus upon, 
the text of the particular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that 
provision; read in their context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to 
the treaty must first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text is equivocal 
or inconclusive, or where confirmation of correctness of the reading of the text itself 
is desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may usefully be 
sought”32. 
This follows the logic that words have an ordinary meaning which should be plain 
and that this language is determined enough to allow an objective interpretation. The 
understanding of the words having a plain meaning is widespread amongst the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body which frequently uses the dictionary as a primary tool to 
interpret the meaning of the words33. 
This method of interpretation is favoured both in national and international ambits as 
it is understood by both legal and linguistics experts that within the boundaries of any 
given language, the literal meaning of the terms is in itself a constraint to further 
interpretation34. However it is essential to take into account that the meaning of the 
terms in legal provisions relies in great part on the context of creation and application 
of the normative proposition. In other words, the clarity of the text is linked not only to 
the meaning of the words, but to the common use of those words in the specific 
context where they are to be used.  
Indeed, what makes the words clear or unambiguous is not their actual linguistic 
meaning but the meaning of the context in which they are used. In other words, the 
text is clear not because the meaning is uncontroversial but because the text is 
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uncontested35. In fact, it is a fallacy to state that there are self-explanatory words that 
require no interpretation. If the meaning of a given word seems so evident that it 
does not require any interpretation, it probably means that the interpreter is so 
immersed in the contextual setting that he does not perceive the act of 
understanding as an interpretive act; the context is so deeply assumed that it 
becomes invisible to the observer36. 
Also, legal rules must be flexible so that they can adapt to social changes without 
becoming obsolete. Not accepting this would lead to a rigid understanding of the 
norms; a strict and literal understanding of the rules that gives great prevalence to 
formalism may lead to absurd outcomes in adjudication. 
 
2.1 Interpretation and Construction. 
The interpretation of GATT and other rules contained in the WTO agreements is 
influenced by different legal traditions and it is fed by the interpretation taking place 
at the Panels and Appellate Body as well as by the numerous discussions taking 
place in academic scenarios. Some of the interpretation methods have their origin in 
long standing systems of law applied in national States; while many of the features of 
the WTO norms are configured according to the Public International Law system.  
The complexity in the interpretation of WTO rules is related to its exceptional 
structure in the context of international law. In principle, the WTO could be defined 
as the institutional host of a set International Public law agreements focused on the 
specific subject matter of trade.  
The structure of the WTO is not a structure of checks and balances like many 
national systems that implement a constitutional democracy. Instead, it is a 
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hierarchical structure37. In this structure, the Ministerial Conference is composed by 
representatives of all the membership and has a legislative position stands at the top 
of the system. The General Council is also representative of all members and it has 
the functions of Dispute Settlement Body and of Trade Policy Review Body. In its 
function as a Dispute Settlement Body, the General Council has, formally, a judicial 
role. Finally, the Secretariat has an administrative role which derives its powers from 
the Director General, who in turn obtains his duties and role definition from the 
Ministerial Conference38. Its unique structure influences theinterpretation of rules in 
the WTO agreementsto a certain extent. 
Due to the strength of the Dispute Settlement Body as main interpreter of the WTO 
law, it is important to establish how this role compares to other judicial bodies, what 
are the similarities and differences with national systems and with Public 
International Law models of adjudication, and what their scope of action is. 
Understanding what the WTO adjudication body can do in terms of normative 
interpretation, will allow a realistic view of the potential applicability of Art XXIII to the 
WTO agreements, and more precisely to the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
 
2.1.1 Interpretation in national law systems, public international law and WTO Law. 
Within the world of legal interpretation, since the very beginning of the adjudication 
activity, there has been a dichotomy in opinion about what the scope of action of the 
judges should be in respect of the written regulation39. From the definition of the 
concept of ―interpretation‖ there are disagreements throughout the history of law. On 
the one hand, to interpret is understood by academics as the mere logical operation 
aimed to reveal the meaning of the norm40. On the other hand, many jurists – led by 
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Hans Kelsen – faithful to the Germanic attitude to the influence of the will in all 
actions generating legal consequences, consider interpretation as a complex judicial 
process of creating individual norms within the frame established by a more general 
norm contained in the written provision41.  
Civil law 
Customarily, the continental tradition of civil law has been inclined to favour the literal 
interpretation of statutes and regulations due to their extensively codified system. 
According to this tendency, each judge should be able to apply his mind to the facts, 
connect them to the law and arrive at a reasonable conclusion able to withstand a 
validity test. This opinion is justified in two main arguments. Firstly, the legislative 
organ undergoes a long process to deliver a regulation that has been subject to 
debate, thorough analysis and consensus; thus the volition of the legislative organ is 
expressed in the words of the text and it is not the task of the judges to modify what 
the legislator has put together after such a tortuous process. To admit otherwise 
would imply that the judges have also had conferred the prerogative of effective 
legislators.  
The previous argument corresponds to the primitive concept of exegesis, born in 
France during the XIX century when the Civil Law System aimed to reach completion 
through adopting exhaustive codification of the areas of higher socio–legal impact 
and a set of general principles applicable to all non-regulated situations. 
Furthermore, interpretation rules were created in an attempt to solve possible 
antinomies and fill eventual lacunae, thus reducing the possibility of judicial law-
making to the minimum yet not extinguishing it completely. The specific method of 
exegesis was strongly criticised for its rigidity and excessive tribute to formality. It 
was eventually softened and replaced by milder methods of interpretation that varied 
in form and style, but did not abandon the fundamental definition of interpretation 
and its conceptual limitation. 
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Secondly, the independence of the judiciary and of each individual judge to act with 
discretion, limited only by the actual positive law, is a value in this system of law. The 
stare decisis is regarded as overly restrictive of that discretionary understanding that 
the positive law is already imposing clear limits to the adjudication. If the written 
norm is the limit, any other restraint would imply an underestimation of the lesser 
judges‘ ability to produce valid and reasonable decisions42 independently (i.e. to 
apply the norm to the facts as a mere logical operation). 
The WTO as a mixed system displays features from the civil law despite not being a 
civil law system itself. This is because the civil law is one of the ―building blocks‖43 of 
the system to which the WTO belongs. One feature from the civil law system that 
can be observed in the WTO configuration is the fact that binding codifications on 
trade law are created by the membership in anticipation of the need for regulations44. 
The binding effect of the approved agreements is important because it means that all 
existing provisions are subject to application. The treaties derive their efficacy from 
their validity as they were discussed and agreed upon by all members. In the event 
of anomies, it is the duty of the judiciary to resolve them without rendering void the 
content of any provision in force at the time of adjudication.  
From the perspective of application of WTO law into the domestic systems of the civil 
law tradition, adjudication is bound to the existing domestic laws and should be done 
under the light of the pacta sunt servanda principle. Therefore, from the perspective 
of the Member States, the interpretation of domestic rules can be made in 
accordance with the doctrine of consistent interpretation45 which establishes that 
when national rules allow for different interpretations, the interpretation that is 
consistent with international obligations. This assists Member States to comply with 
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the obligations acquired through the signature of the WTO Agreements, and to 
incorporate WTO law into their national law through judicial interpretation.  
The application of the rule of consistent interpretation is deemed feasible regardless 
of the monist or dualist nature of the national system46. This is particularly useful for 
countries of Civil Law tradition that do not have codified or sufficiently detailed trade 
law regimes, because they can benefit from the abundance and detail of WTO rules, 
to define the content of rights and obligations47 in their trade law disputes. In other 
words, the application of the rule of consistent interpretation allows national judges to 
access the WTO ―codifications‖ in all the cases where they are compatible with 
domestic law. 
Common Law 
Conversely, common law has been closer to the idea that adjudication is a process 
of law making. This is an obvious consequence of the system‘s configuration and 
evolution. In this type of system very general bills and acts were produced as a 
framework for higher judges to set up principles and rules upon solution of specific 
cases. Those decisions were vested with triplicate binding effects. In other words, 
the principles outlined by higher courts are binding inter partes, becoming obligatory 
to the lower judges in a similar way that positive law is binding to judges in the 
continental systems – as rules – and they also have erga omnes effects. This 
phenomenon has been extrapolated to the majority of the modern constitutional 
systems where constitutional courts or constitutional review has been introduced in 
the already established high courts48 without regard to the legal tradition of the 
adopting countries. Judicial independence was guaranteed, according to the 
common law architects, by providing immediate endorsement of judicial decisions 
when the facts accommodated themselves to the rules created in binding precedent. 
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Also, a collateral benefit was the dissociation of the judges from political vacillations 
and undue influences in their reasoning, even when adjudicating in unstable 
environments.  
As the lacunae in the common law system were filled by judicial decisions and the 
passage of time demanded specific positive regulation of certain topics, the common 
law system reached completion mostly through precedent and residually through 
statutory legislation. General principles were also decanted from the jurisprudence 
and a hierarchy of interpretation was derived, not from a statutory provision, but from 
the very structure of the judiciary. The precedent system serves the purpose of a 
non-codified exhaustive regulation of all areas of legal relevance whilst keeping the 
possibility open of solving antinomies and giving plenitude to the system when a 
concrete case poses the opportunity to do so. 
It is possible to observe common law characteristics in the structure of the WTO as 
an institution hosting a legal system under the framework of a number of treaties. 
The system of law taking place at the WTO has been considered a mixed system for 
which the common law is a ―building block‖. Two of the most prominent features of 
common law that can be encountered at the WTO are firstly ad hoc agreements 
created to solve specific problems without taking into account all implications in the 
context in which they will be applied49. This is a common law situation generated in 
great part by the limited scope of the WTO, which narrows the subject matters that 
can be approached by the Agreements and the adjudication bodies. This limited 
approach leaves out of the calculations and considerations key stakeholders that 
may be affected by the application of the agreements50. On the other hand, this 
approach allows the organisation to be manageable at an international level where 
there is decreasing concentration of hegemonic power in one single country and 
there is a multiplicity of contradicting interests at stake. 
Secondly, de facto reliance on judicial precedent is one of the practices of the WTO 
dispute resolution bodies. Although judicial decisions are secondary to treaty law 
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according to the ICJ statute, the WTO system of dispute resolution is permanently 
informed by judicial precedent, establishing a strong jurisprudential binding effect51.  
 
Public International Law 
International law is a body of norms applicable between sovereign states and other 
entities with international personality (status acknowledged by the international 
community). Those norms are prescriptive propositions formulated as hypothetical 
imperatives52, which means that they are potentially capable of enforcement through 
sanctions, providing the existence of an executive institutional facility of sorts. 
 
The system of public international law is significantly younger than the systems of 
national law. It is therefore naturally less complete and its enforceability not yet a 
material reality. This means that the provisions of international public law, for being 
practically unenforceable (or appreciably harder to enforce than national laws) does 
not have the fundamental attribute of the norms, i.e. the ability to promote, 
discourage and modify human actions by providing legal consequences to 
hypothetical factual premises.  
 
In the system of Public International Law there are different theories of interpretation. 
The most salient and contrasting are the positivistic theory and the counter 
positivistic theories which vary in their tone and radical separation from the 
positivistic approach. As the system of public international law was being 
constructed, and from its early roots, it has been equated to the natural law. The 
Romans called it ius gentium or law of peoples, as opposed to the ius civile, the civil 
law intended to serve the Roman citizens, and from there on it has been understood 
as natural law. Only in modern times has public international law attempted to get 
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codified by means of treaties and international agreements of all kinds53 and by the 
acceptance of the international customary law as binding.  
 
Legal positivism has been defined in relation to the existence of the law. John Austin 
stresses that …The existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another. 
Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an 
assumed standard, is a different enquiry54. According to Bentham and Austin, law is 
a phenomenon of large communities that have a sovereign. A sovereign is a specific 
person or group of persons who have supreme and absolute de facto power. The 
laws in that community are fractions or divisions of the sovereign's commands which 
in turn are general orders applicable to certain actions and types of people and that 
can be enforced by the coactions of a ―sanction‖55.This theory identifies the existence 
of legal systems with patterns of command and obedience that can be ascertained 
without considering whether the sovereign has a moral right to rule or whether his 
commands have substantial merits of deontological foundation to be binding; and 
that is why it is called positivistic.  
 
Two other features are characteristic of the positivistic theory. Firstly, it is considered 
a monistic theory inasmuch as it represents all laws as having a single form which is 
an imperative that imposes obligations on all subjects except for the sovereign56. 
Legal positivism accepts that legislative power may be self-limiting, or limited 
externally by what public opinion will tolerate, and also that legal systems contain 
provisions that are not imperatives (for example, permissions, definitions, and so on). 
However these other imperatives are considered as pertaining to the non-legal 
material that is necessary for, and part of, every legal system.  
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Amongst the positivists, there are different degrees of adherence to this position 
some, like Austin, are more liberal about it. Secondly, legal positivism is considered 
a reductivist theory, because it affirms that the normative language used in 
describing and stating the law – talk of authority, rights, obligations, and so on – can 
all be analysed without remainder in non-normative terms, ultimately as chains of 
statements about power and obedience57. 
 
In the twentieth century it was attempted to include the theory of legal positivism into 
international law unsuccessfully. Further attempts to use positivistic interpretation in 
international law have failed because of the material incapacity of legal positivism to 
explain why international law is binding58. This view evolved to the understanding 
that the system of international law is a simplified form of social structure only with 
primary rules of obligation. This, however, does not explain why international law is 
binding and includes only the concepts of Custom and Treaties, leaving the General 
Principles of Law59 out of the coverage of the positivistic view of public international 
law. 
 
On the other hand, the non-positivistic theory of interpretation mirrors the 
international law to the national laws and concludes that they are similar in their 
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construction as systems with primary and secondary rules60, and this evidence of the 
level of sophistication of the system refuted the idea that the public international law 
was a simplified system. As for the idea of the impossibility of enforcing decisions 
made in the international tribunals, there is positive evidence that despite not having 
the conventional coactive approach used in the nations, the decisions made by 
international tribunals of different natures are in most cases adopted and complied 
with. Also, the jurisprudence shaped by the international tribunals is followed in the 
countries as binding, so this argument, despite its formal validity, is contested by the 
overwhelming evidence against it.  
 
 
 
WTO Law – principles and structure 
 
The WTO as the institution in charge of trade provides a specialised international law 
sub-ordinance. Contrary to common misunderstanding, the WTO treaty is just one 
branch of the bigger tree of public international law. The WTO is not some purely 
economic construct or private club where trade concessions are exchanged. The 
WTO, and the disciplines it imposes on its Members, is based on an international 
treaty. This treaty is, in and of itself, and like all other treaties between states, part of 
public international law61.  
 
The WTO features several characteristics of Public International Law. For example, 
its model of adjudication is similar to the traditional models of international 
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adjudication in the fact that it is only granted to States62 as opposed to individuals 
and its rulings do not have direct effect in the legal Systems of the Members63. 
 
However and despite being part of the system of public international law, the WTO 
has some special characteristics that set it apart from the rest of the international 
organisations. Some of those special characteristics are: 
 
- Strong administrative support by a permanent structure in the secretariat, and a 
body of panelists that can provide adjudication of matters presented to the WTO 
within the time frame established in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, the DSU. 
Some international public law institutions have administrative structures, but the 
combination of a fairly small administrative body and a strong adjudicating structure 
is unique to the WTO. 
 
- A Dispute Settlement mechanism that is automatic and compulsory. Under the 
Dispute Settlement understanding, a Dispute Settlement Body composed of panel 
and Appellate Body, adjudicates the trade disputes amongst the Member States. A 
member may invoke the compulsory jurisdiction of the Dispute Settlement Body by 
requesting the conformation of a panel in order to settle a dispute64. Moreover, there 
is a right to appeal the decision of the panel. The Appellate Body solves questions 
regarding the content and meaning of the WTO agreements, and some of them raise 
important international law issues65.  
 
- An enforcement system based on retaliatory sanctions instead of compensation. 
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- The WTO concept is largely a process of ―negative integration66‖, setting out 
negative prohibitions (―thou shalt not‖ discriminate, impose quotas, etc.)67. The WTO 
does not generally impose positive obligations on its members, for example, to grant 
a certain amount of market access, to have certain policies in place or to achieve 
certain minimum standards (with the notable exception of the TRIPS Agreement). 
This makes ensuring compliance with WTO rules (basically, prohibitions of certain 
things) easier than ensuring compliance with many other rules of public international 
law where a positive obligation of result or achieving certain minimum standards is 
imposed68. 
 
Despite those unique features, the WTO is subject to the rules of public international 
law for the interpretation of the WTO agreements and to other public international 
law principles that apply on the creation, application and interpretation of the existent 
and new WTO rules and procedures. In the area of interpretation, the Appellate Body 
has accepted that there is a need to clarify the meaning of the WTO agreements by 
reference to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties even though 
some of the members of the WTO are not parties of the Vienna Convention. The 
Appellate Body has explained that the Vienna Convention is applicable to all the 
WTO membership, not as a treaty to which the parties are signatories, but as a 
codification of binding customary international law69.  
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It is in this regard that negative integration devices, such as those in the WTO that may be used to strike down 
domestic regulatory regimes, may create demand for positive integration devices, such as those associated 
with majority voting. Deregulation through negative integration may create demand for re-regulation at the 
central level through majority-voting-based legislative capacity.” TRACHTMAN J. “The Constitutions of the 
WTO”. Eur J Int Law (2006) 17 (3): 623-646. Available at 
http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/17/3/623.full#sec-4 
68
Supra PAWELYN 2002. 
69
WT/DS2/9/AB/R United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, adopted 20 May 
1996, para. 23. See also CAMERON  GRAY 2001. 
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Flowing from the Vienna Convention, another principle of interpretation in public 
international law that is applicable to the WTO is the principle of ut res magis valeat 
quam pereator the principle of effectiveness. This principle means that the norms 
must be read with an interpretation that gives effect and meaning to the provision. 
The Appellate Body has expressed that ―a fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation 
emerging from the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 is the principle of 
effectiveness‖70. This is important in the process of understanding of the WTO 
agreements which are also supposed to be interpreted under the principle of Single 
Undertaking, which makes the task to apply the principle of effectiveness a very 
delicate one, as the effectiveness in full of one provision may mean the elimination of 
another one, which is equally valid and applicable.  
 
A third principle of international law that becomes a tool for interpretation of the WTO 
agreements in the principle of in dubio mitius71, or deference to the sovereignty of the 
states when there is doubt in international adjudication72. This principle has been 
applied extensively by WTO Panels and Appellate Body73. 
 
                                                          
70
 "*o+ne of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation 
must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that 
would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility Supra US- 
Reformulated Gasoline, para. 23. See also, WT/DS8/AB/R WT/DS10/AB/R WT/DS11/AB/R. Japan - Taxes on 
Alcoholic Beverages 1996. 
71
In Dubio Mitius means that the interpreter should chose the meaning which is the least restrictive on the 
sovereignty of the parties, if the term to be interpreted has different meanings. KRAJEWSKI M. “National 
Regulation and Trade Liberalization in Services: The Legal Impact of the General Agreement of Trade in 
Services (GATS) on National Regulatory Autonomy. KLUWER Law International. 2003. p. 50. 
72
 The Permanent Court of Justice defined this principle explaining that if the wording of a treaty or a provision 
is not clear, in choosing between several admissible interpretations, the one which involves the minimum of 
obligations for the parties should be adopted. See Frontier Between Turkey and Iraq 1925, Series B, No. 12 at 
25. See also CAMERON  GRAY 2001.  
73
 In WT/DS26/AB/R EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products Beef Hormones adopted 13
th
 Feb 
1998,para 165; the Appellate Body accepted the applicability of the in dubio mitius principle in deference to 
the sovereignty of the States. In WT/DS108/AB/R United States, Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations, 
adopted in 2000,para 179; the Appellate Body recognized the sovereign right of every country to decide on its 
taxation regulations. Other cases where the sovereignty of the Members has been upheld are: WT/DS8/AB/R 
WT/DS10/AB/R WT/DS11/AB/R. Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 1996 and WT/DS2/9/AB/R United States 
- Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 1996. 
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Despite being the most sophisticated of the international public law structures, the 
WTO has a scope of action limited to trade74, and a restrictive body of regulations75 
that can be used in eventual conflicts within the framed trade operational area. This 
is relevant because with the existing rules, the system is incomplete and ambiguous, 
which means that the role of the adjudicating bodies, and especially of the Appellate 
Body, is stronger due to the current incompleteness of the system76. 
Following the argumentative logic described above, a more complete system 
requires less judicial intervention and the same is valid vice versa. The extensive 
requirement for judicial intervention in the WTO is naturally conceded; the remaining 
questions are then which methods are ideal, and where the limits of this intervention 
must be drawn. 
WTO Law - Interpretation and Precedent  
WTO interpretation starts from the rules established by the membership in different 
agreements which have a binding effect in DSU, which as administered by the DSB 
contains the ―hard law‖ of the WTO agreements and includes rules of 
implementation, interpretation and also it includes substantive rules77. Following the 
DSU, and in the events where there is textual ambiguity78, the DSB acts as part of 
                                                          
74
 About the limitations of the WTO with regards of subject matter see WT/DS58/AB/R WTO Appellate Body 
Report on U.S. - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, November, 1998). 
75
GATT and WTO agreements. 
76
 About the issue of completeness of the system: “Increased legalization led members to specify with greater 
detail aspects of the trade contract. Still, gaps and ambiguities remained, often a result of an inability to agree 
on details. This ambiguity posed a challenge to the new judicial system established in the WTO. Consistent with 
a view taken by many national judicial bodies, the WTO Appellate Body has seen its mandate as clarifying and 
ensuring the completeness of WTO law. The result has been a new judicial culture in the WTO that favours 
making law--a role for the Appellate Body far different from what was expected by its creators.” See BARTON 
JH, GOLDSTEIN JL, JOSLING TE &STEINBERG RH (Eds). “The evolution of the Trade Regime”. Princeton 
University Press. 2009. pp. 16-24. 
77
MERCURIO & TYAGI. “Treat Interpretation in WTO Dispute Settlement: The Outstanding Question of the 
Legality of Local Working Requirements. Minnesota Journal of International Law. Vol. 19:2. 2010 p. 277 
78
 Textual ambiguity can occur either because of the very diverse nature of each of the agreements composing 
the “package deal of the WTO”. Ambiguity in the agreements can also be a purposeful strategy by the treaty                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
drafters in order to in order to reach agreements between parties with different inclinations without 
completely compromising their respective mandates. See Supra MERCURIO & TYAGI. p. 278 
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the judiciary79 of the WTO by endorsing the interpretations and clarifications 
contained in the reports of the Panels and the Appellate Body. 
In a specific dispute, the Panels and Appellate body have the duty to elucidate and 
indicate the actual meaning and application of the provisions contained in the 
different treaties where the meaning of the provisions or their interaction is obscure. 
In strict sense, the reports of the panels and Appellate Body are binding for the 
parties only80, yet they are still an important (and, to a certain extent mandatory), 
interpretative resource of WTO rules81 in cases with similar facts and similar 
questions of law.  
The course of performance so far has demonstrated that in the pursuit of certainty 
and stability of the WTO system, judicial precedent has been applied in different 
cases. This has contributed to the construction of a strong body of law that gives 
legal reasoning prevalence over political considerations82. Therefore, even though 
reports are strictly binding inter-partes, the practice has demonstrated that they are 
an authoritative precedent. 
The practice of following the precedent established by previous reports is customary 
in the WTO. Customary does not necessarily mean in this case that it becomes part 
of customary international law, but that once the precedent has been followed on a 
single point of law, legitimate expectations are created amongst the membership and 
                                                          
79
 In the sense that it is not acting as a political decision maker, but merely endorsing the adjudicating work of 
the panels or the Appellate Body. 
80
 On the question about the erga omnes binding effect of Adopted Reports, the Appellate Body in report No. 
WT/DS11/AB/R Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (p. 14) established as follows: “We do not believe that the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES, in deciding to adopt a panel report, intended that their decision would constitute a 
definitive interpretation of the relevant provisions of GATT 1947. Nor do we believe that this is contemplated 
under GATT 1994. There is specific cause for this conclusion in the WTO Agreement. Article IX: 2 of the WTO 
Agreement provides: "The Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to 
adopt interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements". Article IX: 2 provides 
further that such decisions "shall be taken by a three-fourths majority of the Members". The fact that such an 
"exclusive authority" in interpreting the treaty has been established so specifically in the WTO Agreement is 
reason enough to conclude that such authority does not exist by implication or by inadvertence elsewhere”.  
81
PAWELYN J. “Conflict of Norms in Public International Law”. Cambridge University Press. 2008. p. 46. 
82
 CHUA A. “Precedent and Principles of WTO panel Jurisprudence”. Berkeley Journal of International Law. V. 
16. 1998. p. 173. 
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thus, the precedent needs to be taken into account in the solution of subsequent 
cases83.  
Furthermore, the Appellate Body has established that in absence of a justifiable 
reasoning against the established position on a point of law, it shall stand as of 
mandatory application84. Even though stare decisis is not applied in strict sense in 
the WTO it can be said that a de facto85 precedent has been established and it must 
be followed until a reasonable justification is presented by the Appellate Body to 
change the existing reasoning on a point of law. This means that the panels are 
expected86 to take into account the reasoning on legal matters87 contained in 
previous Appellate Body reports. 
The precedent created by the Appellate Body reports is limited to the reasoning on 
points of law and excludes recommendations and specific decisions taken to solve 
individual disputes88. This means that the Appellate Body reasoning in adopted 
                                                          
83 “Adopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are often considered by subsequent 
panels. They create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into 
account where they are relevant to any dispute. However, they are not binding, except with respect to resolving 
the particular dispute between the parties to that dispute.”WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R,WT/DS11/AB/R. 
Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II. Paras. 107-108. 
84
WT/DS/344/AB/RUS anti-dumping measures and designed stainless steel“(...) absent cogent reasons, an 
adjudicating body will resolve the same legal questions in the same way in subsequent cases”. Para 160. 
85
FOLTEA M. “International Organizations in WTO Dispute Settlement: How Much Institutional Sensitivity? 
Cambridge University Press. Nov 2012. P138. For a comprehensive discussion on this matter see BHALA R. “The 
Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy)” Journal of Translational  
Law 9- 1999. pp. 1-151. 
86
 This is confirmed in the Appellate Body report WT/DS58/AB/R, US- Shrimp, paras 107 to 109 when indicating 
that panels are correct to use previous Appellate Body reasoning in the construction of their reports “...Indeed 
we would have expected the Panel to do so. The Panel had necessarily to consider our views, as we had 
overruled certain aspects of the findings of the original panel on this issue, and, more important, had provided 
interpretative guidance for future panels, such as the Panel in this case”. [Emphasis added]. 
87
 DAVID F. “The Role of Precedent in WTO Law- New Horizons” Maastricht Faculty of Law- Working Paper 
2009-12. 2009. p. 6. 
88
 While there is no stare decisis rule, the panel’s reasoning should have enough persuasive weight to convince 
future panels to apply the reasoning on clarified points of law. “The report of a panel or the Appellate Body 
also relates to that specific matter in the dispute between these Members. Even if adopted, the reports of 
panels and the Appellate Body are not binding precedents for other disputes between the same parties on 
other matters or different parties on the same matter, even though the same questions of WTO law might 
arise. As in other areas of international law, there is no rule of stare decisis in WTO dispute settlement 
according to which previous rulings bind panels and the Appellate Body in subsequent cases. This means that a 
panel is not obliged to follow previous Appellate Body reports even if they have developed a certain 
interpretation of exactly the provisions which are now at issue before the panel. Nor is the Appellate Body 
obliged to maintain the legal interpretations it has developed in past cases. The Appellate Body has confirmed 
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reports over matters of law is presumed to have already considered the rules of 
customary rules of interpretation of international law89 and done the interpretation 
process in good faith according to the ordinary meaning of the words in the context 
of the specific treaty and taking into account their object and purpose90. 
The existence of this presumption gives Appellate Body decisions a strong 
persuasive power, because the Appellate Body‘s task of clarifying points of law 
serves the purpose of giving predictability and stability to a system which is 
intrinsically ambiguous91. However, this does not mean that the WTO jurisprudence 
is immovable; instead it means that the practice has created a process to change the 
established jurisprudence.  
In that process, the panels are subject to the Appellate Body reports in all matters of 
law, but the Appellate Body can depart from its own precedent, should it find ―cogent 
reasons‖92 to do so. Cogent reasons do not yet have a technical and all comprising 
definition. Therefore, the possibility of finding and justifying reasons to depart from 
the existent precedent is open for the Appellate Body. By allowing itself to depart 
from its own precedent presenting cogent reasons, the Appellate Body kept the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
that conclusions and recommendations in panel reports adopted under GATT 1947 bound the parties to the 
particular dispute, but that subsequent panels were not legally bound by the details and reasoning of a 
previous panel report.” Dispute Settlement System Module. Ch. 7 Legal effect of panel and appellate body 
reports and DSB recommendations and rulings. 7.2 Legal Status of adopted/unadopted reports in other 
disputes. Available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c7s2p1_e.htm  
89
 As established by Art 3.2 of the DSU.  
90
According to Art 31(1) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
91
 In WT/DS350/AB/R United States – Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, para. 306, 
a member of the Appellate Body made a statement explaining the complexity of the interpretative task at the 
level of the Appellate Body and indirectly explaining why the clarifications given in the reports are key for the 
system’s stability: “The interpretation of the covered agreements requires scrupulous adherence to the 
disciplines of the customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Those disciplines are directed 
towards arriving at a coherent and harmonious interpretation to develop an answer to an interpretative 
problem and thereby provide certainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties. Variability, contradiction, 
and uncertainty stalk the interpretative enterprise, but they are the hallmarks of its failure, not its success. Just 
as the interpreter of a treaty strives for coherence, there is an inevitable recognition that a treaty bears the 
imprint of many hands. And what is left behind is a text, sometimes negotiated to a point where an agreement 
to regulate a matter could only be reached on the basis of constructive ambiguity, carrying both the hopes and 
fears of the parties. Interpretation is an endeavour to discern order, notwithstanding these infirmities, without 
adding to or diminishing the rights and obligations of the parties”. 
92
Supra Japan Alcoholic Beverages II para 160. 
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freedom of revising, and modifying its own reasoning when it considers it 
proportionate, necessary, reasonable and appropriate93. 
 
The open ended contract theory: Article XXIII 
Because the WTO agreements are not implicit social contracts (as national legal 
systems are), but can be treated as contracts in a strict sense94, it is plausible to 
consider all the WTO agreements as open-ended contracts in which rules of specific 
content are either reached by consensus or, when that is not possible, by using legal 
reasoning techniques in the understanding that the positive norms in the agreements 
set out general dogmatic rules (programmatic agreements) with a broad meaning for 
the judges to complete with case related organic rules (factual premise/legal 
consequence)95 in their judgments96.  
 
Rules vs. Standards: Wording of the WTO agreements 
The previous statement presupposes that when the agreements do not exhaust the 
regulatory needs to govern trade situations, they are not rules in strict sense as they 
lack a clear factual condition and a specific consequence. Instead, they are seen as 
guidelines or standards to be aimed for in each judgment97. Other standards of 
public international law are also acceptable as reference points for the sake of 
                                                          
93
Supra VAN DAMME p. 199. 
94
 International agreements cannot be called contracts in strict sense. However, because of the fact that they 
are concluded between de iure equals they have been treated like de facto contracts. In this regard, the US 
Supreme Court has been strongly inclined to understand treaties as contracts as opposed to understanding 
them legislative acts.  It has interpreted that “treaty interpretation is different from statutory interpretation 
because treaties are contracts, not acts of legislation”. MAHONEY C. “Treaties as Contracts: Textualism, 
Contract Theory and Interpretation of Treaties” The Yale Law Journal. Vol. 116, No. 4 (Jan., 2007). P. 829 et ss.  
95
 Some of the aspects that are taken into account when interpreting international agreements as contracts 
come from the theory of contracts such as Good Faith, Course of Performance and prevention of extrinsic 
elements for the  further construction of the terms of the agreement. See Supra MAHONEY C. pp 849-851. 
96
KIM D-W. “Non-Violation Complaints in WTO Law: Theory and Practice” Studies in Global Economic Law. 
Peter Lang. Berne. 2006. p. 102. 
97
 On Rules and Standards see “Rules and Standards in International Law” New York University. 2003. p. 10 . 
See also KAPLOW L “ Rules vs. Standards an economic analysis” Duke Law Journal Vol 42. 1992. pp 557-624. 
Available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3207&context=dlj  
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argumentative strength and logic and to ensure a steady jurisprudential precedent is 
constructed with regular ratio decidendi/obiter dicta structures to allow the extraction 
of rules in a systematic manner. That exercise has been labelled as constructivism, 
and seems adequate for the WTO adjudication process given the abovementioned 
circumstances. 
So far it is not clear whether the Non-Violation claim is an appropriate tool to defeat 
anti-dumping measures acting as a trade barrier by affecting international 
competition98, but it is possible to conclude that the provision is applicable in that 
unique situation. The onus lies on the complainant who would need to provide proof 
of the following: 
 Impaired or nullified GATT benefit (non-tariff trade barrier). 
 Anti-dumping measure with anti-competitive aim. 
 Causal Link. 
Further development of these requirements, their validity as precedent and possible 
interpretations will provide a substantial and thorough understanding of the 
nullification and impairment provision to the Anti-Dumping Agreement in a sensible 
way for both the specific agreement and free trade as a desirable goal. 
Despite these considerations, it must be remarked that the WTO jurisprudence has 
been inclined to literal interpretation, as it has been considered a source99 of security 
                                                          
98
 The obscurity rests in the fact that few further regulations expand on the scope of application of the norm, 
i.e. the DSU and the understanding of Art XXIV (applicability of Art XXIII with respect to restrictive measures 
taken for balance of payment purposes and matters related to customs unions, free trade areas or interim 
agreements leading to the formation of the latter. See ROESSLER F. “The institutional Balance of WTO” in 
BRONCKERS (Ed.) “New Directions in International Economic Law, Essays in Honor of John J Jackson” Kluwer 
Law International. 2000. 
Some provisions like the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing eliminate altogether its applicability to the 
specific subject matter. In the rest of the universe of WTO rules, there is no clear argument of why and how 
the application of Art XXIII, especially Art XXIII (b) has to be subject of a restrictive interpretation.  
99
PETERSMANN E-U. “Ten years of the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Past, Present and Future” Journal of 
International Law and Policy. Vol. III. University of Pennsylvania 2005 p. 9. 
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and predictability to the multilateral trading system100.Using this kind of interpretation, 
Article XXIII will be scrutinised in order to obtain clarity on its meaning.  
Notwithstanding all the limitations, critics and mistakes that can possibly affect the 
provision, its validity is uncontested and it remains part of GATT as an applicable 
norm. It is necessary to engage with the different interpretation theories to give a 
coherent meaning to this provision in relation to the rest of the agreement. 
Additionally, the different methods of interpretation will be used to construct the links 
between the provisions contained in Article XXIII and non-WTO regulated areas of 
international trade. 
 
2.2 State of the art doctrinal interpretation: Conduct covered and grants 
made by Article XXIII 
 
Article XXIII is a unique type of regulation in the GATT agreement. This is because 
the nullification and impairment clause has implications for both the actual breach of 
international obligations, and the ―defeat of reasonable expectations for enhanced 
exports and trade”101. 
The first finding to be made is the object of Article XXIII. In other words, what are the 
behaviours covered by the provision that can give rise to a legal complaint under the 
terms of the article in question. According to the text of Article XIII: 1, there are three 
kinds of conduct or causes of action that can trigger the application of Article XXIII 
and they are located in Article XXIII: 1 in its sub-paragraphs a, b, and c102. The text of 
the provision contains a factual requirement, which is a benefit nullification or 
impairment: 
                                                          
100
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. Apr 15 1994. Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, legal Instruments- Results of the Uruguay 
Round , 33 I.L.M, Art. 3.2. 
101
 JACKSON J. “Designing and Implementing Effective Dispute Settlement Procedures: WTO Dispute 
Settlement, Appraisal and Prospects.” In KRUEGER A. “The WTO as an International Organisation”. Published 
by University of Chicago Press, 1998 p. 166. 
102
 KIM, D.W. “Non-Violation Complaints in WTO Law. Theory and Practice”. Studies in Global Economic Law 
Series No. 9. Peter Lang. Bern, 2006 p. 7. 
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1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly 
or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the 
attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of 
. . .103 
Such requirement can be fulfilled as a result of three kinds of conduct: 
- Violation: [(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations 
under this Agreement104], or 
- Non – violation [(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, 
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement105]. 
Or 
- Situation: [(c) the existence of any other situation, the contracting party may, 
with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written 
representations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it 
considers to be concerned. Any contracting party thus approached shall give 
sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it106]. 
It is important to note that the term Non-Violation is not part of the original text of the 
norm. However the early jurisprudence defined its purpose and consolidated the 
expression in the case of European Economic Community - Payments and 
Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed 
Proteins ("EEC – Oilseeds") in the following terms:  
                                                          
103
 Art XXIII: 1 chapeau [Emphasis added]. 
104
 Art XXIII: 1 (a) GATT. 
105
 Art XXIII: 1 (b) GATT. 
106
 Art XXIII: 1 (c) GATT. 
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―The idea underlying [the provisions of Article XXIII:1(b)] is 
that the improved competitive opportunities that can 
legitimately be expected from a tariff concession can be 
frustrated not only by measures proscribed by the General 
Agreement but also by measures consistent with that 
Agreement. In order to encourage Contracting Parties to 
make tariff concessions they must therefore be given a 
right of redress when a reciprocal concession is impaired 
by another contracting party as a result of the application 
of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the 
General Agreement.‖107[Emphasis added] 
The behaviours to trigger the application of Article XXIII are mutually exclusive as it 
must be understood that the term ―or‖ is disjunctive and not copulative. Otherwise, 
the provision would be illogical108 as a whole. On the one hand, Article XXIII: 1 (a) 
deals with actions that are in breach of the WTO agreements, being violations. 
Violations of the WTO agreements are dealt with by the DSU. There is clarity about 
the legal procedure that a member state must follow upon a breach, so there is no 
moot point on these actions. On the other hand, sub-paragraphs b and c of Article 
XXIII: 1, have been understood as either actions which are not in breach of GATT 
(and the WTO agreements) or mere situations, regardless of whether they are actual 
actions of either party involved or just a set of circumstances beyond the control or 
outside the will of the parties. The actions that are not in breach of the agreement 
have been considered as Non Violations.    
Despite being different, and due to the nonexistence of a breach requirement, the 
potential complaints contained in sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article XXIII: 1 have 
been called collectively Non-Violation complaints. However, there is agreement in 
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EEC Oilseeds- 1990, BISD 37S/86, para. 144. 
108
 While in general a factual measure can be captured by two normative categories. In the specific case of Art 
XXIII a factual measure can’t be deemed in breach and in compliance of the WTO agreements at the same 
time. An action capable of triggering the consequences provided for in Art XXIII must be a breach or a 
compliant action that produces the Non-Violation category.    
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the doctrine and jurisprudence about the complete absence of successful situation 
complaints in the whole existence of GATT109 and the unlikelihood of their 
appearance in the future110. 
Having ascertained that, and taking into account the aspects that contain a true moot 
point, the interpretation of the scope of Article XXIII by the academics111 has been 
focused mostly on the Non-Violation complaints as defined by sub-paragraph (b) of 
Article XXIII: 1. 
Understanding the meaning of each word of the provision, and then putting that 
meaning in context with its creation and evolution is the method prescribed by the 
Vienna Convention of Treaty Interpretation for the interpretation of treaty provisions 
when their meaning is obscure, as is the case of Article XXIII of GATT. This method 
shall be followed to draw conclusions regarding the actual meaning of the provision 
to then compare it with the existing case law. Furthermore, the found meaning shall 
be applied to the abovementioned Anti-Dumping Agreement to suggest a harmonic 
interaction between them.  
 
2.3 Literal Interpretation of the terms in Article XXIII: dissecting the rule in 
the search for the meaning of the words. 
                                                          
109
Supra KIM. pp. 7-10 See also, Appellate Body Report: “Art XXIII: 1(c) has never been a foundation for a 
recommendation or ruling of the GATT Contracting Parties or the Dispute Settlement Body”. India Patent I 
(AB), par.39. 
110
Supra KIM. pp. 7-10 See also, Kennedy K. “Foreign Direct Investment and Competition Policy at the World 
Trade Organisation” George Washington International Law Review. (2001). 
111
 See among others READ R. “Trade Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: The WTO dispute settlement 
understanding in the wake of GATT” Lancaster University Management School. Working paper 2005/012 
available at http://www.pf.uni-lj.si/media/wto.dispute.pdf 
See also: FAUNCE, NEVILLE & WASSON “Non Violation Nullification of Benefit Claims: Opportunities and 
Dilemmas for Australia in the WTO Dispute Settlement System” AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVES ON WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT, Bray, M., ed., pp. 123-129, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2009. Available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1409504 .A different perspective is provided by 
BOWN when he submits that Art XXIII is mostly used when countries are responding to illegal actions 
(violations) under this article in order to provide a forum for direct retaliation in case of nullification and 
impairment. BOWN C. “ The Economics of Trade Disputes, The GATT Art. XXIII and the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Understanding”. Department of Economics and Graduate School of Economics and Finance. 
Brandeis University. 2002. 
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A literal interpretation of each of the sentences in Art XXIII will be done in order to 
detect its sense, spirit and meaning as follows, 
Article XXIII: Nullification or Impairment  
- If any contracting party:  Contracting Parties are currently part of an 
organisation (the WTO) established by an agreement. In the text of Art XXIII ―any 
contracting party‖ means, any of the Member States of the WTO. Initially, when 
GATT was first created in 1947, no text was written in a language that showed the 
creation of an organisation as GATT as merely a trade treaty. Administrative 
functions were assigned to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, indicated in capital 
letters; this meant that all countries that were part of GATT were commissioned 
administrative tasks including dispute resolution, meeting and all other activities 
requiring collective action. Also the contracting parties, in small letters, referred to 
the parties of GATT as trade partners112. Only until 1994, when the GATT became 
part of an official institution could the term ―Member States‖ be used to refer as the 
contracting parties acting as trade partners. A member state is a country that has 
acceded into the WTO either through the transition GATT-WTO or after the 
constitution of the WTO. New members accede to the WTO by signing on to its 
agreements113. 
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 LOWENFELD A. “International Economic Law”. International Economic Law Series. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 2003. p. 29. 
113
 See JACKSON J. “The jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO insights on treaty law and economic relations”. 
Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 2007. pp. 29: There are basically four ways to become a “contracting 
party” of GATT. Three involve accession by a government: by the Protocol of Provisional Application; by 
subsequent protocol and agreement under Art XXXIII of GATT and by directly accepting the GATT itself under 
article XXVI (2)(…) These methods of accession are preceded by a tariff negotiation, the“Ticket of Admission”, 
and often these negotiations extend for several years, during which time by special declaration protocol, the 
applicant is given Provisional Accession to GATT, or relations with GATT are established by other special 
arrangements. The Fourth Route to Membership is open to customs territories in respect of which a 
contracting party has accepted this Agreement: when such territory possesses or acquires full autonomy in the 
conduct of its commercial relations…In 157 GATT set forth a series of recommended procedures to guide this 
sponsorship route to membership, which enabled a newly independent government to have a de facto 
participation in GATT pending a final decision as to entry into GATT. See also WTO glossary of terms. 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/glossary_e.htm. 
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- should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly 
under this Agreement: The wording should consider means that the affected party 
is given the discretion to raise a complaint should they consider that a conduct has 
nullified or impaired a benefit accruing under GATT.  
 
A benefit under GATT today must be understood to be a benefit under GATT 1994 
and it can also be interpreted to be a benefit under the Multilateral Agreements on 
Trade in Goods contained in Annex 1a of the Marrakesh Agreement. This can be 
done in application of the principle of single undertaking. Both agreements form part 
of the WTO agreements. Furthermore, there is a relationship between GATT and the 
Multilateral Agreements of trade in Goods under Annex 1a (The trade remedies 
agreements, including the Anti-Dumping agreement, belong to this group) that can 
be seen in the following features. Firstly, Trade Remedies Agreements contain both 
cross referencing and conceptual developments based on GATT 1994 as a 
foundation114. Secondly, The subject matter of the agreements under Annex 1a is 
specifically trade in goods, which is within the area of scope of GATT (GATS and 
TRIPS, for example, are excluded from this scope due to the nature of their subject 
matters).Thirdly, in the General interpretative note to Annex 1a it is provided that in 
case of conflict between the provisions in GATT and those contained in the 
agreements of Annex 1a, the latter shall prevail. This means that in other spheres, 
the agreements can be interpreted in a way that allows for them to supplement, 
clarify and elaborate each other115. [Emphasis added] 
The scope of Art XXIII GATT can be extended to cover the benefits emerging from 
the Agreements on Multilateral Trade in Goods provided that there are not provisions 
in express contradiction with Art XXIII. In other words, since the Multilateral 
Agreement of Trade in Goods has similar objectives and subject matter to GATT, 
and they have a relationship of interdependence, particularly aimed to protect and 
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 This is evident, for example in the fact that the Anti-Dumping Agreement is called Agreement on 
Implementation of Art VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. See QURESHI A. “Interpreting WTO 
Agreements: Problems and Perspectives” Cambridge University Press. 2006. p. 208. 
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enhance pre-existing benefits under GATT in addition to the new benefits contained 
in them; it can be concluded that Art XXIII can also be applied to the benefits 
emerging from the specialist agreements under Annex 1a.  
 
Benefits covered by Art XXIII must be separated into protection from 
infringements116, market access and improved legal positions117. The inclusion of 
infringements into the scope of Art XXIII obeys the fact that in principle, the 
infringement of a rule does not necessarily damage, nullify or impair the rights or 
expectations of another party118.   
Furthermore, in early practice a formal infringement did not necessarily cause 
substantial damage. This does not have any practical application anymore as the 
evaluation of damage does not explore the amounts of trade flowing as a primary 
source, but the competitive position of the affected party119.  
Improved legal positions have been defined in the Oilseeds case as the assurance of 
a better market access through improved price competition”120. Legal positivism in 
the interpretation of the provision has dominated the jurisprudence and the doctrine 
limiting the scope of the cause of action based on non-violation complaints. The 
arguments to limit the scope of non-violation complaints range from the specific and 
varied multiplicity of regulated subject matters to the vague terms of the provision 
and the growing applicability of general principles of law to WTO law121.  
These arguments are valid, convenient and they are supported by the majority of the 
academic and jurisprudential literature. However, they do not offer a solution to 
effectively apply the provision in Art XXIII and foster a fair trade law system as per 
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Covered by Art XXIII (a), the violation provision of Art XXIII. 
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 Included in Art XXIII 9b), the non violation provision of Art XXIII. See VON BOGANDY A. “GATT non violation 
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 COTTIER T, and SCHEFER K. “Protection of legitimate expectations in WTO” in BRONCKERS M (ED)“ New 
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the mentioned principles of GATT with the available and valid provisions currently in 
force. 
The complexity inherent to the definition of what constitutes a benefit can be crucial 
to the understanding and thus the application of this provision in a legal but also in 
an economically viable manner. In other words, vested rights are clearly benefits but 
so are legitimate expectations and improved legal positions. Legitimate expectations 
are included in art XXIII as one of the few expressions122 in protection of the 
principles of good faith in GATT123. The protection provided by art XXIII (b) can be 
understood as a codified expression of both, the restriction of abuse of right and the 
protection of legitimate expectations in an attempt to include the doctrine of good 
faith in the International Trade agreements124.  
Initially, one of the first benefits emerging from GATT was tariff concessions, as well 
as MFN (Most Favoured Nation) and National Treatment125. Therefore it is possible 
to affirm that tariff concessions are the first advantage possessed by the Member 
States that can be considered as a benefit under the terms of Article XXIII. However, 
tariff concessions are the less likely advantage to be affected by any situation in the 
current world of trade. Non-compliance with tariff concession constitutes a violation 
which is unlikely to occur due to all the support systems around tariff concessions 
and the extensive knowledge about them by domestic enforcement authorities. 
The word benefit could not then be restricted to tariff concessions, as this would give 
an overly restrictive meaning to Article XXIII, which has not been accepted by the 
panels. On the other hand, the concept of benefits can be interpreted as extensive 
advantages beyond the negotiated tariff concession.  
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 Supra COTTIER T and SCHEFFER K. p. 51. 
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 A prominent example of the protection to this principle can be found in the jurisprudence related to Art XX 
GATT. 
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 Supra COTTIER T and SCHEFER K. p. 53. 
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Academics have understood that it is not possible to have a legitimate expectation 
when there is not a concession as countries are free to impose any tariff without 
other legal constraints emanating from GATT126.Therefore, the extension of the 
interpretation of the word ―benefits‖ in Art XXIII(b) goes beyond the formal 
compliance with tariff concessions, to cover legitimate expectations; but it is 
restricted to legitimate expectations of an improved market access position which are 
created in relation to the concessions granted. 
This is based on the argument that when there is no commitment on a tariff reduction 
there is no expectation to be formed, and even if an expectation is generated by the 
course of performance of a specific member state, this does not emerge directly from 
the Agreement and thus the scope of Art XXIII (b) does not extend to those 
expectations127. However, that argument can be refuted reviewing the wording 
following the word benefit in the provision which explicitly mentions that the benefit 
must have been accrued directly or indirectly under this agreement. 
It is plausible to affirm that the direct benefits accrued under the agreement consist 
of concessions and explicit advantages emerging from the agreement and the 
indirect benefits are collateral benefits that are generated practically by the execution 
of the agreement by the different Member States. In addition, benefits in the form of 
legitimate expectations are not restricted to commercial measures as the text of the 
article does not distinguish between or exclude certain type of measures128.  
In fact, in two adopted panel reports129 as well as in two un-adopted panel reports130, 
it has been understood that the word benefits in Article XXIII includes but is not 
limited to tariff concessions. The panels have extended the meaning of benefits from 
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 ROESSLER F. The concept of Nullification and Impairment in the Legal System of the World Trade 
Organisation in PETERSMANN Ed. International Trade Law and the GATT dispute settlement system 
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plain tariff concessions to any benefits under the General Agreement131 and have 
gone further; expressing explicitly that there is no legal justification to restrict Article 
XXIII to tariff concessions and that such restriction has not been part of previous 
panel proceedings132. 
It is clear then, that benefits are more than mere tariff concessions and also include 
breach of general obligations. It is also undisputed that a competitive position or 
relationship originated directly on a tariff concession is a benefit for the purposes of 
Art XXII133. While this is helpful and necessary, it is not sufficient to establish the 
exact scope of the word benefits in the provision of Art XXIII.  
According to the US Sugar Waiver panel report, Article XXIII: 1bdoes not exclude 
claims of nullification and impairment based on provisions of the General Agreement 
other than Article II134. Due to its very nature, it could be said that a collateral or 
indirectly accrued benefit from GATT would be ease of access into foreign markets. 
This can only be materialised by the creation of competitive opportunities135. Those 
competitive opportunities are also qualified by the panels from the early 
jurisprudence that exposed the topic. In other words, the competitive relationship 
upset by a measure is not just a competitive relation that could potentially exist; 
instead, it must be a competitive opportunity that is reasonably anticipated136.  
The panels, despite giving an extended interpretation to the word benefits, have 
limited that scope by including a passive qualification of the benefit. This means that 
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they have placed a burden of proof on the beneficiaries of the provision in Article 
XXIII by adding a reasonable limitation to it, but have also placed a greater burden 
on all Member States on their compliance with the WTO agreements.  
In other words, mere literal compliance is not sufficient for Member States; if a 
conduct beyond compliance (course of performance) has caused a legitimate 
expectation on the other Member States, then such conduct can be considered as a 
benefit and thus it can be covered by Article XXIII, despite the fact that its 
observance was originally voluntary and its non–observance may not constitute in 
itself a breach of the agreement. 
To elaborate on this thought, it must be said that benefits or legitimate expectations 
must be generated either by a legal concession, or by conduct originated by a 
member state that is compliant with the general part of the agreement that has 
produced a benefit for another member state. Benefits emanating from a tariff 
concession are supposed to be linked to reasonable expectations according to case 
law.  
Despite the arguments expressed in favour of a more extensive interpretation of the 
concept of benefits in art XXIII, the practice has been restrictive and the adopted 
reports137 have always introduced a final caveat to the applicability of Art XXIII. This 
has been due to the pressure of the Member States and with the argument that the 
original and only legitimate purpose of the provision is to keep the balance of tariff 
concessions138.  
Legitimate expectations must be studied on a case by case basis because it is not 
clear to what extent the legitimate expectation could be extended without affecting 
the value of a tariff concession. It would be unreasonable to expect that a balance of 
tariff concessions that have been established in the past – and hence the 
expectations – must be kept in force indeterminately.  
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 EC Citrus (unadopted) presents a broader interpretation of the non –violation complaint by extending the 
benefits to all benefits originated in GATT. This position has been rejected by the Membership before the 
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 Compliance in the reciprocally granted tariff concessions has been pointed as the main purpose of the 
provision in the case law. See Oilseeds.  
  
52 
 
 
Therefore, Member States are restricted by Article XXIII to create and enforce 
measures that would indirectly result in the detriment of the real value of the 
concessions previously agreed upon, but this needs to be examined on a case by 
case basis in order to find out: 
- Whether the expectation is created by a country with whom there is bilateral 
reciprocity139 in terms of concessions: the expectation that a third country has for a 
benefit negotiated between two different parties is substantially different than the 
negotiating party as the latter one expects reciprocity in a specifically negotiated 
area whereas the former one obtains the benefit by virtue of MFN principle. 
Therefore, the level of expectation and the type of benefit differ from party to party. 
- Whether in the given circumstances it is reasonable to expect the benefit. 
This could also apply to other benefits deriving from the WTO agreements and which 
are not tariff concessions because after the creation of the WTO all members are 
under a rule of law system, so despite previous reiterated GATT practice in relation 
to the provision, political inconvenience and resistance to a broader interpretation of 
Art XXII, the panels are independent to study and establish the scope of the 
interpretation bound by the provision and by the principles of single undertaking and 
effectiveness. In addition, a review of the impact of the measures in dispute on the 
real economy with different models, and keeping in mind the principle of progressive 
liberalization could allow for the acceptance of a greater scope of application of Art 
XXIII. 
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 According to Art II: 7 all concessions are part of the terms of the Treaty. This means that while the tariff 
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The next group of complaints that can be considered under benefits nullified or 
impaired is the case of complaints emerging from non-tariff concessions. The study 
of these complaints poses an extra challenge which is that they either belong to a 
special area of the WTO which has been separately negotiated; or they are not 
negotiated WTO matters at all. In the case of matters that have not been negotiated 
at all, they can only be taken into account when they are considered part of the 
objectives and benefits that governments legitimately expect to receive for their 
commitments in different areas of trade. This leads to the study of the next part of 
the chapeau in order to establish what exactly is covered by the scope of Article 
XXIII. 
- Is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of 
the agreement is being impeded: Nullification, impairment and the impediment to 
attain any of the objectives of the WTO agreements are covered by this provision. It 
is necessary to determine what the essential content in this phrase is in order to fully 
understand the scope of the article. The article lists three results that are covered by 
the provision: Nullification, impairment and impediment to attain any of the objectives 
of the agreement. 
Nullification and impairment can be grouped in conducts that substantially undermine 
a benefit without doing so formally. In other words, nullification and impairment of 
benefits refer to measures which upset the balance established by concessions and 
other WTO agreements rendering them null, or impairing their successful enjoyment 
by the affected party. The only substantial difference between nullification and 
impairment is a difference of degree. Whilst to nullify means to render null, invalidate 
or deprive of any value or use; to impair means to make weaker, damage or injure140. 
In both words there is a degree of deterioration, but nullification is greater than 
impairment. Despite this difference in degree, it is possible to assemble nullification 
and impairment in one group, because the level of affectation must assert a 
significant detriment in order for any action or measure to be justifiably covered by 
the provision. 
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The terminology Nullification or Impairment comes from the Equitable Treatment 
Clause proposed originally by the United States and it focuses on the results of a 
measure. Initially, the introduction of the nullification or impairment measure was 
directed to prevent non-tariff measures that rendered the tariff reductions absurd 
because the contracting parties did not have any other commitments on trade 
measures other than the tariff concessions. The measure has to be the cause of the 
final incapacity to enjoy a vested benefit, which was either a tariff concession or a 
competitive relationship as explained before. In this light, two types of measures 
could be the source of nullification or impairment; firstly a non-tariff measure that was 
equivalent to a tariff – i.e. technical barriers, but not technically a breach of the 
agreement, and secondly a measure in open breach of the commitments made by 
the agreement. 
The impediment to attain any of the objectives of the agreement has not been 
explored by the panels. The WTO jurisprudence has not performed any attainment of 
any objective test to qualify or disqualify a measure from being covered under Article 
XXIII. Furthermore, this form of complaint was disputed from the very beginning of 
GATT since in the Havana Conference of 1948 it was deleted from the text of Article 
XXIII141. The academics explain that this test is, in practice, very difficult to perform 
because there would be a need to establish or determine the actual objectives of the 
agreement142 which is a complicated task because each contracting party had 
different and potentially conflicting objectives and motives when signing the 
agreement143.  
The argument that it is difficult to establish the objectives of GATT and the WTO 
agreements is only partially true because all the WTO agreements have also 
included a set of common objectives which have to be taken into account when 
making the analysis of Article XXIII. This is true despite the previous approaches by 
the panels and the Appellate Body of the WTO that have not addressed this part of 
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the provision. Literally, GATT contains its own set of objectives in its preamble that 
reads as follows: 
The Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Kingdom of Belgium, 
the United States of Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, the Republic of Chile, the 
Republic of China, the Republic of Cuba, the Czechoslovak Republic, the 
French Republic, India, Lebanon, the Grand-Duchy of Luxemburg, the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Kingdom of Norway, Pakistan, Southern 
Rhodesia, Syria, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America:  
Recognising that their relations in the field of trade and economic 
endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, 
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real 
income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of 
the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods, 
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal 
and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial 
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of 
discriminatory treatment in international commerce144. 
From this preamble it may be assumed that GATT has five objectives: 
1. Raising standards of living 
2. Ensuring full employment 
3. A large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand 
4. Developing the full use of the resources of the world 
5. Expanding the production and exchange of goods. 
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The parties, when signing the agreement believed that the best way to achieve these 
purposes was by reducing tariffs and other barriers to trade as well as eliminating 
discriminatory treatment in international commerce. GATT has integrated developed 
and developing countries in a multilateral trade platform and these objectives must 
be read as principles embodied in an unprecedented agreement145, but they can be 
contradictory amongst themselves.  
Indeed, a trade practice such as dumping, which effectively raises the standards of 
living and provides a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective 
demand for the products of one country, can decrease full employment and diminish 
the production and exchange of goods in another country or even in another group of 
countries. This is applicable to many of the trade actions and measures used by 
trading partners, hence the difficulty of establishing a clear account of the objectives 
of the agreement.  
Nonetheless, even if the objectives themselves can be contradictory and ambiguous, 
the methods established in the preamble give some guidance as to how to apply the 
objectives, allowing the interpreter to establish some principles that can guide the 
execution of the agreement in a coherent manner. Additionally some of the dogmatic 
provisions of GATT are also useful for this interpretative exercise. The most 
remarkable dogmatic provisions in GATT are without doubt Articles I and III, which 
contain the most favoured nation principle and the national treatment principle 
respectively. Also, from different panel reports, Appellate Body decisions and the 
official WTO declarations, it is possible to extract a group of principles that illustrate 
the objectives and purpose of the WTO as an institution and of GATT as an 
agreement. The WTO grouped such principles as follows146: 
1. Non-Discrimination147: As was mentioned above, the two provisions that protect 
the system of international trade against international and domestic 
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discrimination are the MFN principle and the National Treatment principle148. 
This principle requires not to treat ―similarly situated‖ members differently149 
 MFN entails treating all trade partners equally by extending all special 
concessions made to favourite trade partners to all members of the agreement. 
This principle is contained in Article I of GATT, II of GATS and IV in TRIPS. 
However, this principle is not absolute and contains considerable exceptions, 
which make the special concessions in practice more of a rule than an 
exception.  
 The principle of national treatment means treating foreign and local products in 
the same way. However, it does not mean that foreign goods have an 
unrestricted right of entry. Domestic and foreign products must be treated 
evenly according to NT, but this only applies once the imported goods have had 
access to the domestic market.  
2. Freer trade150: This liberalisation of the market is deemed to happen in a 
gradual way. In other words, before GATT there were no tariff commitments, 
so all the countries could impose the tariff that they considered useful for their 
economic strategy. After signing GATT the countries committed to a ceiling of 
tariffs for the trade of goods, which was a first step. Upon the advent of the 
WTO, the restrictions were lowered even more as the agreements expanded 
to services and intellectual property and an institutional support was created. 
This meant that the countries would commit to lowering trade barriers, but 
would also encourage trade by committing to allow free trade by avoiding at 
the very least, measures such as import bans or quotas in order not to restrict 
imports in a selective way.  
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 Liberalisation of the markets develops with the painstaking negotiations held 
periodically by the Member States and these negotiations have gradually 
introduced changes to the system of trade. The most revolutionary round of 
negotiation – the Uruguay Round – launched the WTO as an institution and 
included many aspects of trade that were obliterated by GATT. Since then, 
progress has been rather slow, countries have failed to agree to regulate 
detailed aspects of trade, and yet they are not regulated in the international 
system. This has placed a toll on the gradual liberalisation of the markets and 
has led to some of the legal controversies in sister areas such as International 
Investment Law. 
3. Predictability151: With the creation of the WTO as a structure of support for the 
WTO agreements, which are binding on the parties and have a third neutral 
party as an adjudicator in cases of controversy, the trade atmosphere has 
gained stability. The Member States are of the opinion that transparency, 
stability and predictability encourage foreign investment, which in turn, in the 
best case scenario, is an incentive for job creation and consumer satisfaction. 
The multilateral trading system is an endeavour by the contracting parties to 
make both the domestic and the international business environment steady 
and predictable152. 
4. Promoting fair competition153: By providing an environment that is stable, 
transparent and predictable, the system aims for open and unhampered 
competition in the international markets of goods or services. This does not 
mean that all barriers to trade are lifted or that trade is completely free of 
protective measures. The system allows for the imposition of tariffs and 
protective measures but caps them with a limit. This limit is given by the tariff 
ceilings and by the WTO agreements that list protectionist measures and 
                                                          
151
 Understanding the WTO: Principles of the trading System in 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm 
152
 In fact, the DSB was created with the purpose of giving predictability and security to the system as it is 
stated in Art 3.2 of the DSU.  
153
 Understanding the WTO: Principles of the trading System in 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm 
  
59 
 
regulate the circumstances and methods that countries can use in order to be 
able to apply them. This guarantees fairness to all trade partners and intends to 
eliminate distortions in international markets.  
5. Encouraging development and economic reform154: Another consensus that 
exists on different levels amongst the Member States of the WTO is that a 
system that guarantees trade contributes to development by encouraging 
growth. The WTO structure also allows different levels of commitment for 
countries at different developmental stages. On the one hand, developed 
countries are supposed to commit to more concessions and to do that in short 
periods of time. On the other hand developing countries are given flexibility in 
the measures they are supposed to implement and they are also given flexible 
times to implement the system‘s agreements so that the adjustment is not too 
abrupt for them and does not become detrimental to their growth efforts. 
These principles make the task of applying the chapeau of Article XXIII more 
attainable. It is plausible to affirm that when Article XXIII mentions that the 
attainment of any objective of the agreement is being impeded, it refers to any 
of the principles listed above. Therefore, whenever a member state suffers 
discrimination, more restrictive trade, unpredictable behaviour from trade partners, 
unfair competition, or its development is discouraged by a specific measure or 
practice of another member state, the affected member could resort to Article XXIII 
to challenge the measure or practice through WTO litigation.  
The affected member would have to prove the course of action and the causal link. 
Article XXIII 1 provides three courses of action:  
- As the result of: 
(a) The failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under 
this agreement: The nullification, impairment or impossibility of attainment of 
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the abovementioned objectives can be caused by the failure of a contracting 
party to fulfil its obligations. This means that the first cause of action for this 
claim is clearly breach. Breaching an obligation means an infraction or violation 
of that obligation and, in this case, the obligations were acquired by the 
contracting parties who previously agreed to bind themselves by the Treaty.  
 Literal a of Article XXIII: 1 does not take into account whether there are other 
remedies to solve the breach. In other words, it does not exclude other possible 
remedies for the breach of obligation. Reading this provision, it is possible to 
infer that other remedies available are applicable in case of breach. In the same 
sense, logically, this means that the remedy provided in Article XXIII is not 
excluded by the existence of any other available remedy. 
 The question arises then whether the choice of remedies is left to the aggrieved 
party and whether multiple remedies, including the provision in Article XXIII, are 
applicable simultaneously or if the application of one remedy extinguishes the 
possibility of resorting to another. To analyse the final effect, both the 
provisions containing remedies and Article XXIII should be compared on a case 
by case basis. However, should there be an elimination of choice, it does not 
emanate from Article XXIII: 1 a, which does not contain in its wording any 
indication of remedy elimination nor does it qualify its applicability in any other 
way. This means that as far as Article XXIII is concerned, the existence and 
applicability of other remedies to a situation of breach does not exclude the 
procedure contemplated by the nullification and impairment norm. Such norm 
may well be invoked by the affected member state concomitantly, in exclusion 
or separate to any other breach procedure, provided that the latter does not 
preclude the use of other remedial resources.  
 The breach that gives a cause of action under which Article XXIII is applicable 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs, and which is in accordance with the single 
undertaking principle, extends to all the WTO agreements that have not been 
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explicitly nullified and impaired, either rejecting this remedy155 or modifying its 
conditions of applicability156. 
 Additionally, the presumption of nullification and impairment caused by a 
violation of the GATT was established in early jurisprudence157 and accepted by 
the contracting parties during the Tokyo Round of negotiations but later the 
presumption itself has been the object of academic controversy. Initially, it was 
thought that the presumption of nullification and impairment was rebuttable, and 
the demonstration of lack of adverse impact would be enough to disprove 
it158. However the jurisprudence considered that presumption of causation 
irrefutable159, and the reasons for the later jurisprudence to consider that 
presumption irrefutable are that the object of protection is not the actual 
adverse impact on trade flows, but the trade potential or competitive 
conditions160. This has been reiterated by several panel decisions and it is 
accepted by the doctrine161 as far as understanding that a member‘s potential 
trade benefit is sufficient to establish a dispute settlement panel162.  
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 Art. 8.10 Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. 
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 Art. 64.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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 See Infra Uruguayan Recourse to Art XXIII par. 15. 
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Supra ROESSLER 1997 p. 127 See also KIM 2006 p. 129. 
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 United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances. Report of the Panel adopted on 17 
June 1987 (L/6175 - 34S/136): Para. 3.1.6 …A contextual analysis of paragraphs 4 and 5of the Annex to the 
1979 Understanding on dispute settlement thus clearly showed that there was an irrefutable presumption 
that a breach of the rules of the General Agreement caused nullification or impairment within the meaning 
of Article XXIII and that the question of trade effects was relevant only for a decision to authorise 
compensatory action and for determining the extent of compensation owed when the immediate withdrawal of 
an illegal measure could not be secured. … [Emphasis added]. 
160
European Economic Community – Follow-up on the Panel Report, Payments and Subsidies Paid to 
Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins ("EEC – Oilseeds II"), 31 March 1992, 
BISD 39S/91: Para 77 …the subsidies concerned had impaired the tariff concessions because they upset the 
competitive relationship between domestic and imported oilseeds, not because of any effect on trade 
flows… [emphasis added]. 
161
 Infra Australian Subsidy para12: Panel Report, Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines("Germany – 
Sardines"), adopted 31 October 1952 It was agreed that such impairment would exist if the action of the 
Australian Government which resulted in upsetting the competitive relationship between sodium nitrate and 
ammonium sulphate could not reasonably have been anticipated by the Chilean Government, taking into 
consideration all pertinent circumstances and the provisions of the General Agreement, at the time it 
negotiated for the duty-free binding on sodium nitrate.… [emphasis added]; GATT Panel Report, Treatment by 
Germany of Imports of Sardines ("Germany – Sardines"), adopted 31 October 1952 Para. 16 …It agreed that 
such impairment would exist if the action of the German Government, which resulted in upsetting the 
  
62 
 
 In conclusion, the mere breach of the WTO agreements is a cause of action 
covered by Article XXIII, regardless of its material consequences on trade flows 
as it is presumed that the breach of any clause of the WTO agreement affects 
per se the potential trade and competitive conditions of trade partners. This 
presumption is unique to Article XXIII: 1 a, as the following clauses in this 
provision are unique in their nature and applicability, and may not be read with 
the same criteria used for the violation complaints.  
 
(b) The application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or 
not it conflicts with the provisions of this agreement: The most 
controversial, ambiguous and obscure section of Article XXIII is Article XXIII: 1 
b. This article has been difficult to interpret and therefore difficult to apply 
since the very beginning of GATT. It has been called the Non-Violation 
complaint because it gives a course of action to a member who has suffered 
nullification or impairment or impossibility to attain the objectives of the 
agreement by the application of a measure taken by another member, 
regardless of whether such application is made in compliance with the text of 
the rest of the provisions of the Treaty.  
 By the precedent section of this provision, it is possible to determine that this 
specific section does not refer to breaches, as the breach as a cause of action 
has been exhausted in Article XXIII: 1 b. The concept of Non-Violation has 
been grasped from the historical development of the ratified agreement and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
competitive relationship between preparations of clupea pilchardus and preparations of the other varieties of 
the clupeoid family could not reasonably have been anticipated by the Norwegian Government at the time it 
negotiated for tariff reductions on preparations of clupea sprattus and clupea harengus.… [emphasis added]; 
GATT Panel Report, Panel on Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, L/5623, adopted 15 May 1984, 
BISD 31S/94. Para 50 …in any event, the Panel wished to stress that the existence of quantitative restrictions 
should be presumed to cause nullification or impairment not only because of any effect it had on the volume 
of trade, but also for other reason, e.g. it would lead to increased transaction costs and would create 
uncertainty which would affect investment plans… [emphasis added]. 
162
 Supra KIM 2006 p. 130. 
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also from the further developments in the Havana Charter163 despite the fact 
that it was never entered into force. The Havana Charter clarifies the language 
of the ambiguous Article XXIII GATT leaving the Non-Violation clause free of 
obscurity as it words the provision in more plain language: “The application by a 
member of a measure not conflicting with the provisions of this Charter”164. 
 
 From these and other preparatory works it is possible to deduct that Article 
XXIII: 1 b is referred to as a measure that does not constitute a violation of the 
agreement, and that it is commonly called Non-Violation in academic circles165. 
With the advent of the WTO the clause has been kept valid and thus applicable 
to new sectors of the international trade in all the cases where there has not 
been a specific provision overruling or modifying the content of Article XXIII166. 
This has proven problematic in different ways and has given rise to different 
interpretative methods to solve the problems emanating from the features of the 
Non-Violation clause contained in Article XXIII: 1 b.  
 
 Some of the developments in the construction of the concept the Non-Violation 
clause are found in the case law that exists so far; but the fact that Article XXIII: 
1 b is considered to be a relic of the diplomatic system contradicts the legal 
nature of the WTO, which is bound to use the rule of law to solve all disputes 
brought by the Member States. This obeys the original context where the article 
was created which involved a diplomatic dispute resolution mechanism, instead 
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See UN Doc. E/Conf. 2178.Havana Charter for an International Trade Organisation Havana Charter.March 
24 1948. 
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Havana Charter. Consultation and Arbitration clause. 
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 The expression Non-Violation is used widely amongst WTO academic, practitioners and in dispute 
resolution. See WT/DS50/AB/R India- Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products. 1998. Para 39. See also, SKYES A. “The Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Ensuring Compliance” Ch. 25 
in NARLIKAR A., DAUNTON M., & STERN R. “The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organization” OUP. 
2012. p. 565; and LINARELLI J. “Global Procurement Law in Times of Crisis: New Buy American Policies and 
Options in the WTO System” in ARROWSMITH S. & ANDERSON R. (Eds). “The WTO Regime on Government 
Procurement: Challenge and Reform” Cambridge University Press, 2011. P798. See also, “(…) the term “Non- 
Violation Complaints” has never been precisely defined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES” See 
MTN.GNG/NG13/W/31 “Non Violation Complaints under Article XXIII: 2” Note by the Secretariat. Negotiating 
Group on Dispute Settlement. 1989. p. 2. Available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/history/urdsu/w31.pdf. 
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of a system of rule of law. The diplomatic form of dispute resolution implied a 
mediation made by the delegates of the contracting parties, whereas the 
system of rule of law necessitates an interpretation and adjudication over the 
content of the provision and the merit of the complaint.  
 
 The evolution from a diplomatic mediation to a legal adjudication has been 
gradual and parallel to the evolution from ―power-orientated international 
relationships to different systems of rule orientated relations167. This has 
affected the way in which international treaties are interpreted and applied and, 
in the case of Article XXIII of GATT, the attitude of some members who show a 
predilection for the negotiations – soft law, or adjudication – hard law – in the 
dispute resolution of international trade disputes168 has contributed to the 
contradictions in their address to this circumstance. 
 
 Due to these reasons, the case law available contains unaddressed inherent 
ambiguity169which confuses the contracting parties about the proper use of the 
provision. Both in adopted and unadopted reports, some of the decisions 
equate violations to Non-Violations in order to solve the complaints. 
Furthermore, according to the panels, Article XXIII: 1 b on its own is not 
enough to bring a case in the GATT system; in other words, Article XXIII: 1 b 
does not provide an independent and definite cause of action170. It is the 
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 JACKSON J. Perspective on the Jurisprudence of International Trade: Costs and benefits of Legal 
Procedures in the United States 82 Michigan Law Review 1984 p. 1572. 
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 The main positions have been pro-diplomatic and flexible approach endorsed strongly by the European 
Union and the pro-adjudication and rule of law promoted by the United States. The EU argues that since GATT 
has a considerable degree of ambiguity and that international trade disputes contain a high amount of 
sovereign decisions, it is more convenient to have a flexible system that allows compromises, negotiations and 
mediations. On the other hand, the United States advocate for the reinforcement of predictability, 
transparency and shield against populist protectionist sprouts in the domestic environment by the 
enforcement of the WTO rules with a clear rule of law by means of adjudication. See a detailed explanation on 
US-EU interactions in the WTO in: BUSCH M  REINHARDT E. Transatlantic Trade Conflicts and GATT/WTO 
Dispute Settlement in PETERSMANN EU.  POLLACK M. Eds.Transatlantic Economic Disputes: The EU, the 
US and the WTO OUP 2003.p. 466. 
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 CHO, S. “GATT Non-Violation Issues in the WTO Dispute Settlement Framework: Are They the Achilles’ Heel 
of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process?”Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 39, No. 2, 1998 pp. 322. 
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Supra CHO p. 322. 
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understanding of the panels that it is only a subsidiary remedy in case the 
violation argument does not prosper. The contracting parties, confused by this 
case law outcome have been increasing the confusion by presenting cases with 
Non-Violation complaints paired up with violation claims171.  
 
 However, the decision on the Japan-Film case172 clarified that Non-Violation 
measures could only be considered as the cause of nullification and impairment 
when the complaining party proves the link between the measures and the 
nullification or impairment. In other words, the complainant carries the burden 
of proving a clear correlation between the measures and the alleged 
nullification or impairment173. 
 
 Another problem posed by the Non-Violation concept is that its development 
has been confined to the interpretation of GATT. This interpretation is 
unacceptable in other areas of trade such as the trade in negotiated services 
and regulated by GATS. The interpretation parameters given in the scarce case 
law are only useful if the complaint is related to trade concessions, but when 
the subject changes to trade in services, or specifically negotiated areas of 
trade such as textiles and intellectual property, the guidelines created by the 
cases fail and are rendered useless. 
 
 For instance, the notion of legitimate expectation as understood by the case 
law is incompatible with the GATS system of Schedules of Specific 
Commitments174 which are made individually and at different levels as per the 
principle of progressive liberalisation. As these are not made with the concept 
of reciprocity governing them, a different type of legitimate expectation must be 
created. Originally, legitimate expectations were connected to tariff 
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 In 14 out of 26 Non-Violation complaints 1947-1990 the complaining parties filed a Non-Violation 
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172
 This can also be seen in the Japan- Film case1998. 
173
 Infra Japan- Film 1998 para. 10.83. 
174
 GATS Art XX schedules of Specific Commitments. 
  
66 
 
concessions. In the case of GATS, legitimate expectations can only be 
connected to the schedule of the country, but if they are not given in exchange 
of anything specific, the link of causation becomes feeble between the 
concession and the expectation, and therefore it is difficult to construct the link 
to allow Non-Violation complaints in this context.  
 
 Even the benefits mentioned above are subject to modification in accordance 
with the text of other WTO agreements such as GATS. For example, a 
competitive market that is so clearly a benefit for the trade in goods becomes 
unclear as a benefit in the area of trade of services as defined by GATS. This 
occurs because trade in goods is governed by border measures whereas trade 
in services is regulated by domestic law175. For cases like this there is no case 
law framework to give guidelines to be used in the application of the Non-
Violation provision. This leaves all the decision-making to the panels that are 
entrusted to decide on a given case whether there has been nullification and 
impairment of benefits, and they have to accept or reject the benefits argued by 
the complainant party. 
 
 These problems amongst other practical difficulties have led scholars to 
suggest some methodological interpretative exercises to try to overcome the 
problem. The first approach that was attempted was to shift the Non-
Violation concept into a violation176 by seeing the measures brought under 
Non-Violation complaints as formal disguises of a discriminatory measure, 
which substantially would amount to a violation of the treaty177. 
 
 This would mean that many of the issues raised under the Non-Violation 
complaint would be treated as a breach of one of the obligations contained in 
the WTO agreements, narrowing the scope of Article XXIII: 1 b. This reading 
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 O'NEAL TAYLOR C, The Limits of Economic Power: Section 301 and the World Trade Organisation Dispute 
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has an implicit advantage which is the adaptation of Article XXIII: 1 b from the 
context of GATT, which considered diplomatic and political dispute resolution 
as acceptable, to the context of the WTO, which is an institution that intends to 
apply the rule of law. However, this approach is not completely novel as it 
encourages the panels and Appellate Body to read beyond the mere text of the 
provisions to look into the objectives and purposes of GATT in the context of 
the WTO, which is exactly what the chapeau of Article XXIII prescribes. 
 
 The thought that general and specific obligations may be read beyond the 
products and situations to which they are bound under Article II restricts the 
content of Article XXIII: 1 b whilst expanding the scope of application of Article 
XXIII: 1 a, by regarding as violations some conduct that may be formally in 
line with the WTO law, but that in fact detracts from the substantial purpose of a 
specific norm. The consequence of such interpretation is that benefits and 
market situations that have been outside the scope of the WTO deliberately by 
the lack of will of the Member States would come in through the back door of 
adjudication.  
 
 With this positive approach it would be unjustifiable, for example, not to take 
into account competition policies detrimental to international trade. More 
specifically, it may be discriminatory, as an integral part of the considerations 
necessary to solve disputes over most areas of trade. Administrative actions, 
policies and practices of the governments that evidence a bias against foreign 
competitors178 can also be interpreted as discriminatory and the national 
treatment provision can be read in a broad manner using the proposed 
interpretation of the Non-Violation provision, which was explained above.  
 
 The previous interpretation would expand the scope of legal obligations under 
the WTO system179, but it would not be against the DSU provision that allows 
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interpretation as long as it does not add or diminish the rights and obligations 
covered in the agreements, as the rights and obligations would be maintained 
and their content would be understood to be in accordance with the original 
negotiated principles and objectives of the WTO agreements. 
 
 There are practical challenges faced by this interpretation which render it 
inapplicable, and not theoretically plausible. Firstly, it defies the existing 
jurisprudence that reinforces the concept of Non-Violation and its application 
broadens the scope of the WTO agreements which is a politically unstable 
position that could lead to the deterioration of the whole organisation. Secondly, 
it requires an institutional framework that currently does not exist in the WTO 
and that demands technical experts as the process to convert Non-Violations 
into violations is intensive in fact-finding and technically complex.  
 
 The current structure of the WTO utilises panellists who are either trade 
diplomats, who represent their countries on the different WTO committees, or 
they are trade bureaucrats who have served as senior trade policy officials of 
the Member States180. This structure allows for technical, advisory or expert 
counselling, but should the panels be used in each Non-Violation claim with a 
view to converting the claim into a violation, it would be unfeasible due to the 
varied professional areas in which litigation can take place within the WTO181.  
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 Supra CHO p. 341. See also DSU Art. 8.1. 
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 According to Art .806 of the DSU, the panels are composed by nominees proposed by the Secretariat. They 
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not trade diplomats and have not been senior trade policy officials, they are normally academics or retired 
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settlement case”. 6.3 The panel stage. Available at 
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 It is known that the secretariat of the WTO is not capable of providing the kind 
of technical and professional support that would allow the panels to create 
violations from Non-Violation complaints. This challenge should not be 
underestimated as it is the administrative structure of the whole organisation 
that leads the way dispute resolution is understood in the field of international 
trade182.  
 
 A second approach to interpret the contents of Article XXIII: 1 b is the 
shift of the standards of review, where more relevance is given to the 
policies and measures implemented by the local governments in cases which 
involve cultural or policy decisions183 and measures that would in principle be 
considered nullifying or impairing a benefit, are put in place. This deference to 
the opinion of local governments over what is and what is not nullification or 
impairment of a benefit emerging from the WTO agreements, implies that the 
panels faced with controversies containing cultural characteristics defined by 
local governments need to do pre-reasoning before approaching the resolution 
of the dispute. Such pre-reasoning consists of deciding if the domestic 
governments have correctly determined what constitutes the essence of the 
case unless their determination is arbitrary and unjustifiable by any means. 
 
 In other words, the test of proportionality of the measure taken by a local 
government would start with a presumption that the domestic authorities are 
acting within the spirit of the WTO agreements provided that: a. they are not in 
clear breach, b. their action is justified for policy or cultural reasons and c. the 
measure is not so arbitrary as to appear to clearly transgress the spirit of the 
WTO agreements. Should the measure be so arbitrary, it would in itself 
constitute a violation.  
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 The difficulty with this approach is that it deviates too widely from the textual 
meaning of the provision and changes its content too drastically. In order to 
apply this interpretation in a non-conflict area, it has been suggested that it 
would be useful to solve the Non-Violation conflicts by searching for a way of 
cooperation between the parts in conflict184 before a dispute arises185. This is 
typical of the diplomatic cooperative system from which the WTO is trying to be 
separated and does not provide an acceptable interpretation of the valid 
provision contained in Article XXIII: 1 b. 
 
 In summary, the two methodological approaches that have intended to explain 
or apply Article XXIII: 1 b in a different way from what the text suggests are 
unenforceable because of the gap that separates the suggested interpretation 
and the legal text. Article XXIII: 1 bcovers conduct that is clearly not in breach 
of the contents of GATT. It is applicable independently from any breach or any 
other complaint based on Article XXIII: 1 a. This is why, despite having a 
specific procedure, certain areas of trade that have been specifically regulated 
and that do not expressly exclude the application of Article XXIII are covered by 
this provision in addition to the rules governing such specific areas of trade.  
 
 A third approach to the interpretation of Non-Violation complaints is the 
separation between specific obligations and legitimate expectations as general 
obligations. When specific obligations are established by the parties they are 
codified in the agreements and their breach leads to a violation of the 
agreements. Legitimate expectations on the other hand are derived either from 
general obligations or from the course of performance.  
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 The concept of legitimate expectations deriving from a general obligation is 
connected to the concept of a duty of care186. According to this understanding 
and in application of the neighbour principle, a WTO member would be liable 
for a WTO compliant action every time that this action affected a trade partner 
to whom a duty of care was owed. Member States stand in a care relationship 
to their trade partners to the extent that they can reasonably foresee a 
nullification or impairment for that specific trade partner emerging from their 
WTO compliant action. It can be stated that reasonable care can be deemed to 
have been applied whenever a measure is enforced with good faith and taking 
into account possible objections from the affected trade partners187.  
 
 This explains the need to prove legitimate expectations besides the nullification 
and impairment of benefits as well as the causal link between a measure taken 
in compliance with the WTO agreements and the undesired consequence.  
 
 The Non-Violation provision of Article XXIII provides a standard of objective 
liability. In other words, the standard is one of results, where a member state is 
liable for the consequences caused by its legitimate action. In this case, liability 
is attributed to the member state despite recognising that no responsibility is 
attributed to it, which reinforces the idea that the member state did not commit 
any wrong in relation to WTO law.  
 
 While no responsibility, in the sense of obligation [factual supposition] plus 
juridical consequence [in the form of sanction or otherwise] is attributed to the 
Member States that are attributed a duty of care towards their trading partners, 
liability is attributed to them in the mere sense of the obligation to provide 
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reparations as a consequence of an injury [nullification or impairment], 
regardless of the absence of subjective responsibility on the causation of the 
injury.  
  
 In the words of Alan Boyle, Initially the [International Law] Commission used 
these [responsibility and liability] terms interchangeably, but it eventually 
adopted the view that Responsibility was appropriate in cases involving a 
breach of obligation, while liability should be used in connection with activities 
which are otherwise lawful or involve no wrongful acts188. 
 
 This reasoning is constructed for the interpretation of Article XXIII: 1 b and 
derives from an examination of the international law189 beyond the WTO 
agreements in the assumption that despite being quite comprehensive, the 
WTO is not a self-contained system. This construction is allowed and 
suggested by Article 3.2 of the DSU190. 
 
                                                          
188
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 Therefore, the Non-Violation provision provides a liability in the sense 
explained by international law, as the consequence of a lawful measure191. To 
demonstrate its existence there must be a justification in treaty provisions or in 
customary international law. To equate the concept of Non-Violation with the 
concept of liability facilitates the task of interpretation and application in dispute 
resolution because the concept of liability is more known and understood in 
international jurisprudence than Non-Violation. This allows the use of 
conventional jurisprudence in the task of interpretation and application of the 
provision by the Member States to their trade partners and in the context of 
WTO litigation. 
 
 A fourth plausible understanding of this provision is the understanding that 
a member can access its protection when its rights or legitimate expectations 
are being affected by measures of uncertain legality192. In this case, the 
measure can be attacked by the affected member whenever it is impairing and 
nullifying benefits and its legality is not clear. In this event, the lawfulness and 
legality of the measure would not be a valid defence by the respondent 
member, which can extend the scope of the provision. This, however, is a 
discretionary power of the panels who are supposed to ascertain if measures 
affect WTO benefits or legitimate expectations even if they are not linked to any 
concession. 
 
 This possibility has been rejected with virulence by the established doctrine and 
the case in which it was contained has been called a ―wrong case‖193. 
(c) The existence of any other situation: The study of the situation complaint 
has not been attempted by any scholar or by the panels who have considered 
the application of the provision contained in Article XXIII: 1 cunattainable as 
this would be against the predictability and transparency of the system of the 
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WTO. In fact, the existence of any other situation implies that any situation 
different from a breach and different from a measure that is taken legitimately 
and that creates a nullification or impairment to the complaining party. This 
means that whilst the provisions in Article XXIII: 1 a and b cover the 
situations created voluntarily – illegitimately or legitimately – by a member 
state; the provision in Article XXIII: 1 c is directed to cover all the situations 
nullifying or impairing benefits regardless of whether they were expected or 
intended by the Member States. Situations generated by force majeure and 
acts of God would be covered by this provision if it was applied according to its 
text. 
 The inapplicability of this provision is undisputed amongst the adjudicating 
bodies in the WTO and the academy as its text is quite separated from the idea 
of negotiated concessions and reciprocal benefits. Also, it would undermine the 
idea of gradual liberalisation and would place the Member States in an 
environment of uncertainty and lack of sovereignty that is simply unsustainable 
for a multilateral organisation like the WTO that derives its institutional identity 
from the cooperation, negotiations and regulations of its members.  
In any event, a complaint of this sort may be brought by the members but it is 
deemed that it will not prosper since, should there be a situation outside the will of 
the Member States that affects the benefits of another member194, it probably also 
affects the internal balance and it would seem unreasonable to demand 
compensation, reparations or a change of conduct put in place to solve an 
unexpected and undesired situation.  
 
- The contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of 
the matter, make written representations or proposals to the other contracting 
party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any contracting party thus 
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approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations or 
proposals made to it: Article XXIII provides a first procedural step in the nullification 
and impairment complaints. Naturally, due to its diplomatic origin, it requires a 
bilateral communication with the party in potential conflict. It is important to note that 
this communication is not limited to a complaint or a mere description of the 
problematic situation by the aggrieved party, but it is designed to be a constructive 
exercise where the affected party may bring up a proposal to resolve the situation. 
The communication must be done in writing and it shall be addressed to either one 
party or all the parties involved in the issue concerning the affected party. 
There are two relevant aspects to highlight from the first step in the procedure of 
Article XXIII. Firstly, it is a parallel procedure from that established in the DSU, which 
can operate autonomously and directly between the parties in potential conflict. This 
is meant to facilitate diplomatic encounters, but it can also be useful to resolve 
communication problems that seem to be a source of conflict and once elucidated 
may avoid litigation. Secondly, the affected party is required to make representations 
and proposals to the other contracting party. This means that the affected party must 
have identified the problem, and must describe it in a way that is correct and 
represents not only the facts, but also the legal consequences – what exactly is the 
nullification or impairment, possible damages, links of causation, measures disputed, 
possible breach of obligations; and also, the aggrieved party is allowed to make 
proposals with a view to adjusting the matter satisfactorily. In other words, the 
affected party can produce a micro negotiation environment where both its interests 
and the ones of the other member are taken into account in order to lead to a 
resolution to the matter. The receiving party is obliged to give sympathetic 
consideration to such representations.  
The meaning of sympathetic considerations can be ethereal, but it may be described 
as the action of acknowledging receipt of the written representations and the action 
of giving them some degree of importance, thought, examination, contemplation, 
deliberation, attention and a response or consequence. The level of action can vary 
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in the country‘s administrative capacity and bureaucratic ability, but a reasonable 
period can always be determined on a case by case basis. 
This step is a threshold requirement that has to be exhausted in all the events of 
violation and Non-Violation complaints. If the complaint is based on a situation, the 
written representations can be left out in order to proceed directly to the second 
procedural aspect of this Article. 
- If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties 
concerned within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type described 
in paragraph 1 (c) of this Article, the matter may be referred to the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly 
investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make appropriate 
recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be 
concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate. The CONTRACTING 
PARTIES may consult with contracting parties, with the Economic and Social 
Council of the United Nations and with any appropriate inter-governmental 
organisation in cases where they consider such consultation necessary: The 
second step described in the provision itself, in the procedure established by Article 
XXIII gives the contracting parties direct access and jurisdiction to investigate the 
matter referred to them and make the corresponding recommendations or a ruling. 
Should the contracting parties find that it is justifiable, they may authorise the 
aggrieved party to lift concessions or waive them from their obligations under GATT. 
The party affected by this sanction has two options: a. to accept the waiver and 
continue its membership in the WTO or b. to withdraw from GATT. A third option 
could be formal dispute settlement. 
This section of the Article raises the question of whether it is possible for the WTO 
panels to recognise jurisdiction of the matters raised under Article XXIII over the 
direct knowledge of the matter by the contracting parties. The answer to this 
question becomes complicated due to the arrival of the WTO and WTO agreements 
in a principle of single undertaking to complement and be in harmony with GATT. 
More specifically, the query to be solved is whether this dispute resolution procedure 
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is supposed to be read independently from the dispute settlement understanding195 
created in the Uruguay Round of negotiations which creates a whole system of panel 
review and appeal process within the WTO, or if it is supposed to be read as part of 
it, and if its rules are applicable to it. 
The jurisdiction of the WTO over the trade disputes can be identified with a test of 
the relevant elements of jurisdiction: 
a. Subject-matter jurisdiction (the particular types of claims and proceedings 
that may be brought before a WTO tribunal196; 
 
b. Applicable law (the law that a panel or the Appellate Body may interpret and 
apply); and 
 
c. Inherent jurisdiction (the WTO‘s innate prerogatives, derived from its nature 
as a judicial body)197. 
 
There are a number of disputes in which the DSB has considered requests referred 
to provisions in GATT. Art XXIII is subject to the DSU198 and thus the jurisdiction of it 
over Art. XXIII is inherent. Therefore, provided that the nullification and impairment 
claim is related to any of the aspects covered by the WTO agreements and its 
objectives and purposes, and that Article XXIII is invoked as applicable law, it can be 
confirmed that the WTO dispute settlement procedures are applicable due to the 
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inherent jurisdiction given to them in the DSU, which must be read in conjunction 
with Article XXIII.  
In the jurisprudence established in the case of Mexico – Soft Drinks, the Appellate 
Body has established that the WTO panels have jurisdiction over WTO covered 
matters as follows: 
WTO panels have certain powers that are inherent in their adjudicative 
function. Notably, panels have the right to determine whether they 
have jurisdiction in a given case, as well as to determine the scope of 
their jurisdiction. In this regard, the Appellate Body has previously 
stated that “it is a widely accepted rule that an international tribunal is 
entitled to consider the issue of its own jurisdiction on its own initiative 
and to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case that comes 
before it.” Further, the Appellate Body has also explained that panels 
have “a margin of discretion to deal, always in accordance with due 
process, with specific situations that may arise in a particular case and 
that are not explicitly regulated199.” 
 
This indicates that despite the fact that Article XXIII gives jurisdiction to the 
contracting parties to consider and give a ruling over the matter, by signing the 
DSU; the contracting parties delegated that competence to the WTO panels, 
which, due to their inherent adjudicative function, are in a position to accept such 
jurisdiction and delimit its scope.  
 
- If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances are 
serious enough to justify such action, they may authorise a contracting party 
or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties 
of such concessions or other obligations under this agreement as they 
determine to be appropriate in the circumstances. If the application to any 
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contracting party of any concession or other obligation is in fact suspended, 
that contracting party shall then be free, not later than sixty days after such 
action is taken, to give written notice to the Executive Secretary to the 
contracting parties of its intention to withdraw from this agreement and such 
withdrawal shall take effect upon the sixtieth day following the day on which 
such notice is received by him: The second question that arises from the last 
paragraph of Article XIII refers to the remedies available for a situation of 
nullification, impairment or impossibility to attain WTO objectives when invoking Art 
XXIII as a cause of action. In most trade disputes solved by the WTO panels and 
reviewed by the Appellate Body, the remedies available are the withdrawal of the 
measure affecting a member state within a reasonable period of time as is described 
in Article 19 of the DSU: 
Article 19: Panel and Appellate Body Recommendations  
1. Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent 
with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned 
bring the measure into conformity with that agreement. In addition to its 
recommendations, the panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the 
Member concerned could implement the recommendations. 
6. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 3, in their findings and 
recommendations, the panel and Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the 
rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements. 
There are critics of this system of dispute resolution who argue that the remedies do 
not provide a satisfactory outcome of the issues presented to the panels because the 
system does not provide for specific remedies and leaves the adjudicating bodies 
free to suggest any recommendation that they deem convenient. It is argued then, 
that Customary International Law could be applicable to the WTO adjudication 
because it belongs inherently to the WTO system as it is not a self–contained system 
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of law200. It must be specified that Customary International Law only applies in the 
event of an internationally wrongful act, which would exclude the Non-Violation and 
situation complaints from its scope. However, this argument is useful in the 
application of Article XXIII because if it is possible for the WTO panels to apply 
norms that do not belong to the trade system according to the theory of inherent 
jurisdiction, it is even more plausible for them to incorporate the remedies of the DSU 
to the ones provided by Article XXIII. Furthermore, this is reinforced by the fact that 
Article XXIII does not contain any restrictive clause or wording that indicates that the 
remedies thereby contained are available exclusive of other remedies subsequently 
added to GATT.  
This reading makes the applicability of the nullification or impairment provision more 
plausible in practice because the specific remedy for the situations in which the 
panels201find that the nullification or impairment justifies it. The remedy in Art XXIII 
only allows for the waiver of the obligation and authorisation to lift concessions 
previously negotiated and does not contain any resource of appeal or revision, which 
makes it quite stringent and impractical. Meanwhile, by applying Article 19 of the 
DSU, the panels can suggest an array of measures to settle the situation without 
imposing a burden as onerous as the waiver of obligations and the possible 
withdrawal from the WTO of the member that has nullified or impaired the benefits of 
another with its conduct.  
Apart from its evident practicality and the natural convenience of this reading of the 
provision, it is also in accordance with the principle single undertaking and the fact 
that the DSU was issued subsequent to Article XXIII and that instead of providing an 
alteration to its composition it provides an alternative method for the settling of the 
dispute. In other words, Article 19 is not self-contradictory because it does not add or 
diminish to the provision contained in the last paragraph of the nullification and 
impairment article, but instead it provides a general and alternative procedure; it is 
                                                          
200
 MAVROIDIS P. “Remedies in the WTO legal System: Between a Rock and a hard Place”. European Journal of 
International Law, Volume 11, Number 4, 2000, pp. 763-813. 
201
Acting as delegates of the Contracting Parties. 
  
81 
 
the prerogative of the adjudicators to use their discretion to use either of the 
available procedures.  
In summary it can be said that Article XXIII contains damage nullification, 
impairment of vested benefits emanating from the agreement, or impossibility to 
attain the agreement‘s objectives that needs to be proven and linked to one of the 
causes of actions described in the same provision and that could be described as a 
cascade of causes of actions. The first level of causation that can trigger the 
application of Article XXIII departs from a positive action or omission from the 
affecting the member state which results in a violation of a provision contained in 
the WTO agreements – without prejudice to other available remedies contained 
elsewhere in the agreement. 
The second level of causation can be understood as a positive action or omission 
from the affecting member state that is compliant with the agreement at least 
formally, which has been called by the academia Non-Violation. 
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Finally, the third part of the causation sequence described in Article XXIII ends in a 
mere situation not caused or intended by the affecting Member State that can 
be an act of God, an unforeseen natural situation or an externality in the economic 
sense of the word202. 
 
Since the panorama for the interpretation and application scenarios of Article XXIII is 
still quite obscure, it is imperative to revise the origins in depth, justifications and 
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Figure 2: Graphical depiction of the dimensions of Nullification and Impairment 
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construction of Article XXIII to be able to give a reasonable estimate of its 
applicability in a WTO context. 
 
2.4 Historical Account of the provisions contained in Article XXIII GATT 
 
In order to produce an analysis of the applicability of Article XXIII in the context of the 
WTO, it is pertinent to conduct an historical account of the provisions. This will lead 
to an exact understanding of the purposes for which it was created and will help to 
design a strategy to implement it within the context of WTO. Firstly, it must be 
remarked that when GATT was drafted, the only concessions offered were tariff 
reductions and it was understood that tariff reductions could be bypassed by 
measures not contained in the agreement such as competition policy, subsidies, and 
product regulation with legitimate aims. In order to prevent the frustration of the 
agreement‘s object, the unconventional remedy of Non-Violation complaints was 
created, and it responded to the reality of the political character of the GATT 1947203.  
 
 
2.4.1 Negotiation 
 
The political environment of GATT negotiations was marked by the end of the 
Second World War, since the GATT, as part of the Bretton Woods system, was seen 
as a tool to reach the goals of the system through free trade using the format of the 
already established bilateral trade agreements that the United States had created 
before the Second World War204. The keynote of those agreements was the concept 
of reciprocity which the United States considered fundamental for its negotiations. 
Therefore, GATT was designed to be a system of tariff reductions with reciprocity205.  
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The provision of Nullification and Impairment emerged in an environment of legal 
uncertainty from the drafters of GATT. Even more so, the lack of sound permanence 
and the probability of contracting parties evading the agreed tariff reductions by 
implementing measures not covered in the agreement206 created suspicion amongst 
the signing countries. The Non-Violation provision contained in Article XXIII of GATT 
was designed as a political solution created to assure the countries that they could 
still take action in the absence of a tangible breach when their benefits in GATT were 
nullified or impaired. Should this be the case, the affected country, in the mind of the 
GATT drafters, could resort to the Non-Violation provision and obtain compensation 
for the lost benefit. 
 
The main concern at the time was to ensure that the contracting parties effectively 
obtained the tariff concession. The distinction between breach and Non-Violation 
action was as important for the negotiation as it was to provide an emergency 
escape door for the countries that saw their agreed benefit diminished due to 
another party‘s actions. This escape valve was inserted without a thorough analysis, 
so the ambiguity of its wording has been present since the very beginning of GATT. 
Some experts in the field classify this provision as one of the ―birth defects‖ of 
GATT207. 
 
2.4.2 Crafting of Article XXIII 
The final text adopted as Article XXIII was achieved only after six stages of 
drafting208: 
1. League of Nations suggestion on Equitable Treatment Draft (July 1933): After 
the war, countries were interested in promoting trade by implementing what 
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was called a customs truce209 and the negotiators were concerned that the 
success of the concessions would be jeopardised by non-tariff protectionist 
measures that would render the effect of the concessions worthless. An early 
report from the League of Nations (International Economic Conference, Geneva 
1927) stated that there were four types of indirect protection:  
- Subsidies 
- Dumping and Anti-Dumping Legislation  
- Discrimination arising from the conditions of transport, and  
- Fiscal measures discriminating against foreign goods210. 
However, after the 1927 report no measures were taken and discussions were 
reopened in the Conference of the League of Nations in 1930, where the need to 
abolish indirect protectionism was reiterated and the mandate to create an extensive 
list of the measures used as indirect protectionism was given to the secretariat. A 
duty to inform the secretariat of these measures was extended to all the Member 
States. 
Finally, the London Monetary Economic Conference held in 1933 addressed the 
issue. The US department of Commerce drafted a memorandum specifically pointing 
out that: 
a. The measures that were susceptible to becoming indirect protectionism were 
not condemnable in all cases. 
b. Many of the measures that could constitute indirect protectionism had 
legitimate purposes211. 
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c. The relevant question in order to safeguard Member States from indirect 
protectionism was not whether the measures would be acceptable, but to 
what extent. 
In the words of the US Department of Commerce representative, Henry Chalmers: 
I shall, therefore, assume in this study that under the term "indirect protectionism" 
might be included all measures – other than regular import duties and routine 
customs regulations – whether legislative of origin, or whether originating with 
ministerial, regulatory or administrative branches of governments, which in their 
purpose, or in their effect, tend unreasonably to hamper the movement of 
International trade, and to afford additional protection to the domestic producers, 
through the increasing difficulty of effecting importations212.  
This insight generated the formation of a sub-commission dedicated to study and 
address the problematic area of measures that could be justifiable but harmful to 
trade at the same time. The submission of Yugoslavia highlighted in an exhaustive 
manner the possible problems that the tariff truce could face should the League of 
Nations neglect to address the issue of indirect protectionism; also the Yugoslav 
representative proposed three clauses to promote good faith amongst the parties: 
a. The parties would agree not to impose new burdens on trade without informing 
the other parties 
b. The parties would agree to restrain from implementing new burdens on trade 
that would affect goods already en route, and 
c. The parties would restrain from creating new burdens on trade during exporting 
season213.  
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These proposals were pondered by the parties under the international law premises 
of the time. At that time, the principle of good faith was not part of the international 
law principles and a legal positivist approach prevailed during the time of the 
negotiations. Nonetheless, the generalised feeling was that a broader and more 
general provision was more effective than the most comprehensive and exhaustive 
list of possible indirect protectionism measures. 
At the meeting of the sub-commission, a proposal previously prepared by the 
American delegate Fred Nielsen upon request from the secretariat was put forward. 
This proposal contained the clause that was originally included by the United States 
in its bilateral agreements. The proposed version of a fair and equitable clause was 
finally presented as:  
The High Contracting Parties agree that, if one of the 
Contracting Parties introduces, after the conclusion of the 
present treaty, any measure, even of an internal nature, 
capable of materially altering the de facto situation, created by 
the present treaty, to the Prejudice of the other Party, the first 
party shall not refuse to consider in a friendly spirit any 
complaints or proposals that may be made by the other Party, 
or to enter into negotiations with that Party with a view to 
seeking the best means of re-establishing the disturbed 
equilibrium214 
Slight modifications to the text of the clause were made before final submission and 
a fair and equitable clause introduced the expression of nullification and impairment 
in the London conference final report as follows: 
If, subsequent to the conclusion of the Treaty, one of the 
Contracting Parties introduces any measure, which even 
though it does not result in an infringement of terms of the 
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treaty, is considered by the other party to be of such nature as 
to have the effect of nullifying or impairing any object of 
the treaty, the former shall not refuse to enter into 
negotiations with the purpose either of an examination of 
proposals made by the latter or of the friendly adjustment of 
any complaint preferred by it215. 
This clause was understood by the parties to be a simple and effective strategy 
against all forms of indirect protectionism that were not addressed specifically in the 
conference216 and that would no doubt emerge in international trade. It was adopted 
in the Conference Report.  
2. Bilateral trade agreements 1930 and 1940:  
At the London conference it was suggested that the parties should create a sub-
commission on indirect protection, which in its turn suggested the inclusion of a fair 
and equitable treatment clause in the bilateral trade agreements. This marks the 
second stage of evolution of the current Nullification and Impairment clause in GATT. 
The United States had great influence in the International Trade Organization(ITO) 
discussions, the language used in its own bilateral trade agreements was supported 
and pushed in the ITO not only by the United States themselves, but also by their 
trade partners with whom they had already signed bilateral trade agreements.  
After the London conference, the US Congress passed the US Reciprocal Trade Act 
in 1934 where the terms of the fair and equitable clause from the London conference 
came back under the instructions of Secretary of State Cordell Hull as a guarantee to 
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secure the negotiated tariff concessions and as a way of keeping them from indirect 
protectionism by very definite substitutes for the functions of a tariff217. 
The fair and equitable treatment clause was not for the exclusive use of the United 
States. Other countries decided to use either the same clause or a very similar one218 
and in some cases even a broader clause219 in their own bilateral trade agreements. 
Some countries included more specific clauses in their trade agreements220, but they 
were all intended to tackle the issue of unforeseen trade flow distortions. 
 
3. Suggested charter for International Trade Organisation (ITO) (September 
1946): 
Despite the fact that the ITO was never ratified and an international trade 
organisation with a binding rule of law was not launched until the creation of the 
WTO, the GATT as a multilateral treaty contained the trade regulations discussed 
and adopted by the member countries.  
The United States submitted a suggested charter for the ITO in 1946 in which it 
included five chapters: Commercial Policy, Employment Policy, Restrictive Business 
Practices and Commodity Agreements. The initial Nullification and Impairment 
(including Non Violation) clause was meant to be applicable only to the Commercial 
Policy chapter despite the fact that the dispute settlement mechanism they had 
proposed was intended to cover all chapters. This showed their intention of making 
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Commercial Policy a separate agreement221. The text of the suggested Article 30 
was as follows: 
Each member shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and 
will afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, 
such representation as may be made by any other member 
with respect to the operations of customs regulations and 
formalities, quantitative and exchange regulations, state 
trading operations, sanitary laws and regulations for the 
protection of human, animal or plant life or health, and 
generally all matters affecting the operation of this chapter. 
Moreover, if any member should consider that any 
measure adopted by any other member, whether or not it 
conflicts with the terms of this Chapter, has the effect of 
nullifying or impairing any object of this Chapter, such 
other Member shall give sympathetic consideration to 
such written representations or proposals as may be 
made with a view to effecting a mutually satisfactory 
adjustment to the matter. If no such adjustment can be 
effected, either Member shall be free to refer the matter to 
the Organisation, which shall investigate the matter and 
make appropriate recommendations to the members 
concerned. The Organisation, if it considers the case serious 
enough to justify such action, may determine that the 
complaining Member is entitled to suspend the application to 
the other Member of specified obligations or concessions 
under this Chapter, and if such obligations or concessions 
are in fact suspended, such other Member shall then be free, 
within sixty days after such action is taken to withdraw from 
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the Organisation on sixty‟s days‟ written notice to the 
Organisation222. 
This text kept the spirit of the suggestions presented formerly by the US government 
but goes beyond it by including a set of institutional remedies to facilitate 
negotiations between the members concerned. Additionally, it allows the member 
whose conduct is nullifying or impairing the rights of another member, to exit from 
the Organisation should the negotiations fail and the previously authorised 
withdrawal of trade concessions occur. 
4. London Draft 1946 
During the London conference nullification and impairment was altered in two 
meaningful manners. Firstly, its scope of application was broadened as in the 
suggested Charter it was intended to be applicable only to the Commercial chapter, 
but in the London conference the same provision, intended to be applicable for the 
whole Charter, that is, the restriction to the Commercial Policy chapter was 
eliminated, extending the scope of the provision to the whole agreement223. Also, in 
this provision there is an interesting remark in the sense of broadening the 
applicability of this Article by modifying the suggested Charter in order to allow any 
member […] to request the Organisation to set aside any Obligations under Chapter 
V; it also authorises the organisation to set aside such obligation in the event on 
any situation arising, whether or not caused by action by another member, 
which would nullify or impair any object of the charter224. 
The vague circumstances in which it was conceived that a contracting party could 
request consultations and the ILO could set aside any obligations under the chapter 
of Inter-Governmental Commodity Arrangements was suggested by the US Delegate 
Hawkins, who saw this expansion as an attempt to protect not only the letter of the 
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 Report on the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Employment U.N. Doc E/P/T/33 1946 [London Draft]. Chapter III: General Commercial Policy, Section A- 4 
Consultations- Nullification and Impairment. 
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agreement, but also its spirit225. What this remark can tell us is that since the London 
draft there has been an interest in protecting the Member States not only from 
breaches as conventionally known, but also to protect the objectives and purposes of 
the GATT within an institutional framework despite the legal loopholes to circumvent 
concessions. It is clear that this referred exclusively to tariff concessions, which 
could be easily bypassed by many non-tariff measures, but also by the use of 
legitimate prerogatives given by the system in detriment of a contracting party. This 
version was very controversial because it posed an unjustified sanction in the sense 
that any party could be the subject of action despite its substantial adherence to the 
treaty.  
5. Geneva Draft 1947 
The ample scope given to the nullification and impairment article was a worrisome 
matter for the negotiators, who redrafted it in the negotiation session that took place 
in Geneva. In this draft the tone of the current structure of the provision was 
achieved by using the new proposals offered during the Geneva negotiating session. 
These proposals were brought by the Australian delegate who presented a more 
moderated provision which allowed a complaint if any benefit accorded to it [the 
complaining contracting party] directly or indirectly by this Charter is being nullified or 
impaired or the promotion by it of any of the Purposes of this Charter is being 
impeded226. 
Also, the cause of action was restricted by the acceptance of the Australian 
delegate‘s proposal to give a cascade of three types for which these complaints 
could be brought; these three types are [i] the application by another member of any 
measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Charter; or [ii] the 
failure of another member to carry out its obligations under this Charter; or [iii] the 
existence of any other situation.  
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E/PC/T/C.II/PRO/PV/9. Connie Hawkins at the Preparatory Committee of the International Conference on 
Trade and Employment - Verbatim Report of the Ninth Meeting of the procedure Sub-Committee of 
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By creating causes of actions, the scope of the provision was defined in terms of 
benefits. One aspect remained in the provision of the Geneva draft from the London 
draft, it was the fact that a complaint could originate in benefits originated anywhere 
in the Charter and thus the benefits were not confined to the Commercial Policy 
chapter. Finally, another significant modification to the proposal was the creation of 
categories of claim227; this meant that the affected benefits should have a causal link 
to a defined measure contained in any of the types proposed, which in turn allowed a 
different standard of proof for each type of cause of action228.  
The structure of the Geneva draft was an important evolutionary advance for the 
nullification and impairment concept because it was an attempt to narrow the scope 
and give exactitude to the proposals made by the US delegate during the London 
session. Additionally it created the idea of types of complaints which later became 
interpreted as degrees for the vertical structure in which the Article is drafted.  
6. October 1947- Final GATT text. 
Before the Havana Charter of 1948, a group of 25 countries negotiated an 
agreement separately. This agreement was an accord on tariffs drafted under the 
auspices of the Preparatory Committee in charge of the draft of the final ITO charter. 
Using the Geneva draft and schedules of tariff commitments made by the 25 
countries GATT was born as the Geneva Final Act229. It was signed as a temporary 
arrangement before the ITO was established. As the Havana Charter was never 
ratified, the agreement signed in October 1947 was the final text that ruled on the 
trade in goods for most of the rest of the century230. 
The Nullification and Impairment provision was included in GATT as it was drafted in 
the Geneva session of negotiations, but the references to the Organisation were 
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removed because at the time of its signature there was no organisation in place. The 
term Organisation was replaced by ―Contracting Parties‖. The provision with that sole 
modification was placed in Article XXIII.  
Remarkably, the nullification and impairment procedure was the only dispute 
settlement provision included in GATT231. There was a Protocol of Provisional 
Application which became instrumental in the GATT period of operation. 
 
2.4.3 Documentation of the Drafts and final version of the GATT 1947232 
 Table 1: Chronological documentation towards the final GATT - Draft name, description and 
document number
233
.   
Document  Document No.  
A Proposal for an International Commercial Union 
(James Meade): In this document the notion of an 
International Clearing Union is introduced as a 
regulatory institution to keep the balance of payments of 
all members adjusted. This was conceived as a premise 
for a Commercial Union. The works of the Clearing 
Union would allow the members to withdraw 
concessions if and when balance of payments has an 
excess debit according to the Clearing Union. Upon 
creation of a Commercial Union, the concept of National 
Treatment was outlined with several exceptions to 
provide for post-war recovery. There is no mention of 
nullification and impairment measures. 
None 
 
Suggested Charter for an International Trade None 
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Organisation of the United Nations (U.S. State 
Department Proposal) September 1946: In the 
Suggested Charter 1946 the US government includes 
and explains in detail the concepts of Most Favoured 
Nation and National Treatment as the basis of a 
Multilateral Trade Agreement. In Article 30 of this 
document the idea of nullification and impairment is 
applicable only to the commercial chapter. 
 
London Draft. November 1946: As was explained 
above, the London draft was mostly controversial for its 
implicit protection of the spirit of the Treaty.  
E/PC/T/33  
Tentative and Non-Committal Draft Suggested by 
the Delegation of the United States. February 7, 1947 
E/PC/T/C.6/W.5
3 
Draft of February 15, 1947 E/PC/T/C.6/85 
New York Draft. March 5, 1947 E/PC/T/34 
Draft of July 24, 1947 E/PC/T/135 
Geneva Draft August 30, 1947. The London draft was 
moderated to include the structure that was kept in the 
final agreement. Types of causes of actions were 
created. The ambiguous language in Article XXIII: 1 b 
was introduced in this draft234.  
E/PC/T/189 
Draft of September 10, 1947 E/PC/T/186 
Draft of September 13, 1947 E/PC/T/196 
Draft of October 4, 1947 (Draft Final Act) E/PC/T/214, 
Add.1, Rev.1 
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Final Act, GATT and Protocol of Provisional 
Application 
October 30, 1947 
None 
FINAL ACT OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT: 
Havana Charter 
None 
HAVANA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE ORGANISATION 
March 24, 1948 
The Havana Charter provided for the creation of the 
International Trade Organisation ITO. This 
organisation was meant to take its place beside the 
other institutions of Bretton Woods, the IMF and the 
World Bank. The Havana Charter contained a 
Commercial Policy chapter – which was contained in 
GATT 1947 – as well as chapters on economic activity, 
development, reconstruction, and restrictive trade 
practices. The Havana Charter was never ratified by the 
United States; therefore it never entered into force235.  
 
However in this Charter the provision of nullification and 
impairment underwent two subtle changes that can 
clarify and also modify the interpretation of this rule. 
Firstly, the name was changed from nullification and 
impairment to Consultation and Arbitration. This leads 
one to believe that the nullification and impairment 
norms were intended to be integral part of an incipient 
system of dispute resolution within the ITO. 
UN Doc. 
E/Conf. 2178 
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Secondly, the chapeau was drafted in a broader manner 
than the Geneva draft and the final text of GATT by 
including the words implicitly or explicitly. 
Finally, the Havana Charter draft clarified the types of 
courses of action into a breach, a measure not 
conflicting with the Charter, that is, a non-breach, in 
other words, a Non-Violation; and any other situation. 
This last category was not given any further qualification 
in the Havana Charter, hence its scope and actual 
significance remains obscure in this particular draft: 
Consultation and Arbitration 
1. If any member considers that any benefit 
accruing to it directly or indirectly, implicitly 
or explicitly, under any of the provisions of this 
Charter other than Article 1, is being nullified or 
impaired as a result of, 
a. A breach by a member of an obligation under this 
Charter by action or failure to act, or 
b. The application by a member of a measure not 
conflicting with the provisions of this Charter 
c. The existence of any other situation 
The member may, with a view to the satisfactory 
adjustment of the matter, make written representations 
or proposals to such other member or members as it 
considers to be concerned and the members receiving 
them shall give sympathetic consideration thereto. 
 
It is recognised that the provision in Article XXIII was a tool for the contracting parties 
to veto undesired trade actions from foreign countries. However, the understanding 
of this rule has been slightly shaped, subjecting its use to the moderation of the WTO 
judicial structure and restricting it to a favourable decision from a panel or the 
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Appellate Body. This implies that the original meaning of Article XXIII has been 
weakened in substantial content because the existence of a benefit nullified or 
impaired is subject to approval from the Appellate Body and thus to its interpretation 
of the effective content of the Non-Violation claim. In the words of a former WTO 
insider: 
The negotiators of the GATT thus regarded the concept of Non-Violation 
nullification or impairment as a benchmark guiding consultations, 
negotiations and multilateral decision-making. They did not envisage the 
application of the concept in binding third-part adjudication procedure. The 
Contracting Parties to the GATT 1947 applied the concept in the context 
of procedures under which each contracting party had the possibility to 
block the adoption of a finding of nullification or impairment. The open-
ended nature of the concept of nullification or impairment did not entail a 
threat to the sovereignty of the Contracting Parties. Under the WTO 
Agreement, however, the decisions determining the benefits that might 
accrue under a provision in addition to the benefit of its observation would 
be determined by the Appellate Body, whose decisions must be 
unconditionally accepted. What has thus happened, more by accident 
than by design, is that the power of an independent tribunal to hand out 
licenses to retaliate is defined by a legal concept that originally served to 
define the scope of the obligation to consult under bilateral trade 
agreements236. 
 
At this point it is pertinent to take into account that the dispute settlement system 
designed by GATT was meant to be solved by the Member States directly, and there 
was no delegation to an independent third party at any point of the dispute. This 
system was completely diplomatic as opposed to legal; the main legal achievement 
meant by the parties was the granting of tariff concessions237, the rest of the system 
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was conceived to be a diplomatic facilitation rather than a juridical order with binding 
adjudication.  
 
Due to the evolution of the trading system and the creation of the WTO, the dispute 
resolution system has shifted from a diplomatic solution to a rule of law adjudication 
which is regulated in the DSU without prejudice to other procedures contained in the 
GATT. As was explained above, the DSU contains procedural rules of mandatory 
application. However, they did not overrule the procedures contained in GATT, 
including the one contained in Art XXIII. Yet, it must be reiterated that the procedure 
contained in the DSU gives a possible and acceptable outcome of the dispute 
settlement, whereas Article XXIII, read in isolation, is simply inapplicable due to the 
great burden it places on the parties involved.  
 
2.5 Scope of Article XXIII 
In order to apply the consequences of Article XXIII to any of the Non-Violation 
behaviours specified above, a survey of its structure, design and evolution must take 
place. This will also help to understand the mandate of the Appellate Body with 
regards to the application of this Article and eventually will lead to an interpretation 
that harmonises with the rest of the WTO agreements with the provision contained in 
Article XXIII. That survey must be linked to the second question to answer regarding 
the interpretation of Article XXIII, which is whether Article XXIII can be interpreted to 
extend the Non-Violation claims to:  
2.5.1 Conducts included in the negotiated agreements but which cause nullification 
and impairment of benefits accrued to the member state by GATT or any of the WTO 
agreements 
When subparagraph (b) of Article XXIII: 1 states that any member may bring a 
complaint when it considers that a benefit has been impaired by ―the application by 
another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the 
provisions of this Agreement” the letter of the provision suggests that actions that are 
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compliant with the agreement can also trigger its application as long as in the 
opinion of the member state there is a nullification or impairment of such benefits.  
It is important to note that the wording of the chapeau238 gives a broad spectrum for 
the member state to define the conduct when it leaves the power of defining the 
nullification or impairment to the discretion of the affected member state. At a first 
glance, a perfectly compliant measure of a negotiated agreement could potentially 
become subject to a Non-Violation complaint. However, the Member States would 
not have the liberty of defining a conduct as nullifying or impairing within the areas 
subject to existing agreements because they have exercised their sovereignty, and 
freely limited their scope of action in the areas where they have defined lawful and 
unlawful conducts and remedies for them.  
In principle, the issue of conducts that are included in the negotiated agreements but 
that cause nullification and impairment of benefits accrued to the member state by 
GATT or any of the WTO agreements would be settled by the rationale mentioned 
above. This reasoning appeals prima facie as logical and could be strongly defended 
if it was not for the incoherence that emerges when examining the content of the 
different WTO agreements with respect to these types of claims. Some agreements, 
like the TRIPS239and the Agreement on Agriculture240 have expressly excluded the 
Non-Violation complaint from the scope of their dispute resolution mechanism for a 
specific period of time. Others, like GATS241 have limited the scope242 of Non-
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Violation complaints, and some, like the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing243, have 
gone even further by definitively excluding the Non-Violation complaints from their 
dispute settlement system244.  
There is a problem in the fact that some WTO agreements that have not taken into 
account the provisions of Article XXIII are excluded from the application of the Non-
Violation provisions only for the specific nature of the commitments contained in 
them, and yet its interpretation cannot be extended to existing WTO agreements that 
do not expressly exclude its application. This issue is partially solved by 
understanding the complaints emerging from negotiated conducts as ―violations‖ and 
by giving them the procedure and remedies foreseen in their specific WTO 
regulation, or by applying subparagraph (a) of Article XXIII. The problem is then 
reduced to actions that are in compliance of all WTO agreements but that a member 
state considers a nullification or impairment of its benefits under the WTO 
undertakings.  
This problem can occur in two different forms: either as exceptions under Article XX, 
which are susceptible to challenge under Article XXIII; or in the form of regulatory 
protectionism245. As exceptions under Article XX, the Non-Violation complaints have 
been raised in residual arguments of Member States against the exception provided 
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in Article XX; this is the case of EC-Asbestos246 where the Non-Violation complaints 
were used as a last resort to defend the legitimacy of a complaint that was against 
basic environmental regulations. In the specific EC-Asbestos case, the use of the 
provision was senseless because the measure against trade could have been 
reasonably expected; it is unreasonable to expect countries to allow trade of 
hazardous items. Furthermore, the use of Article XXIII against measures covered by 
the exceptions of Article XX is not legally feasible, because the acceptance given to 
the Article containing the exceptions is in itself a self-restricting positive action that 
makes it unreasonable to expect benefits in contradiction of it. 
On the other hand, it may be more plausible to engage in the issue of the 
applicability of Article XXIII in the scenario of regulatory protectionism. In this case, a 
member state can formally comply with the WTO agreements, but the local 
regulations may be a real obstacle in attaining trade objectives. In the past, these 
considerations have been made in the handful of cases that dealt with Non-Violation 
complaints either in GATT or in the WTO creating the precarious and sometimes 
contradictory jurisprudence about the issue in international trade law. 
 
2.5.2 Case Law Survey 
In comparison with the number of reports before and after the WTO was constituted, 
it is remarkable that the number of reports regarding Non-Violation complaints is only 
slightly more than a dozen, and that the cases that have engaged with the analysis 
of the Article are just five. From this scarce jurisprudence, it is very difficult to draw 
meaningful jurisprudential landmarks to clarify the meaning of the provision in Article 
XXIII (b). However, the reports shed some light on the requirements needed to lodge 
a complaint of the Non-Violation sort. Also, the very absence of heavy litigation on 
the point indicates that the point of Non-Violation complaints are not one of moot. 
Nonetheless, and in the interest of coherence and plenitude of the legal system of 
international trade law, it is important to explore whether the use of this kind of 
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complaint is available as a tool for controlling the disguised protectionist conduct of 
Member States. 
In the Asbestos case247, the Appellate Body cites all the cases where the Non-
Violation complaints have been raised as well as their outcomes248. According to this 
panel report and with the addition of US-Offset Act249there have been 15 cases in 
which a claim under Article XXIII: 1(b) has been considered by working parties, 
panels, and, now, the Appellate Body. In six of these cases, the claim under 
Article XXIII: 1(b) was successful and, on three of these occasions, the report was 
adopted. The successful claims were made in: Australia – Ammonium Sulphate 
(adopted 3 April 1950), Germany – Sardines (adopted 31 October 1952), EC – Citrus 
Products (unadopted), EEC – Canned Fruit (unadopted), EEC – Oilseeds (adopted 
25 January 1990) and EEC – Oilseeds II (unadopted)250. 
Each of the adopted cases has introduced one or more aspects to take into account 
for the interpretation of Article XXIII and they also give some clues about the 
applicability of the provision of conduct covered by the WTO agreements. A case by 
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case analysis is pertinent in order to have accurate findings from the jurisprudence 
before performing a thorough interpretative analysis. It is important to note that all 
the adopted cases are pre-Uruguay Round, thus the jurisprudence regarding this 
provision emerges from pre WTO cases where the report has either not been 
adopted and from WTO cases where the claim for application of Article XXIII has not 
been successful. 
Australia – Ammonium Sulphate (adopted 3 April 1950)251 
Measure challenged: The removal, on 1 July 1949, of nitrate of soda from the pool 
of nitrogenous fertilizers which was subsidised by the Australian Government.  
 
It was then considered whether the measure taken by the Australian Government 
constituted a failure by the Australian Government to carry out its obligations under 
the Agreement, within the terms of Article XXIII 
Relevant Findings :(...) the Chilean Government could not have been expected 
during the negotiations in 1947 to have foreseen such action or the reasons 
which led to it. [Emphasis added] 
 
Application of Article XXIII: There is in their view nothing in Article XXIII which 
would empower the CONTRACTING PARTIES to require a contracting party to 
withdraw or reduce a consumption subsidy such as that applied by the Government 
of Australia to ammonium sulphate, and the recommendation made by the working 
party should not be taken to imply the contrary. 
 
The ultimate power of the CONTRACTING PARTIES under Article XXIII is that of 
authorising an affected contracting party to suspend the application of appropriate 
obligations or concessions under the General Agreement. The sole reason why the 
adjustment of subsidies to remove any competitive inequality between the two 
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products arising from subsidisation is recommended is that, in this particular case, it 
happens that such action appears to afford the best prospect of an adjustment of the 
matter satisfactory to both parties. 
 
Type of measure in dispute (Covered by GATT or not covered by GATT): GATT 
consistent measure. 
 
(…) the value of a concession granted to Chile had been impaired as a result of a 
measure which did not conflict with the provisions of the General Agreement, the 
working party came to the conclusion that there was no infringement of the 
Agreement by Australia. Since Chile had not applied for a release from any of its 
obligations, under the provision of the last two sentences of Article XXIII, paragraph 
2, and it was moreover hoped that an adjustment of the matter satisfactory to both 
parties could be reached (without prejudice to the views of either on the merits of the 
case). 
 
Analysis: This case has applied Article XXIII to a measure that is GATT consistent, 
meaning that the scope analysed by the working party was within the conduct that is 
covered and allowed by the relevant agreements, GATT in this case. It is important 
because it brings two relevant considerations regarding the applicability of Non 
Violation complaints. 
Firstly, it introduces the notion of legitimate or reasonable expectations by pointing 
out that the issue in dispute could not have been expected or foreseen by the 
complainant. This concept will be refined in future cases as will be explained below. 
Secondly, it clarifies the scope of the provision by explaining that under Article XXIII, 
the affected party may only seek authorisation to remove a concession equivalent to 
the nullification or impairment suffered in order to level the playing field. In other 
words, the limits of the provision according to this case are that the affected party 
may reduce a concession in proportion to the nullification or impairment proven by a 
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legitimate measure that was not reasonably expected or foreseen at the time of 
acquisition of the GATT commitments.  
In summary, from this case three requirements can be extracted in order to apply 
NVNI (Non-Violation Nullification and Impairment) claims: 
(1) A concession that was negotiated and exists;  
(2) A measure that when applied upsets the established competitive relationship; 
and  
(3) The measure could not have been reasonably anticipated at the time the 
concession was negotiated. 
 
 
Germany – Sardines 1952252 
Measures Challenged: 
a) The imposition, as from 1 October 1951, of an import duty of14 per cent on 
preparations of clupea pilchardus as compared with a duty of 20 per cent for clupea  
harengus and 25 per cent for clupea sprattus, 
 
b) The application as from 16 November 1951 of a charge equivalent to the German 
turnover tax at a rate of 4 per cent on preparations of clupea pilchardus and of 6 per 
cent on preparations of clupea sprattus and clupea harengus, and (c) the removal of 
quantitative restrictions on preparations of clupea pilchardus while these restrictions 
were maintained on the preparations of the other varieties. It then considered 
whether the aforementioned measures taken by the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany constituted, within the terms of Article XXIII:1 (a), a failure by 
that Government to carry out its obligations under the Agreement253. 
 
                                                          
252
Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines Report adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES on 31 October 
1952 G/26 - 1S/53. 
253
 Supra- Sardines. 
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Relevant Findings: 11. The Panel noted that the difference of treatment was not 
based on the origin of the goods but on the assumption that preparations of clupea 
pilchardus, clupea sprattus and clupea harengus are not "like products" within the 
terms of Article I and Article XIII. 
 
Application of Article XXIII: (…) impairment would exist if the action of the German 
Government, which resulted in upsetting the competitive relationship between 
preparations of clupea pilchardus and preparations of the other varieties of the 
clupeoid family, could not reasonably have been anticipated by the Norwegian 
Government. 
 
(…) it would be appropriate for the CONTRACTING PARTIES to make a 
recommendation to Germany and Norway in accordance with the first sentence of 
paragraph 2 of Article XXIII. This recommendation should aim at restoring, as far as 
practicable, the competitive relationship which existed at the time when the 
Norwegian Government negotiated at Torquay and which that Government could 
reasonably expect to be continued254. 
Type of measure in dispute: The measure was found to be GATT consistent. 
  
Analysis: This report is mostly valuable as a jurisprudential source of law because it 
makes reference to the concept of like products and defines them in a clear manner. 
Regarding Article XXIII, this report highlights the need for an existing competitive 
relationship between the parties at the moment of the measure causing impairment. 
This competitive relationship is, according to the Sardines case, at the same time the 
object of Article XXIII and the one subject to reconstruction by means of the 
implementation of Article XXIII. Also, this jurisprudence reiterates the requirement of 
breach of a legitimate expectation in order to trigger the provisions contained in 
Article XXIII. Furthermore, it is important to note that the measure subject to this 
report was legitimate according to the Torquay agreement. 
                                                          
254
 Supra- Sardines. 
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Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII 1962255 
Measures: Restrictive measures in the form of:  
1. Import permit requirements and quotas; 
2. Health regulations; and 
3. State trading. 
4. Production or Turnover taxes 
Over a variety of agricultural products enforced in different proportions and 
combinations by: 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the United States of America. 
 
Relevant Findings: The Panel had been unable to find nullification or impairment 
under the General Agreement in respect of a large number of items. In many of such 
cases, the contracting party concerned was nevertheless urged to remove the 
measure in question or any adverse effect which it might have on Uruguayan 
exports256. 
Application of Art XXIII: Article XXIII was not applied in this case because the 
complaining party – Uruguay – failed to provide a detailed justification of its claim:  
While it is not precluded that a prima facie case of nullification or impairment 
could arise even if there is no infringement of GATT provisions, it would be in 
such cases incumbent on the country invoking Article XXIII to demonstrate the 
grounds and reasons of its invocation. Detailed submissions on the part of 
that contracting party on these points were therefore essential for a judgment 
to be made under this Article. [Emphasis Added] 
 
                                                          
255
 Report of The Panel on Uruguayan Recourse to Art XXIII Report adopted on 16 November 1962 (L/1923 - 
11S/95). 
256
Supra – Uruguayan Recourse to Art XXIII p. 3. 
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However, the panel had also suggested that the Uruguayan authorities should seek 
mutually beneficial solutions through bilateral or multilateral consultations with the 
importing countries concerned257.  
 
Type of measure in dispute: In a number of the cases presented in the original 
Uruguayan submissions, the Uruguayan Government did not wish to challenge the 
contention of the contracting parties concerned that the measures in question were 
either fully consistent with GATT or, though not consistent, were permitted under the 
terms of the relevant protocol of application, and the panel refrained from 
examining the legal question of consistency in these cases258. [Emphasis 
added] 
 
Analysis: The panel abstained from giving a ruling as it considered that a ruling is 
only appropriate when there is a disagreement on a point of law or fact. However, 
they still proceeded to make recommendations in order to settle the matter without 
applying the provision contained in Article XXIII. The recommendations were 
coherent in that they suggested the removal of all measures affecting Uruguayan 
imports but, in this case, the point to highlight is that despite that prima facie 
nullification and impairment can be proven, a detailed submission, after using all the 
available channels, is the only instrument that would render the situation as ―serious 
enough‖ to allow the panel to consider authorising the suspension of concessions. 
In other words, despite proving the prima facie nullification and impairment, 
according to this report, if the measure is GATT consistent or covered by a protocol 
in force259, the complainant can only obtain authorisation to suspend concessions as 
a matter of last resort. In this particular case, most of the parties involved unilaterally 
removed the trade affecting measures and conciliation was agreed upon260.  
                                                          
257
Supra – Uruguayan Recourse to Art XXIII. 
258
Supra – Uruguayan Recourse to Art XXIII p. 3. 
259
 In WTO language, this could be read as covered by any of the WTO agreements. 
260
CONCILIATION Uruguayan Recourse to XXIII. Report of the Panel (July 1963) adopted on 3 March 
1965(L/2074 - 13S/35). 
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In this case, the jurisprudence was settled with regard to the violation complaints. It 
was presumed by the panel that a breach of the GATT agreement nowadays it can 
be read that the imposition of any WTO inconsistent measure causes nullification or 
impairment, in the words of the panel: 
(…) In cases where there is a clear infringement of the provisions of the General 
Agreement, or in other words, where measures are applied in conflict with the 
provisions of GATT and are not permitted under the terms of the relevant protocol 
under which the GATT is applied by the Contracting Party, the action would prima 
facie, constitute a case of nullification or impairment and would ipso facto require 
consideration of whether the circumstances are serious enough to justify the 
authorisation of suspension of concessions or obligations261. 
This jurisprudence was adopted and the rebuttable presumption of nullification and 
impairment was codified and GATT rules by the Contracting Parties during the Tokyo 
Round as follows: 
In cases where there is an infringement of obligations assumed under the General 
Agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification 
and impairment262. 
Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors 1988263 
Measure Challenged: Japan and the United States concluded an agreement to 
facilitate trade of semi-conductors. 
 
The arrangement was linked to the suspension of anti-dumping procedures 
initiated in the United States against imports of certain categories of Japanese 
semi-conductors and to the suspension of the Section 301 proceedings on access 
to the Japanese market for US-made semi-conductors. 
 
                                                          
261
 Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII para. 15. 
262
 Annex to the Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, 
adopted on 28 November 1979. –Tokyo Codes. Para. 5. 
263
Japan- Trade in Semi-Conductors. Report of the Panel adopted on 4 May 1988 (L/6309 - 35S/116). 
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The EEC claimed that the benefits accruing to it from the General Agreement were 
being nullified or impaired by the very nature of certain provisions of the arrangement 
between Japan and the United States which constituted an unacceptable 
interference with the trade in, and production of, semi-conductors of contracting 
parties not parties to the arrangement. Some of the measures so introduced were 
upsetting international competitive relationships unilaterally and artificially264. 
[Emphasis Added] 
 
Relevant Findings: Despite finding that several of the measures implemented by 
the Japanese government in the framework of the Agreement concluded with the 
United States were GATT inconsistent, the panel did not find that those which were 
GATT consistent ―serious enough‖ as to allow them to authorise measures 
contemplated in Article XXIII: 2 
Application of Art XXIII: The panel reiterates the jurisprudential pattern set in 
Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII by not applying Article XXIII arguing that there 
is not a detailed justification:  
A contracting party claiming that benefits accruing to it under the General Agreement 
had been nullified or impaired as a result of a measure consistent with the General 
Agreement would be called upon to provide a detailed justification. The Panel 
considered that the evidence submitted by the EEC relating to access to the 
Japanese market did not permit it to identify any measure by the Japanese 
Government that put EEC exporters of semi-conductors at a competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis those of the United States and that might therefore nullify or 
impair benefits accruing to the EEC under the General Agreement and impede the 
attainment of objectives of the General Agreement within the meaning of Article 
XXIII265. 
 
                                                          
264
Supra- Japan Trade in Semi-Conductors 30 p. 8. 
265
Supra- Japan Trade in Semi-Conductors 131 p. 34. 
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Type of Measure in dispute: Measures covered by the GATT agreement: export 
related measures. 
a. Measures related to exports to third country markets were found to be inconsistent 
with Article XI: 1 
b. Measures related to Japanese Market Access: GATT consistent. 
 
Analysis: In this case there is a broad scope of the term measure266, as the 
agreement reached between the United States and Japan and its whole 
implementation were considered as measures subject to be considered by the panel. 
In terms of Article XXIII the jurisprudence is reiterated; even though the Uruguayan 
recourse to Article XXIII case is not cited, the principle of a detailed justification is 
applied without a very clear definition of what a ―detailed justification‖ is and what the 
elements are that make a justification detailed enough to trigger the application of 
Article XXIII. 
EEC –Oilseeds267 
Measure Challenged: Community's payments and subsidies paid to processors and 
producers of oilseeds and related animal-feed proteins. 
 
Relevant Findings: Compliance with the finding on Article III thus could, but would 
not necessarily, eliminate the basis of the United States complaint that the benefits 
accruing to the community producers of oilseeds impair the community's tariff 
concessions for oilseeds. 
 
Application of Article XXIII: The idea underlying [the provisions of article XXIII:1(b)] 
is that the improved competitive opportunities that can legitimately be expected from 
a tariff concession can be frustrated not only by measures proscribed by the General 
Agreement but also by measures consistent with that Agreement. In order to 
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Supra- KIM, 79. 
267 European Economic Community - Payments and Subsidies paid to processors and producers of oilseeds and 
related animal-feed proteins Report of the Panel adopted on 25 January 1990(L/6627 - 37S/86). 
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encourage Contracting Parties to make tariff concessions they must therefore be 
given a right of redress when a reciprocal concession is impaired by another 
contracting party as a result of the application of any measure, whether or not it 
conflicts with the General Agreement. 
 
Type of Measure in dispute: Measure covered in the GATT agreement that was 
found to be inconsistent with Article III. 
 
Analysis: The EEC-Oilseeds case is a landmark in the interpretation of Article XXIII 
because it laid the foundation for the distinction between violation and Non-Violation 
cases and explains the content of Article XXIII. Furthermore, it expresses the 
purpose of the differentiation between violation and Non-Violation complaints. It also 
clarifies the objective of the Non-Violation complaints as a tool to protect the agreed 
tariff concessions from other measures – regardless of whether they are tariff or non-
tariff measures – that have as an effect the nullification of the negotiated tariff 
prerogative. 
 
US- Sugar Waiver 1990268 
Measure Challenged: The EEC lodged a complaint against the United States to 
attack their sugar quotas and the implementation of the waiver for import restrictions 
on sugar and sugar products. 
 
Relevant Findings: The Panel therefore concluded that the fact that the restrictions 
found to be inconsistent with Article XI: 1 conform to the terms of the Waiver does 
not prevent the EEC from bringing a complaint under Article XXIII: 1(b) of the 
General Agreement but it is up to the EEC to demonstrate that a nullification or 
                                                          
268
United States- Restrictions on the Importation of sugar and sugar- containing products applied under the 
1955 Waiver and Under the Headnote to the Schedule of Tariff Concessions. Report of the Panel adopted on 7 
November 1990 (L/6631 - 37S/228). 
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impairment of benefits accruing to it under the General Agreement has resulted from 
these restrictions269. 
 
The Panel found that the EEC failed to provide the needed detailed justification for 
its claim that the nullification or impairment suffered by the US actions entitled it to 
compensation. 
 
Application of Art XXIII: a) A measure that is inconsistent with GATT, regardless of 
it being covered by a waiver is subject to application of Article XXIII: 2 
b) Reiteration of the doctrine of the ―Detailed Justification‖. The benefits impaired or 
nullified must be expressed in an exhaustive manner: A complaint under Article 
XXIII: 1(b) must therefore be supported by a justification that goes beyond a mere 
characterisation of the measure at issue as inconsistent with the General 
Agreement270. 
 
Type of measure in dispute: The measures were implemented within a waiver 
provision, so despite being GATT inconsistent, they were legitimate. 
 
Analysis: Apart from the evident reinforcement of the already established doctrine of 
the ―Detailed Justification‖, this case also offers some light with regards to the 
acceptable origin of a Non-Violation complaint when it permits the EEC to lodge a 
Non Violation Nullification and Impairment complaint despite the existence of a 
waiver, giving a literal interpretation to the provision in Article XXIII: 1; in other words, 
this jurisprudence allows a challenge under Article XXIII despite the fact that the 
measures are found to be in conformity with other provisions of the agreement. 
Under the new WTO configuration, this must be interpreted extensively so that it can 
be understood to be applicable to all WTO agreements.  
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Supra US- Sugar Waiver 5.17 p. 28. 
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Supra US- Sugar Waiver 5.21 p. 28. 
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Japan- Film 1998271 
Measure Challenged: Actions by the Japanese Government affecting the 
distribution, offering for sale, and internal sale of imported consumer photographic 
film and paper, in particular, (i) distribution measures; (ii) restrictions on large retail 
stores; and (iii) promotion measures272. 
 
Relevant Findings: The Panel found that the United States failed to demonstrate 
that the measures at issue nullified or impaired benefits accruing to the United States 
within the meaning of Article XXIII: 1(b).  
 
Application of Art XXIII: Article XXIII was not applied due to the finding mentioned 
before. However, the panel reiterated the requirements for application of Art XXIII 
(…) the Panel considered that a complaining party must demonstrate three elements 
under Article XXIII: 1(b): (i) application of a measure by a WTO Member; (ii) a benefit 
accruing under the relevant agreement: and (iii) nullification or impairment of the 
benefit as the result of the application of the measure. 
 
Type of measure in dispute: Measures outside the scope of the WTO agreements 
that were found to be compatible with them. 
 
Analysis: The first case of the WTO era in which Non-Violation complaints were 
meaningfully considered, was the Kodak-Fuji dispute between the United States and 
Japan273, and in which the United States failed to meet the requirements set in 
Oilseeds and Sardines. The decision however is not a clear landmark for the 
interpretation of Article XXIII and the concept of Non-Violation compensation 
rights274. Having occurred recently after the Uruguay Round, the facts of this case 
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Panel Report, Japan — Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R, adopted 22 
April 1998, DSR 1998: IV, 1179. 
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Supra Japan-Film. 
273
 Japan- Measures affecting Consumer Photographic Film and paper WT/DS44/R. 
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Supra. The final decision is based on failure provide evidence, a procedural requirement. Substantial 
clarification of the problematic aspect of the provision and its relationship with the rest of the GATT was not 
sufficiently addressed.  
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inured themselves to a harmonising interpretation, yet the panel and Appellate Body 
failed to produce a thorough analysis of the applicability of Article XXIII, the binding 
effects of pre-Uruguay Round cases, i.e. they failed to establish the scope of 
application of Article XXIII on national behaviour not contemplated in the GATT 
regulations or multilateral agreements of sorts, but in local statutes affecting 
international trade relationships. 
It can be perceived by the position adopted in the Kodak-Fuji case that the panels 
and the Appellate Body are very respectful of the countries‘ will to regulate certain 
aspects of their trade under the WTO and reserve some others for themselves. In 
fact in this particular case, the message clearly produced was that the WTO is not a 
tool for extraterritorial application of national laws referring to aspects that have not 
been subject to regulation within the multilateral forum (competition). It is evident 
then, that the only possibility of enabling the Non-Violation nullification and 
impairment claim to be successful is when it is associated with measures taken as 
the result of legitimately implementing a provision included in GATT (and related 
agreements) that produces a collateral and inevitable damage to another contracting 
party.  
In other words, the provision is not so ample as to allow member countries to seek 
compensation for loss of benefits emanating from their own domestic laws because 
that would involve other members‘ portion of sovereignty that they did not agree to 
compromise by joining the WTO. There is still a grey zone of ambiguity in respect of 
non WTO international law binding on the contracting parties in conflict; unfortunately 
the facts of the case did not fit in this hypothesis, thus that analysis was not 
triggered. 
With respect to the area which was addressed by the panels the Kodak–Fuji case 
concludes by reinforcing three of the requirements alluded to in previous 
jurisprudence of Non Violation complaints. They are: 
(1) The application of a measure by a WTO member; 
(2) A benefit accruing under the relevant agreement; and  
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(3) Nullification of the benefit as the result of the application of the measure275. 
 
From the causation point of view, the Kodak-Fuji case explains the application of 
Article XIII in the event of Non-Violation complaints by saying that Article XXIII can 
only be applied if the causation between the relevant measures and the nullified or 
impaired benefits is confirmed – as opposed to the jurisprudence on violation 
complaints which contains an irrefutable presumption of nullification and impairment 
with the mere confirmation of the non-compliant measure. In the words of the panel: 
 
[The complainant] must show a clear correlation between the measures and the 
adverse effect on the relevant competitive relationship276. 
 
Also, for the first time, the panel established a standard of causation with four 
referents277: 
 
a. The degree of causation that must be evidenced or the standard of proof: the 
panel determined almost a negative proof standard in the case of Non-Violation 
complaints by giving the complainant of a Non-Violation the burden of proving 
that a given measure affected its benefits to a considerable extent which should 
be more than de minimis. On the one hand, this seems reasonable given the 
fact that the measure at stake is WTO compliant. On the other hand, as it was 
mentioned before, the benefits from the agreement that can be nullified or 
impaired such as a competitive relationship in a given area of trade are difficult 
to measure and to prove in the conventional manner.  
 
Hence, this requirement is too onerous for the complainants in the future 
because they will practically never be able to succeed with their complaints due 
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Japan - Film, para 10.41. 
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 Supra Japan Film para 10.83. 
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 Supra Japan Film para. 10.83: First, the question of the degree of causation that must be shown - 
"but for" or less. Second, the relevance of the origin-neutral nature of a measure to causation of nullification 
or impairment. Third, the relevance of intent to causality. And fourth, the extent to which measures may be 
considered collectively in an analysis of causation. [Emphasis added]. 
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to the impossibility to comply with this evidence requirement. This means that 
only measurable benefits such as tariff concessions can be considered under 
this understanding of the standards of proof for Non-Violation complaints; in 
fact this has been applied in previous cases where the failure to meet this 
standard of proof has been decisive for the failure of the complaint278. 
 
b. The relevance of origin neutral measures: The panel did not discard that it is 
possible to have a nullification and impairment complaint from a measure that 
could be formally compliant, as a de facto discrimination, as it has been 
understood in connection with the principle of MFN. Nonetheless, it imposed 
the burden of proof of a detailed description of the impact of trade flows and a 
link of causation with the measures to the complainant279. 
 
c. The relevance of intent: despite the fact that the complainant must prove the 
effect on trade flows and the link of causation with the measure applied by the 
government of the trade partner, the panels may consider the intention to 
restrict imports – which must be evident or at least beyond reasonable doubt – 
as one of the factors to establish the existence of a causal link between the 
measure and the nullification or impairment. 
 
d. The extent to which collective effect of the measures may be considered: The 
panel did not discard the possibility of this consideration but broached the 
possibility with extreme caution as it could be subject to potential abuse. 
 
One of the most important jurisprudential changes and a remarkable separation from 
previous decisions is made by the Kodak-Fuji panel when in its reasoning it implicitly 
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Supra Japan- Semi-Conductors 1988 and Supra US- Sugar Waiver 1990. 
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 Supra Japan Film para. 10.85: even in the absence of de jure discrimination (measures which on their face 
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removed the requirement of a detailed justification of the evidentiary standards in 
acceptance of the arguments brought by the United States280. This was heavily 
criticised as a misunderstanding from the panel. It was argued by the academics that 
the detailed justification is not supposed to be a procedural standard, but rather a 
material or substantial requirement which has to be taken into account in order to 
ascertain the existence of a valid Non-Violation claim281.  
 
Korea –Procurement 2000282 
Measure Challenged: the assignment to Korea Airport Corporation (KAA) of the 
responsibility for Inchon International Airport (IIA) procurement. 
Relevant findings: (…) even if the principles of a traditional Non-Violation case 
were applicable in this situation, the United States has failed to carry its burden of 
proof to establish that it had reasonable expectations that a benefit had accrued. 
 
Application of Article XXIII: Unlike traditional Non-Violation claims there is no 
actual schedule commitment in this case. If there was a commitment, the case would 
probably be a violation case because the measures cited by the United States as the 
basis for the Non-Violation nullification case (e.g., inadequate bid deadlines and 
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insufficient challenge procedures) would, if they were substantiated, result in a 
violation. A traditional Non-Violation case could, therefore, not be sustained in this 
situation. 
Type of measure in dispute: Measures not covered under Appendix 1 of the 
Government Procurement Agreement (hereinafter GPA), and not covered by the 
general obligations of Korea under the GPA. 
Analysis: The Korea procurement case clarifies a few of the questions that the 
Kodak-Fuji case merely suggested. The Korea-Procurement case is emphatic in 
restraining to concede relief under the provision with ―legitimate expectations‖, and 
reinforces the requirement of a firm concession or a representation of it. It places the 
burden of proof of the misrepresentation on the applicant, meaning that if there is an 
error that induces the claimant to believe that there is agreement upon a specific 
concession of a benefit, this error has to be proven beyond reasonable doubt by the 
claimant in order to trigger the provision of Article XXIII: 2. 
This narrows the scope of the meaning of Non-Violation, reducing it to a legitimate 
use of a concession that has caused collateral damage to the claimant. The panel 
takes into account that by the time the dispute arises the NVNI provision was still in 
the negotiation stage of the Government Procurement Agreement, and thus it could 
not be extended to it as agreement on whether it was going to be included or 
excluded was still uncertain.  
 
EC Asbestos 2001283 
Measure Challenged: Canada claimed that Decree No. 96-1133 concerning 
asbestos and products containing asbestos is inconsistent with a number of 
obligations of the European Communities under Article 2 of the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (the "TBT Agreement"), Articles III and XI of the General 
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the "GATT 1994"), and that, under Article 
XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994, the Decree nullified or impaired advantages accruing to 
Canada directly or indirectly under the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World 
Trade Organisation (the "WTO Agreement"), or impeded the attainment of an 
objective of that Agreement. 
 
Relevant Findings: The panel found that: Canada failed to provide a detailed 
justification of why it could legitimately have expected that France would not adopt 
measures restricting the use of any asbestos product284. 
 
However, the Appellate Body found that: The measure may give rise to a cause 
of action under Article XXIII: 1(b) of the GATT 1994. [Emphasis added] 
 
Application of Article XXIII: The exceptions of Article XX are applicable despite the 
fact that a measure is found inconsistent with the Agreements.  
Article XX was applied to the claim arising from Article XXIII (b) of the GATT 1994. 
This application was not appealed by Canada, and thus it was not considered by the 
Appellate Body. 
Type of measure in dispute: The measure in dispute was contained in the TBT 
agreement and was found to be consistent with the WTO agreements through the 
use of the exceptions contained in Article XX GATT. 
Analysis: In the appeal of this case the Appellate Body addresses for the first time 
the interpretation and applicability of Article XXIII in light of the WTO. In its 
considerations, the Appellate Body differentiates between the application of Article 
XXIII: 1 (a), and Article XXIII: 1 (b), giving complete support to the interpretation 
regarding violation and Non-Violation complaints explained in the EEC-Oilseeds 
case where the foundations of the concept of Non-Violation claims were laid as was 
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explained above. The Appellate Body found that the measure considered in the 
asbestos case could be the subject of a Non-Violation complaint. This opinion was 
contrary to the one expressed by the panel and opened the door for future 
consideration. However, the Appellate Body did not delve into the details of such a 
potential complaint as that was not one of the points specifically appealed by 
Canada.  
Another relevant matter for the purposes of this investigation in which this case is 
illustrative about the applicability of Article XXIII is in the interaction of Article XXIII 
with Article XX. According to both the panel and the Appellate Body, the exceptions 
of Article XX are applicable to claims brought by virtue of Article XXIII not 
considering whether the complaint is a violation or a Non-Violation. In other words, 
nullification and impairment measures can be justified under the exception contained 
in Article XX, as are the measures that, proven inconsistent with the agreements, are 
shown to be justified under the exceptions of Article XX according to the Appellate 
Body. 
 
2.5.3 Summary of the Requirements for Non-Violation complaints 
The Non-Violation complaint has some requirements mentioned in the case law of 
adopted and un-adopted reports. These requirements are established in cases 
where the panels look to re-establish the original value of a given tariff concession 
that has been somehow distorted. They are called supplementary mode cases285. 
The requirements extracted from the cases, and the provisions contained in Article 
XXIII GATT and Articles 3.2, 19.2, 26 DSU, can be grouped in three: 
i. The measure must not be reasonably anticipated286. 
ii. Abstract adverse change in competition287: distortion of a competitive 
relationship between two products in question. 
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iii. Detailed justification: proof of causal link288 between the invoked measure 
and the nullified or impaired benefit: despite the affirmations made in the 
Kodak-Fuji case, and according to Articles 4.4 and 6.2 from the DSU, it is 
clear that the detailed justification is not a pleading or procedural 
requirement but a substantive requisite for the existence of Non-Violation 
complaints. 
 
The jurisprudence before the establishment of the WTO fluctuated between 
Restraint and Activism289. In the restraint cases, it was inclined to narrow the scope 
of the provision and to declare it as a measure of last resort. This is the case in both 
adopted and unadopted reports such as Australian subsidy on Ammonium 
Sulphate290, EEC Canned Fruits291, Oilseeds292, Sardines293 and Japan- Semi 
Conductors294. This group of cases gave birth to the abovementioned requirements 
for the application of the Non Violation provision of Article XXIII. 
In the activism phase of the panels, some of the reports applied Article XXIII and 
accepted the Non-Violation complaint without having a link between tariff 
concessions and legitimate expectations emerging from such concessions. This is 
the case of the reports in Japan – Nullification and Impairment of Benefits295. Also, an 
attempt to expand the scope of the provision and legitimise expectations not arising 
from the tariff concessions was made in the Citrus296case. The reports produced 
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following an activist logic advocated a broader protection of benefits expected as a 
result of reciprocal undertakings. However the attempts of activism from the panels 
before the WTO were not adopted and with the advent of the Uruguay Round the 
possibility of using that logic became not only remote, but unsustainable. 
In other words, an activist approach to dispute resolution in terms of the Citrus and 
Japan - nullification and impairment cases would be impossible to apply in the 
current state of affairs of the WTO due to the stringent restrictions of the DSU 
regarding the powers of the panels and the Appellate Body297 as they are strictly 
instructed by the DSU not to add or diminish the rights and obligations covered in the 
agreements and because the DSU also provides a qualification of the requirements 
drawn by the jurisprudence298. It is important to also note, that the solution for a 
successful Non Violation complaint does not necessarily end up in a withdrawal of 
the nullifying or impairing measure as this is not mandatory according to the DSU299. 
Furthermore, the recommendations of the panel and the Appellate Body are not 
                                                          
297
 Dispute Settlement Understanding Art 3.2, 19.2 and 26. 
298Art. 26:1.DSU Non-Violation Complaints of the Type Described in Paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII of 
GATT 1994. 
Where the provisions of paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 are applicable to a covered agreement, a 
panel or the Appellate Body may only make rulings and recommendations where a party to the dispute 
considers that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under the relevant covered agreement is being 
nullified or impaired or the attainment of any objective of that Agreement is being impeded as a result of the 
application by a Member of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of that Agreement. 
Where and to the extent that such party considers and a panel or the Appellate Body determines that a case 
concerns a measure that does not conflict with the provisions of a covered agreement to which the provisions 
of paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 are applicable, the procedures in this Understanding shall apply, 
subject to the following: 
(a) the complaining party shall present a detailed justification in support of any complaint relating to a 
measure which does not conflict with the relevant covered agreement; 
(b) where a measure has been found to nullify or impair benefits under, or impede the attainment of 
objectives, of the relevant covered agreement without violation thereof, there is no obligation to 
withdraw the measure. However, in such cases, the panel or the Appellate Body shall recommend 
that the Member concerned make a mutually satisfactory adjustment; 
(c) notwithstanding the provisions of Article 21, the arbitration provided for in paragraph 3 of Article 21, 
upon request of either party, may include a determination of the level of benefits which have been 
nullified or impaired, and may also suggest ways and means of reaching a mutually satisfactory 
adjustment; such suggestions shall not be binding upon the parties to the dispute; 
(d) notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 22, compensation may be part of a mutually 
satisfactory adjustment as final settlement of the dispute. 
299
Supra DSU Art. 26:1. 
  
125 
 
binding on the parties and as a unique case in the WTO provisions, there is place for 
compensation as part of the settlement agreement between the parties.  
Despite the important definitions made in the different cases traversed in this 
investigation, the factual situations reviewed and reported by the panels and the 
Appellate Body were never situations concerning anti-dumping measures applied 
during the lifetime of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Therefore, the jurisprudence did 
not address the problem of acting under GATT specific prerogatives (the Anti-
Dumping Agreement) in a manner contrary to international non-binding standards of 
conduct (OECD) and to domestic laws (competition laws) that nullify or impair 
benefits legitimately expected by the membership to GATT itself (Objectives of 
GATT and WTO, general provisions of GATT). Numerous questions remain about 
the anti-dumping/competition conflict in international trade, and the substantial 
content of the Non-Violation provision itself.  
 
2.6 Evolution and Current Structure 
Initially the application of GATT was directly entrusted to the Member States to take 
the decisions when a dispute arose. In that model of dispute resolution, the 
procedure allowed for any contracting party to block the adoption of a decision 
related to Non -Violation complaints; hence there was not a real threat to the 
sovereignty of the contracting parties300. However, with the creation of the 
institutional support of the WTO, the procedure for dispute resolution is left ultimately 
in the hands of the Appellate Body. Technically the decisions have to be adopted by 
the DSB, and some disputes may end at the panel level when they are not appealed, 
yet the substantial deliberation and the creation of procedural reference and 
substantial jurisprudence remains in the hands of the Appellate Body. This is due to 
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the procedural introduction of the concept of reverse consensus during the Uruguay 
Round301. 
To extend the scope of Non-Violation complaints would necessarily mean giving the 
Appellate Body the licence to grant an un-negotiated benefit302. This occurred due to 
the original circumstances of drafting, negotiation and approval of Article XXIII and 
the rapid evolution in the multilateral system in the past three decades303. 
The subjects not included in the negotiated agreements that are particularly sensitive 
to the interpretation of Article XXIII are Competition, Environment Protection and 
Investment. Each area is very different in its international system and therefore they 
deserve separate attention in order to find out whether the nullification and 
impairment, and especially the Non Violation complaints, can ever be applicable to 
any of these subjects.  
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III. THEORY OF COHERENT INTERPRETATION 
3.1 General Theory of Coherent Interpretation 
In a coherent system of norms the juridical order is described by non-contradictory 
statements304. In other words, in a coherent system of norms, the interpreter shall 
aim to understand all norms in harmony with the other norms in the system, making 
this understanding in such a way that all norms keep a substantial content in the 
form of permission, prohibition or prescription. 
An antinomy occurs in the event that a rule contains a proposition that is 
incompatible with another equally valid rule and within the same sphere of hierarchy 
in a given legal system. This has been defined as the situation in which one norm 
permits a conduct and another norm in the same level of validity prohibits the same 
conduct, or when one prescribes and the other permits the contrary, or when one 
prescribes (obliges) and the other prohibits305. In law, antinomies occur because 
opposed values are rooted in the legal system. For example, freedom and security 
are opposing values, because to ensure security, one must restrict liberty and the 
guarantee of freedom generally acts in detriment of security306. 
To determine when two norms are incompatible, the interpreter must always take 
into account the type of norm to be interpreted. In order to achieve this it is 
imperative to determine the relationships between the normative qualifications 
(permission, prescription and prohibition). Norms are incompatible in the following 
three cases: 
1. Prescription against prohibition –In this case the rules are in a relationship of 
contrariety. 
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2. Prescription against permission not to do the prescribed conduct – The rules 
are in a relationship of contradiction. 
3. Prohibition against permission to do the prohibited conduct – In this case the 
rules are in a relationship of contradiction307. 
Rules can be contrary or contradictory and still be compatible if they belong to a 
legal system which has a system of coordination or subordination that indicates the 
prevalence or specific application of one norm above the other in a given context that 
needs to be contained within the propositions in the norms themselves. In other 
words, if the scope of application of one norm does not overlap with the scope of 
application of the other because of special, temporal, material or temporal 
differences, the norms can be contradictory but they are not incompatible. These are 
not antinomies as such, as the norms are totally compatible because they have 
exclusive applicability in a specific scope. 
There are, however, partial incompatibilities which can be solved through different 
interpretation criteria, in which case the antinomy is not real, it is apparent308. The 
criteria to determine whether there are real antinomies or not are: the chronological 
criteria, the hierarchical criteria and the specialty criteria. In other words, in a juridical 
system, the rule that has been issued later prevails over the one issued earlier; the 
norm that has been issued by a superior instance prevails over the one issued by an 
inferior instance and the special norm prevails over the general norm309. 
 
3.1.1 Different Theories of Coherence 
There have been several theories of coherence which give this concept a different 
value in the justification of the legal systems. The most prominent of them are Neil 
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McCormick‘s theory of the normative coherence310, Peczenik‘s model of 
interpretation311 and Dworkin‘s theory of the law as integrity312. Each theory revisits 
and re-evaluates the criteria to determine the existence of antinomies between 
incompatible norms, and has a method for clarifying the actual concept of 
antinomy313. 
The pioneer in coherence studies was Neil MacCormick, who differentiated between 
narrative coherence and normative coherence: the latter being only relevant for the 
justification of legal conclusions over factual situations, MacCormick considered the 
coherence as an essential element of the law314. For MacCormick, coherence is a 
necessary and essential value of the legal justification. However he does not 
conceive coherence as a sufficient condition for legal justification. In this sense, the 
theory of MacCormick has been considered as weak because according to him, a 
decision can‘t be justified solely based on arguments of coherence. This theory 
understands that the coherence only allows identifying a group of justifiable 
decisions. 
Dworkin adds another angle to the understanding of coherence. Dworkin affirms that 
a legal decision of whatever nature is justified if it is coherent with the principles 
informing the legal practice under the light of a political morality315. This theory is 
more comprehensive and it entails the existence of a political morality that has been 
generally identified and accepted. In fact, this theory compromises the concept of 
truth by connecting it with the concept of coherence. 
Finally, Alexy and Peczenik have formulated a theory of legal argumentation that 
gives coherence a larger role in the justification of decisions and the construction of 
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the law316. Alexy and Peczenik proposed criteria to grade the coherence of a 
theory317. They affirm that coherence is crafted along the process of a judicial 
decision though a pondering process. Legal justification is a balance between a 
group of relevant reasons including moral and legal reasons. According to this 
theory, the decisions reached will be not only justifiable, but completely justified.  
For the purposes of the present analysis, a theory of coherence that justifies 
decisions when they are coherent, not only with other norms but with moral 
principles underpinning those norms shall be used. This means that the theory 
proposed by Dworkin will be applied with some of the aspects referred to by Alexy 
and Peczenik with regards to the pondering318 process shall be deemed relevant for 
ascertaining a coherent understanding of Article XXIII of GATT and the Anti-
Dumping Agreement from a normative point of view. 
The reason why the theory proposed by Dworkin is privileged in this analysis is that 
for “Dworkin, good interpretation is concerned with elaborating these abstract 
constitutional principles. At least in the context of the textual clauses that are of the 
most concern to Dworkin, the Constitution represents the abstract intentions of the 
Founders, and those abstract intentions are more fundamental than any concrete 
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intentions that they may have had”319. In consequence, it is necessary to clarify the 
abstract constitutional principles in the WTO and in the Anti-Dumping Agreement in 
order to apply Dworkin‘s theory of interpretation correctly to the WTO agreements. 
This in turn will be a tool to utilise the fundamental principles in applicable and 
concrete norms that underpin the WTO as an institution, and those fundamental 
principles upon which the Anti-Dumping Agreement is constructed. 
 
Such interpretation is instrumental for this analysis as only by unveiling the deeper 
meaning of the WTO rules and understanding that the principles have a pervasive 
effect on the content of the rules in which they occur, the true morality and sense of 
the WTO agreements can be verified and the need for coherence amongst the rules 
can be satisfied. 
 
3.1.2 Applicability of Interpretation theories based in a constitutional structure to the 
WTO 
The question that arises then is the applicability of Dworkin‘s theory to the WTO. 
Indeed, the theories of interpretation formulated by Dworkin, as well as the theories 
developed by Alexy and Peczenik are established on the basis of a national 
organisation, in the form of a constitutional state. The problem is that the WTO is not 
a state nor has it a defined constitution. The attempt to use the fundamental 
principles as a constitutional structure requires a strong theoretical justification.  
There are already voices advocating for the idea of understanding the WTO as an 
institutional body governed by a constitutional structure. Might we understand efforts 
to constitutionalize the WTO as a move to address these regime-specific concerns, 
as well as broader concerns about the discipline of international law? A 
constitutionalized WTO would possess the strength and vigour that other 
international norms may lack; a constitutionalized WTO would have the stability that 
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other treaty norms lack; and a constitutionalized WTO would no longer be 
understood as a complex, messy negotiated bargain of diverse rules, principles and 
norms, but rather as a coherent, integrated structure320. [Emphasis added] 
To speak about fundamental principles underpinning the WTO necessarily implies 
the existence of the constitutional aspect of the WTO as an international law 
institution and as a set of international law agreements. The analysis to follow can 
only be undertaken under the premise that the WTO is in fact a constitutional 
structure and that its institutionalism is subject to be analysed with the ideas 
formulated by Dworkin, which are directed primarily to the open-ended nature of 
constitutions. 
It has been heavily debated whether the national constitutional concept can be 
transmissible to the fundamental principles of the WTO, not only to defend the WTO 
system on the predicate of principles, but also to make those principles permeate all 
the normative structure in a substantive way.  
The constitutional features of the WTO are present in both its procedural and 
substantive dimensions. Procedurally, the WTO has introduced and enforced the 
rule of law which is applied within the organization and extends all the way to the 
domestic regimes of the Member States321. Other procedural constitutional principles 
already existing in the WTO are the duty of publication, neutral and just 
implementation of trade regulations, transparency in policy making and due 
process322.  
The substantive constitutional pillars of the WTO are the principles of non-
discrimination which is materialized in the Most Favoured Nation and National 
Treatment provisions and their developments; and the principle of the use of uniform 
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and proportionate policy instruments323 which is materialized in the prohibition of 
quantitative restrictions and the implementation of tariffs to manage trade flows in the 
least intrusive manner possible324. 
There are four main objections to the idea that the fundamental principles of the 
WTO can be equated to a constitutional structure. A review of such objections and 
the arguments against them will be dissected to finally pursue an interpretation 
based on constitutionally originated doctrines, which should lead to a more coherent 
view of the WTO system of norms. 
a. Inappropriateness: This argument is related to the manner in which 
constitutional methodologies and values are used in the normative hierarchy to 
resolve antinomies and other normative conflicts. The inappropriateness reason 
is raised by those who see the constitutional tools as a solution historically 
tailored to the specific problems of nation-states and their focused and unique 
relevance to those institutions. The argument is that constitutional techniques 
and principle are not ―one size fits all‖ solutions for all kinds of normative 
systems and they may not be extended through interpretation to other 
structures – such as international law bodies – because the problems that the 
constitutionalism aims to solve are not relevant or appropriate for any other 
structure different to nation-states325. 
 
 The argument of inappropriateness can be refuted by stating that even though 
it is true that constitutional theories are crafted for a specific type of system 
which must have a specific sort of structure, international institutions 
experience the same kind of challenges, just on a different scale. Even more 
so, international organisations do have a very similar structure to nations even 
if they do not share the national model in a complete manner. Therefore, the 
techniques and reasoning used in constitutionalism applied to nations can be 
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replicated in the international institutions keeping the proportionality of scope 
and limited concentration of political power. 
 
b. Inconceivability: The inconceivability argument poses the question of the 
category in which international law institutions belong and it is somehow an 
extension of the inappropriateness argument in that it insists that constitutions 
and constitutional theories are specifically created for nations with the 
characteristics that only a nation, and a particular form of nation, can have 
(land, government, separation of powers).This argument indicates that the use 
of constitutional theories to attempt good governance practices in international 
institutions is not suitable because the concept of an autonomous sovereign 
group of people represented by their elected agents is absent and impossible to 
conceive in the current international law panorama326. 
 As this argument is practically an extension of the inappropriateness argument, 
it can be contradicted by liberating constitutionalism of the epistemic 
understanding of it which presupposes and refers to a particular form of 
state327. This separation can be done by recognising that the premises on which 
a constitutional state is rooted are not exclusive to national organisations and 
can exist in international organisations in different proportions maintaining the 
essential elements of autonomy, society and a given institutionalism. The 
strongest pro-constitutionalism argument for international organisations, 
however, is the empirical facts that show how international organisations are 
successfully managed with constitutional approaches even though the 
conceptual definitions have not been completely clarified. This has been of 
critical importance in key decisions in international organisations328 that have 
taken place using the principles as a fundamental norm, thus giving them 
constitutional character. 
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c. Improbability: “The argument of improbability refers to the way in which 
constitutionalism is implicated in existing relations of authority‖329. Constitutional 
theories imply a specific political organisation and a normative framework to 
manage it. Since each state has a portion of authority which remains private in 
the international organisations the agreements are amongst peers or between 
sovereigns. In other words, international institutions are governed by 
arrangements in which it is not probable to bind all members to an all-
encompassing normative framework of compulsory compliance and supreme 
hierarchy, simply because states keep their sovereign powers and self-
determination while participating in international agreements. 
 
 This argument then is reliant on a fallacy which is that constitutionalism can 
only exist in a national state330, which as explained previously, this is not true. 
The fallacy presupposes one true statement which is that it is unlikely that 
international organisations bind their members in the same form and 
organisation as a national state; the argument is then continued on a false 
premise which is that constitutional theories are only applicable to organised 
nation states. 
 
 The argument of improbability contains an error of concept in radicalising the 
application of constitutional theories to strict and clearly differentiated 
organisational structures, ignoring the existence of fundamental principles and 
other structures in which constitutionalism can conceptually and practically fit331. 
Therefore, due to such fallacy, improbability is not a valid argument to reject the 
application of constitutional theories to international law organisations which 
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have the basic elements of an organisation – a normative system with a 
constitution as a fundamental norm. 
 
d. Illegitimacy: ―The argument of illegitimacy, finally, concerns the manner in 
which constitutionalism is frequently invoked as an ideological claim, as a way 
of adding or detracting symbolic value from an actual or projected state of 
affairs on the basis of its supposedly „constitutional‟ or „unconstitutional‟ 
qualities. 
 
The case here is a straightforward consequential one. If constitutionalism, on 
one or more of the three grounds considered above, can only properly be 
conceived as a matter of and for the state, then any attempt to assume the 
mantle of constitutionalism beyond the state is by necessary inference 
illegitimate. If a claim of constitutional status is made on behalf of an entity or a 
set of regulatory practices in circumstances where the tools are inappropriate to 
the problem, or where the requisite underlying belief system is not in place, or 
where the necessary de facto authority is absent, then that claim becomes an 
empty or misleading one”332. 
 
 The argument of illegitimacy of international law institutions and regulatory 
bodies is self-explanatory. It is clear that some international law organisations 
lack de facto authority to implement the regulations that they issue. However, 
the WTO is a sophisticated institution with common views, internal fundamental 
principles, norms drafted in the form of rule-sanction, and an authority to apply 
them as well as a hierarchy in the dispute resolution system. Indeed, the WTO 
mimics the characteristics of a national state almost identically with a legislative 
body which deliberates and creates binding norms, an executive body which 
enforces the administrative matters and a judiciary which is organised and 
bound by the rule of law. The fact that the majority of the decisions taken by the 
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panels and Appellate Body are implemented voluntarily by the members is a 
compelling argument about the legitimacy of the organisation.  
 
 
It is pertinent at this point to proceed with a coherent interpretation of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement in relation to Article XXIII. It is important to take into account 
that some of the tools to be used in such interpretation are purely constitutional 
including the core theory (As described by the Theory of Dworkin) that informs the 
methodology and ideology of the analysis. 
 
This affirmation does not necessarily mean that the debate of whether constitutional 
principles are applicable to international institutions is a closed one. It just indicates 
that the current arguments against constitutionalism in international organisations 
are not persuasive enough to override the arguments and facts which advocate a 
constitutional understanding of some international institutions, provided of course, 
that the organisations have the abovementioned indispensable elements which 
characterise a constitutional structure. 
 
3.2 Coherent interpretation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in relation to 
Article XXIII 
Indeed, it is then possible to accept that the fundamental principles of the WTO may 
be used in a constitutional manner to correctly interpret the WTO agreements under 
the predicate that they constitute the foundational grounds which are comprehensive 
of the full structure. That structure comprises the 20 full agreements, 7 
understandings, several decisions, and all tariff and service schedules of the 
Member States333.  
As was mentioned previously, it is only through an approach that considers 
Dworkin‘s theory that a coherent interpretation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in 
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relation to the rest of the provisions of the WTO agreements can be achieved. 
Therefore, and in order to comply with his proposed method, the first step is to 
gather the ―constitutional‖ principles of the WTO to study the norms both in form and 
substance. The second step is to observe them in their application throughout an 
interpretation that shall include a formal assessment on the structure desired by the 
negotiators as well as a substantial assessment of the principle or principles 
motivating it. The final step is to analyse how that principle or principles should 
animate a specific interpretation.  
 
3.2.1 Fundamental Principles of the WTO and their interaction with the foundational 
principles of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
According to the doctrine, the main 5 principles of GATT which passed to the WTO 
agreements are: non-discrimination334, reciprocity335, enforceable commitments336, 
transparency337, and safety valves338. They should permeate all WTO law and 
practice as they are the pillars where all the institutional apparatus and the 
justification for the complex system of rules lie. Hence the need to explain their 
content in order to make it available for application in the specific rules to be studied 
within this investigation: 
a. Non-Discrimination: as it was previously mentioned, the principle of non-
discrimination has a twofold composition: firstly, the Most-Favoured Nation 
(MFN) rule, and secondly, the National Treatment principle. Both dimensions 
of the non-discrimination principle are expressed throughout all the WTO 
agreements in one form or another. However their scope is determined by 
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each agreement depending on the relevance of the principle to the specific 
situation and the negotiated nuances of each set of rules339. 
b. National Treatment: does not apply to trade in services as it was specifically 
excluded from GATS. The principle of national treatment entails that external 
goods which have met the entry requirements of a country are treated as if 
they were domestic i.e. they must not have differentiated taxes or burdens 
just because they are foreign (Article III, GATT). This prevents the importer 
country from applying specific regulations to importer goods that become 
equivalent to the reduction of the tariff, rendering such reduction null.  
c. Most Favoured Nation: Unlike the national treatment principle, the MFN 
principle does not have any conditions to it. However, it is acceptable to 
make special concessions to certain trade partners for reasons of regional 
integration, trade areas or customs unions. Additionally, least developed 
countries have an altogether different treatment and developing countries 
have the possibility of obtaining better treatment depending on the 
circumstance of trade. This keeps the members from trying to increase trade 
barriers or to give preferences to most lucrative trade partners, excluding the 
other countries. Once a negotiation has been accepted it benefits all 
members equally340.  
d. Reciprocity: The fourth principle, which is a pillar of the WTO negotiations, is 
the principle of reciprocity. During the negotiations, each member receives 
something in exchange for their liberalisation from a trade partner. With this 
method, all countries receive extended benefits at a limited cost, as all the 
benefits are extensive and the concessions are restrictive, and there is a 
greater liberalisation in general.  
e. Binding and Enforceable Commitments: A key pillar of the WTO is the 
principle that entails the binding effect of the commitments. This is contained 
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in the schedules of concessions as well as in the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, which establishes that the commitments contained in the 
agreements are binding and have a clear and well structured dispute 
settlement mechanism.  
“Once tariff commitments are bound, it is important that there be no resort to 
other, nontariff measures that have the effect of nullifying or impairing the 
value of the tariff concession”341. This appears in a number of articles and 
agreements amongst which the most prominent are Article XI GATT (on 
quantitative restrictions), the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, and the Anti-Dumping Agreement itself. Most of the protective 
mechanisms against nullification or impairment of the benefits emerging from 
the different agreements are contained in specific provisions within the 
agreements addressing remedies for breaches affecting particular 
concessions, rights or benefits.  
Additionally, the clause of nullification and impairment included in Article 
XXIII covers the benefits and rights that are affected for violations not 
contained in other provisions and even for actions which formally are not 
violations, but that materially nullify or impair the benefits (vested rights or 
legitimate expectations) of the affected country. Therefore,“(…)if a country 
perceives that actions taken by another government have the effect of 
nullifying or impairing negotiated market access commitments or the 
disciplines of the WTO, it may bring this situation to the attention of the 
government involved and ask that the policy be changed. If satisfaction is not 
obtained, the complaining country may invoke WTO dispute settlement 
procedures, which involve the establishment of panels of impartial experts 
charged with determining whether a contested measure violates the WTO. 
Because the WTO is an intergovernmental agreement, private parties do not 
have legal standing before the WTO‟s dispute settlement body; only 
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governments have the right to bring cases. The existence of dispute 
settlement procedures precludes the use of unilateral retaliation”342. 
f. Transparency: The principle of transparency is central to maintaining trust 
amongst members and the effectiveness of the agreements. Transparency 
as a principle is exercised in the disclosure of information during the 
negotiation phases as well as during the execution phases of the WTO 
agreements. It is contemplated in Article X of GATT, and it includes not only 
disclosing the correct and complete information during negotiations, but the 
update of any trade policy change at the WTO secretariat. The transparency 
principle is not exclusively applicable for internal communications, but must 
be understood to extend to internal actions which may affect trade partners 
such as administrative investigations, judicial procedures and other internal 
administrative actions which may indirectly affect the benefits or rights of 
other members. This understanding aims to prevent domestic authorities 
circumventing other members‘ rights and benefits procedurally, and to 
increase the legal certainty both in the multilateral and in the domestic 
environments343.  
g. Exceptions (or Safety Valves): Another principle that underpins the WTO 
agreements is the existence of exceptions in specific situations in which the 
countries cannot be held accountable for the commitments made in the WTO 
due to circumstances that affect their system in a significant way. In some 
cases governments are allowed to restrict trade, either to prevent unfairness 
against their own manufacturers and producers (to avoid unfair competition), 
or to pursue urgent non-economic objectives (such as public health, national 
security, affirmative action with the aim to empower a previously 
disadvantaged community), or for purely economic reasons (to improve the 
balance of payments or to overcome an economic crisis)344. 
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h. Single Undertaking: Perhaps the most important principle in relation to the 
coherence of the WTO agreements, the single undertaking principle, is 
difficult to define because of its complex historical development345. However, 
at the WTO it has been understood that “virtually every item of the 
negotiation is part of a whole and indivisible package and cannot be agreed 
separately”346. This applies not only to the negotiation, but also has an effect 
later, during the implementation and interpretation of the agreed package. 
Since everything is agreed as a whole and in the negotiations it is 
understood that every previous regulation is taken as is, the single 
undertaking principle materially means that each country accepts all of the 
existing rules, plus the ones agreed on a specific round where it participates, 
and must apply them all in a coherent way.  
In other words, existing members build over the foundations of the rules 
already in place, and new members enter under the condition that they bind 
themselves to the rules in place for other members in order to level the 
playing field for all members. The effect of the single undertaking principle 
must not be underestimated, as this principle is necessary to providing a 
coherent interpretation of all provisions in force within the WTO agreements, 
and allows certain interpretation privileges, over others, due to the necessity 
that it creates to give validity and efficacy to all the rules pre-existing any 
new agreement.  
 
These are the principles that shall be used to apply a Dworkinian analysis to the 
interaction of two specific rules: the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article XXIII of 
GATT. This is intended to provide a harmonious interpretation of both provisions and 
                                                          
345
 WOLFE R. “Arguing and bargaining in the WTO: Does the Single Undertaking make a difference?”School of 
Policy Studies. Queen’s University. (Prepared for the Canadian Political Science Association Held 4-6 June 2008, 
available at http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Wolfe.pdf). 
346
WTO Doha Development Agenda. Available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/work_organi_e.htm 
  
143 
 
will lead to an idea of their correct interpretation in procedural and substantial 
aspects which shall be analysed in the chapters below.  
 
3.2.2 Interaction of anti-dumping rules with Article XXIII for a coherent interpretation 
under the light of the principles of the WTO. 
Using the theory of coherent interpretation of the norms presented above, and the 
underpinning principles that must inform the interpretation of all WTO rules, the rules 
contained in the Anti-Dumping Agreement shall be classified and a hypothetic 
interaction with the rule contained in Article XXIII shall be made available in order to 
continue with the examination of the current anti-dumping practices and analyse 
them in light of Article XXIII. 
Firstly it is necessary to divide the organic norms in the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
from the dogmatic ones, that is, the norms containing principles and not directly 
applicable, from the ones containing express and directly applicable prescriptions, 
prohibitions or permissions. The former ones have a different interpretation process 
as they have to be connected to the set of principles ruling GATT and the rest of the 
WTO agreements, whilst the latter can have direct interaction with Article XXIII. 
It is uncontested amongst the doctrine of legal interpretation (both in the ambit of 
domestic public and private law, as well as in the field of international law) that the 
rules which do not provide a prescriptive or prohibitive proposition contain in 
themselves permission for the recipient. In the case of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
this is applicable too. The recipient of most of the rules in the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement is the domestic authority of a given member state who shall apply the 
norms.  
The interpretation flaw that has been consistently occurring in the interpretation of 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement is the widespread acknowledgement that whenever 
there is a permission in the agreement, explicit or implied, the domestic authority has 
complete freedom to regulate and act as they deem fit. This is mistaken because it 
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does not give application to the principle of single undertaking, which is a 
constitutional principle of the WTO, and thus it permeates all the rules, allowing for 
coherence of the system. 
An interpretation that took into account the single undertaking principle and other 
constitutional principles (such as the principle of transparency and the binding effect 
of commitments) of both the WTO and the Anti-Dumping Agreement would certainly 
follow a Dworkinian approach by seeing how these principles thread into the rules. 
This would not only produce a different outcome from the domestic authorities in 
their own interpretation, but also would allow the members to see the true meaning 
and limits of the discretion awarded to local authorities under WTO law.  
In the specific case of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and its relation to Article XXIII 
there is a patent case of the idea expressed above. The norms contained in the Anti-
Dumping Agreement have different formal structures depending on their purpose, 
but in all areas where there is neither a prohibition nor a prescription, the proposition 
must be read in harmony with the principles of single undertaking, national treatment 
and most-favoured nation, amongst all the other constitutional principles already 
mentioned.  
Specifically, this means that in all the permissions contained in the text and annexes 
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement there is an inner prescription to conduct all the 
discretionary acts (regulatory or executive) under the framework provided by all the 
WTO agreements in force. Article XXIII of GATT is part of that framework, which in 
turn means that in the discretionary acts of the domestic authority under the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, all the benefits of the trade partner must be known, taken into 
account, and the discretion limited by this provision which protects all members 
against nullification or impairment of their benefits.  
This is applicable for substantial aspects as well as for procedural aspects because 
material benefits emerge from both dimensions of the application of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement. The following account of the structure of the norms in the Anti-
Dumping Agreement will show the prescriptions, prohibitions and permissions 
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(implied and express) contained in the text of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
Additionally, it will highlight the applicability of Article XXIII of GATT to these 
permissions and, in a further section, the outcomes of the current interpretation shall 
be exposed to a comparison of the outcomes that a coherent interpretation, in the 
terms herein proposed, could provide for the plenitude and harmony of the system of 
the WTO. 
 
3.2.2.1 Descriptive and Prescriptive propositions in the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
All the provisions stated below contain more than one form of normative structure. 
Therefore, the main structure will be used in a general description and in the event 
that the same provision contains both prescriptive and permitting norms or 
prescriptions and prohibitions, the weaker form of normative structure within the 
articles shall be examined separately. Hence, the norms included in this section are 
considered as prescriptive because the majority of their content features specific 
prescriptive or descriptive propositions in its format. 
a. Incomplete Definition and Determination of Dumping-Article 2: This article 
defines the events when a product is to be considered dumped and it lays 
the foundation for the domestic investigation procedures. The framework 
established for the procedures imposes (prescribes) the phases in which the 
process must be taken by the domestic authorities when defining the like 
product347, market value348, export price construction349 and fair 
comparison350.  
 Article 2 established a limited but mandatory set of criteria. This is clear by 
the specific provision stating that the authority may construct the export price 
under certain conditions. The conditions are prescriptive and inform the 
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action of the authorities. These criteria are necessary but not sufficient to 
determine the existence and scope of dumping.  
 In this sense, the prescriptive content of Article 2 may not be modified 
through interpretation of Article XXIII. However, due to the fact that its 
content is incomplete (as the application of the criteria do not necessarily 
lead to the accurate establishment of whether or not there was dumping and 
its scope) any additions to the expressly prescribed rules of this provision 
must be made in the least intrusive manner for the importing trade partner in 
accordance with a coherent reading of Article XXIII GATT and Article 2 of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement. This provides recourse for all violations and Non-
Violations that create a nullification or impairment of the benefits acquired 
through GATT or any of the WTO agreements by the importing trade partner.  
b. Determination of Injury – Article 3: This is another example of a prescriptive 
proposition in the text of the Anti-Dumping Agreement: The determination of 
injury is prescriptive as it clearly commands the elements to take into 
account when determining injury to the domestic industry.  
 Furthermore, the need for collective evaluation of all injury factors in the 
determination of injury is reinforced in the fact that even for the 
establishment of a threat of material injury, the factors seen as an 
inseparable unit are the correct tool to foresee the probability of material 
injuries: ―No one of these factors by itself can necessarily give decisive 
guidance but the totality of the factors considered must lead to the 
conclusion that further dumped exports are imminent and that, unless 
protective action is taken, material injury would occur.‖ 
 The prescriptive form of this provision takes the form of categorical 
imperatives of a norm of special nature which was issued after the GATT351. 
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In contrast, Article XXIII is a norm of a general nature. Therefore, an 
interpretation of these norms in a coherent assessment must give 
prevalence to the posterior and special norm over the general provisions of 
Article XXIII in all the rulings contained expressly within it.  
 However, the statements that are vague or obscure must be read in 
accordance with the necessity, proportionality and rationality criteria in order 
to read Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in coherence and harmony 
with Article XXIII. In other words, the areas of the procedure of determination 
of injury that are not expressly regulated in Article 3 must be crafted in light 
of Article XXIII and the rest of the WTO agreements in order to provide a 
single undertaking approach to the interpretation and implementation of 
international rules. 
 Additionally, the prescriptive nature of the provision is limited to the 
obligation to take into account all injury factors. This has been remarked by 
the WTO panels and the Appellate Body in several cases352. However, the 
Appellate Body has made a distinction between the obligation to evaluate all 
injury factors and the manner in which this evaluation must be done. 
 According to this distinction, the analysis of the injury factors is at the 
discretion of the domestic authorities. It has been accepted by the Appellate 
Body that even an implicit evaluation of the factors is valid353. On the 
discussion of whether an implicit evaluation of the factors is acceptable, the 
United States introduced the concept that what is important is that the 
decisional path is reasonably discernible. This was based on Appellate Body 
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jurisprudence354instead of demanding a discussion of each factor355.This 
further clarified the separation of the obligation to consider all factors from 
the method of evaluation chosen for each of them.  
c. The discretion given to domestic authorities on their choice of analysis and 
evaluation does not allow them to escape the obligation to evaluate the 
indicated injury factors in totality as it is understood that the material injury 
determination can only be established by examining them as a group. 
Definition of Domestic Industry – Article 4: This article prescribes the form in 
which domestic industry shall be understood and does not leave space for 
ambiguity; hence it is not subject to further interpretation. 
d. Initiation and subsequent investigation – Article 5: This article sets a strict 
framework which must be complied with by all domestic procedures. 
However, this procedure is by no means complete and the domestic 
authorities must create the missing steps to obtain a full anti-dumping 
procedure. In the space that is given to the domestic authorities to regulate 
aspects not contained in Article 5, they must take into account that such 
action is the implementation of a WTO agreement and thus it must be made 
in accordance with the terms agreed on in all the agreements as part of the 
single undertaking commitment. 
e. Evidence: the description of the provision, evaluation and handling of 
evidence by the parties and by the investigating authorities is stated in 
Article 6. However, there is not much detail provided in this provision. Much 
discretion in this matter is left to the domestic authorities of the Member 
States. 
f. Retroactivity: Article 10 prescribes the events and forms in which retroactivity 
shall be understood and applied in the agreement. This article is thorough 
enough to regulate the issue and does not leave room for local discretionary 
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interpretation, therefore it is applicable as is and no other article from the 
WTO agreements can be invoked in this matter as this is particularity agreed 
upon and fully regulated by Article 10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
However, it must be noted that within Article 10, the provisions in Art 10.2 
and 10.6 are permissive as they allow they authorities to act with discretion 
by using the word ―may‖ in their provisions. 
g. Article 11 prescribes the procedure for the duration and revision of the anti-
dumping duties and undertakings. In 11.2, it specifically uses the word 
reasonable when it refers to the local authorities who must review the 
continued imposition of a duty in what is called an interim review. In addition, 
in 11.3, the provision establishes the possibility to review the measures once 
the initial period has elapsed. This is called the ―Sunset Review‖. The 
maximum period of an anti-dumping duty is five years. However, it is up to 
the domestic investigating authorities to determine it. This means that they 
have been given such prerogative and might not be challenged in their 
choice before the five year limit unless there is clear, sufficient and strong 
evidence of the unreasonableness of their choice of term. 
This article establishes the term and the nature of the possible reviews that 
can be applied to an anti-dumping duty in the internal procedure. It does not 
indicate the form in which such reviews must be made, except to mention 
that they shall me made expeditiously and take no longer than 12 months. It 
is then the responsibility of the domestic authorities to establish and 
implement the review procedure. Besides from being ‗swift‘ as per the 
wording of the provisions in Art 11, the procedure must be conducted 
following the foundational principles of the WTO. Its configuration as well as 
its implementation may give rise for Nullification and Impairment claims in 
the event that the procedure design by a specific Member affects the 
benefits and legitimate expectations of another.  
  
150 
 
h. Public notices are clearly explained and regulated in Article 12 and there is 
no room for interpretation, the focus is on implementation at the most basic 
administrative level. 
i. Article 13 prescribes in a categorical way that the judicial review of 
administrative action must be available in all the countries that have anti-
dumping proceedings. In addition, it mandates that the judicial review is 
performed by an authority that is independent from the administration 
authority in charge of the management of anti-dumping procedures and 
measures. 
j. Article 14 occupies itself with the applications on behalf of a third party in a 
twofold manner. Firstly it prescribes the requirements to do so by the 
interested party, and in a second instance, the article has a minority of 
permission where it allows the importing country to decide whether or not to 
proceed with a procedure initiated on behalf of a third party. 
k. Article 15 prescribes a special treatment for developing economies in a 
dogmatic manner. This article is subject to ample interpretation and its 
implementation depends on other rules contained in the WTO agreements. It 
is not clear whether this article establishes an obligation for all the 
membership or if it is applicable upon request. If so, members from 
developing countries would be entitled to request alternative remedies in all 
the matters that are subject to anti-dumping investigations and that affect 
their essential interests. However the dogmatic nature and formulation leads 
one to think that as a dogmatic proposition it needs to be developed further 
in an organic set of norms which can either be separate from the Anti-
Dumping Agreement or can be linked to it as implementing regulations from 
either the membership or the domestic authorities in their investigation 
procedures.  
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So far, the provision has been interpreted by the DSU356in the sense that it is 
applicable only to developed countries and that the obligation contained 
therein is limited to ―considering‖ constructive remedies.  
l. A committee on anti-dumping practices is created by Article 16 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement in a prescriptive manner. Its functions are briefly but 
clearly stated and it receives several types of information from the 
membership. All members are obliged by Article 16 to submit the information 
to the committee and, in turn, make it available to the public amongst other 
precise functions. This article is not subject to contest as it has already been 
implemented and it contains a comprehensive explanation of its scope and 
application. 
m. Consultation and Dispute settlement: apart from the confidentiality 
considerations, Article 17 is a prescriptive norm which describes the manner 
in which the DSB must process anti-dumping disputes357. This article relies 
on the DSU and it expressly states that it is applicable in everything that is 
not expressly regulated otherwise in the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
 
3.2.2.1 Prohibitions in the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
a. The term in which provisional measures must take place is indicated as a 
prohibition in Article 7.3, which is worded as follows ―Provisional measures 
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shall not be applied sooner than 60 days from the date of initiation of the 
investigation”358. 
b. The condition contained in Article 8.2 related to price undertakings is a clear 
prohibition which is qualified by the events in which it is not applicable. In 
other words, it could be stated that this prohibition is a negative prescription, 
but its formal layout is clearly intended to create the scenario where an 
action – offering a price undertaking before a preliminary affirmative 
determination – is prohibited and as a consequence it is rejected from the 
investigating authorities, as it is clearly described in the actual norm: ―Price 
undertakings shall not be sought or accepted from exporters unless the 
authorities of the importing Member have made a preliminary affirmative 
determination of dumping and injury caused by such dumping”. 
c. Article 9.3 and 9.4 are worded as prohibitions and refer to the limitations to 
the imposition of anti-dumping duties described in Article 2 and Article 6. 
These descriptions refer to margins of dumping and calculations which are 
specified in Art 2, as the margin of dumping.  
d. Confidential information provided to the panel is subject to the prohibition of 
being made available to the public by Article 17.7 unless there is express 
authorisation to do so. This is a standard clause applied both in public and 
private law and even though it is not fully regulated it is clearly expressed 
and its formulation does not leave room for further interpretation. 
 
3.2.2.1 Permissions in the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
a. Provisional measures and the actions are allowed in Article 7 conditionally. 
The conditions to permit provisional measures are described in the text as 
the norm so as to exclude all other circumstances from a provisional 
measure. In that sense, this can be seen as a passive prohibition. However 
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the structure of the norm is written in a permissive sense, thus making it 
suitable to be included amongst the permissive norms in the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement. Additionally, it indicates which form can take the provisional 
measures.  
 This procedure is a general framework that does not cover all the 
administrative actions required to take the whole procedure to fruition. This 
means that the administrative procedure of provisional measures, outside 
the wording of Article 7, is left to the discretion of the investigating authority. 
Nonetheless, they are not completely autonomous to regulate the procedure 
as the rest of the WTO agreements are applicable to the empty procedural 
space left by Article 7. It is in these procedures where Article XXIII is fully 
applicable and all measures taken must objectively be those which affect the 
importing trade partner the least. Acting otherwise can trigger the application 
of a nullification and impairment claim in its form of a Non-Violation 
complaint. This does not mean that the provision of Art XXIII is being read 
into the Anti-Dumping Agreement, but that some measures taken under it 
can be subject to claims of nullification and impairment in the event that they 
undermine benefits of the affected party. 
b. Price undertakings in the Anti-Dumping Agreement are worded generally as 
a permissive statement that allows an investigated country to opt for a price 
undertaking. The regulation for this procedure is contained in Article 8 and it 
is a permissive statement except for Article 8.2 explained above. 
c. The imposition of an anti-dumping duty is a permission directed to the 
investigating authorities, except for the limit worded as a prohibition in Article 
9.3, as explained above. 
d. Article 13 briefly allows the existence of judicial review in the anti-dumping 
procedure stating only one condition which is their separation from the 
investigating authorities. The judicial review procedure shall be established 
by each country without prejudice to the applicability of other WTO norms in 
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the implementation of this procedure. At this point, however, it is important to 
mention that the intention of the article was to use the domestic systems 
already in place to facilitate the review of anti-dumping investigations. In that 
case, the room for application of other WTO rules to the domestic civil or 
commercial procedure in place is narrowed both by the form and intention of 
Article 13. 
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IV.ANTI DUMPING MEASURES AS A PROTECTIONIST TOOL 
FORGOVERNMENTS 
4.1 Historical Background 
Anti-dumping measures are not new in the international trade panorama. Indeed 
they have been around since the early 20th Century. The first modern anti-dumping 
law was passed in Canada in 1904 with New Zealand and Australia following close 
behind in 1905359 and 1906 respectively. South Africa adopted Anti-Dumping 
legislation in 1914360. By 1921, the U.S., France, Britain and most of the British 
Commonwealth had passed similar laws361. However, in 1958, when the contracting 
parties carried out a survey amongst themselves about the use of anti-dumping 
measures, the result was that in total only 37 anti-dumping decrees were in effect 
between all GATT contracting parties362. 
 
Anti-dumping did not enter into common use until the early eighties363. This can be 
explained by two main reasons. The first one is that during the mid decades of the 
century, tariffs were higher, and there was a mercantilist approach to international 
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 WAINCYMER J. “Implications for anti-dumping and countervailing”. Paper delivered at the  
Conference, An Australian-United States Free Trade Agreement -- Opportunities & Challenges. Session 5B: 
Competition Policy and Subsidies, Hyatt Hotel, Canberra, 2001. P5. Available at 
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“South Africa in 1914 became the fourth country in the world to adopt anti-dumping legislation, while in 
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dollars of trade.”BRINK G. “Anti-Dumping in South Africa” TRALAC Working paper 
No.D12WP07/12.Stellenbosch. 2012. p. 5 Available at http://www.tralac.org/files/2012/07/D12WP072012-
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362
Supra PRUSA  SKEATH 2001. pp. 6–7. 
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 Despite the fact that Anti-Dumping Laws exist from as early as 1904 (Canada), and that its use has been 
observed with certain regularity since the early fifties (Including the exceptionally heavy use of Anti-Dumping 
measures by South Africa in the period between 1948-1958), it is in only since early eighties that it has been 
observed that“…AD has been spreading worldwide in two dimensions. On the one hand, the number of AD 
petitions has been growing in the so called traditional users (i.e., Australia, Canada, EEC, New Zealand and US). 
On the other hand more and more countries have implemented AD law and many of them have followed the 
traditional users’ example and started to strongly rely on this policy tool”. ZANARDI M. “Anti-Dumping: A 
Problem in International Trade”. Tilburg University Discussion Paper No. 2005-85. 2005. Available at 
http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=53783.p. 17. 
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trade which made domestic industries feel less threatened by foreign imports. The 
second reason is that up to the eighties, rules for imposing anti-dumping duties were 
not uniform, the United States had a stringent system of calculation that made it 
relatively difficult to impose an anti-dumping duty and Anti-Dumping was not a 
widespread practice bar the traditional users and exceptional cases like South Africa. 
The United Stated amended its Anti-Dumping regulations in 1974, introducing 
changes that made it easier to apply duties. This change in legislation resulted in an 
explosion of Anti-Dumping cases in the 1980s364. The increase in the decade of the 
eighties was exponential but it was somehow still reduced to the group of traditional 
users. 
 
Anti-dumping use was seen as the privilege of a few countries known as the 
traditional users. By the end of the eighties, the traditional users were joined by other 
contracting parties who were from then on known as new users365. New users started 
using anti-dumping following the patterns established by the traditional users366. 
Article VI of GATT contains the foundation of the anti-dumping regime. In this article 
GATT disapproves export sales below normal value when they cause or threaten to 
cause material injury to the domestic industry of the importing country or if they are 
materially impeding or delaying the creation of a local industry without justification.  
 
Sales are considered to be below normal value when the export price is lower than 
the comparable price for products destined for consumption in the exporting country, 
in the ordinary course of trade. In the event that those circumstances are verified and 
that the causal link between the sales below normal value and the injury is proven; 
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 LINDSEY & IKENSON “Coming Home to Roost: Proliferating Antidumping Laws and the Growing Threat to 
U.S. Exports” CATO Institute. Trade Policy Analysis No. 14. 2001. p. 5. 
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 “During the 1990s, antidumping use increased by 50 percent relative to the ’80s. The surge in new cases 
reflects the proliferation of antidumping laws in the developing world. Developing countries accounted for only 
seven investigations during 1980-87; by contrast, developing countries brought over 700 cases during the 
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the importing country can impose anti-dumping duties equal to the difference 
between the normal value and the export price367. 
 
The Anti-Dumping Agreement developed throughout the different rounds of 
negotiations and was decanted until reaching its present state. In the Kennedy 
Round of negotiations, discussions on the procedural rules for the imposition of anti-
dumping duties resulted in the 1967 Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI, 
also known as the Anti-Dumping Code368. The Anti-Dumping Code laid out detailed 
criteria and procedures for the invocation of anti-dumping actions but it did not make 
any reference to the part of Article VI related to countervailing duties. In the Tokyo 
Round of negotiations, the 1967 Anti-Dumping Code was revised, primarily with 
respect to causality and injury determination369. The Anti-Dumping Code was 
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 Supra, INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTER. 2009. 
368
Agreement on implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.(Anti-Dumping 
Code). Geneva 1969. 
369
Agreement on implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement in Tariffs and Trade.(Anti-Dumping 
Code).Geneva 1979 (Adopted 1980). 
Article 3: Determination of Injury 
1.A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of the General Agreement shall be based on positive 
evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports and their effect 
on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on 
domestic producers of such products. 
2.With regard to volume of the dumped imports the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has 
been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or 
consumption in the importing country. With regard to the effect of the dumped imports on prices, the 
investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant price undercutting by the dumped 
imports as compared with the price of a like product of the importing country, or whether the effect of such 
imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise 
would have occurred, to a significant degree. No one or several of these factors can necessarily give decisive 
guidance. 
3.The examination of the impact on the industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant 
economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry such as actual and potential decline 
in output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors 
affecting domestic prices; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, 
growth, ability to raise capital or investments. This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors 
necessarily give decisive guidance. 
4. It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, causing injury 
within the meaning of this Code. There may be other factors which at the same time are injuring the 
industry, and the injuries caused by other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports. [Emphasis 
added] 
5.The effect of the dumped imports shall be assessed in relation to the domestic production of the like product 
when available data permit the separate identification of production in terms of such criteria as: the 
production process, the producers' realizations, profits. When the domestic production of the like product has 
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renegotiated in the Uruguay Round and a new Anti-Dumping Agreement was 
adopted370. 
 
Historically, multilateral negotiations on anti-dumping have been exceptionally 
delicate. Indeed, some academics feel that was one of the factors that delayed 
consensus on the agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the Anti-Dumping Agreement) and that 
retarded the finalisation of the Uruguay Round of negotiations for almost two 
years371. During the Uruguay Round there were few but significant achievements with 
regards to the anti-dumping regulation. For example, one important development of 
the Uruguay Round which was included in the Anti-Dumping Agreement was the 
introduction of mandatory sunset reviews which the US did not have at the time 
(Canada, Australia and the EU already had various forms of sunset provisions)372. 
The reason for introducing such mandatory reviews was that anti-dumping measures 
tended to last for very long periods, some cases stretching over decades. The risk 
was then that the proliferation of anti-dumping measures around the world would 
lead to a ratchet effect, with made-to-measure protection creeping back through the 
back door to replace declining MFN tariffs and other trade barriers373. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
no separate identity in these terms the effects of the dumped imports shall be assessed by the examination of 
the production of the narrowest group or range of products, which includes the like product, for which the 
necessary information can be provided. 
6. A determination of threat of injury shall be based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or 
remote possibility. The change in circumstances which would create a situation in which the dumping would 
cause injury must be clearly foreseen and imminent. 
7. With respect to cases where injury is threatened by dumped imports, the application of anti-dumping 
measures shall be studied and decided with special care. 
370
Supra INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTER, 2009. 
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DUNN A. “Antidumping.” In Stewart, Terence P., ed., “The World Trade Organization: The Multilateral Trade 
Framework for the 21st Century and U.S. Implementing Legislation”, Washington, DC: American Bar 
Association, 1996, p. 246. 
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CADOT, de MELO, TUMURCHUDUR. “Anti-Dumping Sunset Reviews: The Uneven Reach of WTO Disciplines” 
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6502. 2007 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1140029. The EU 
introduced a five-year sunset clause as part of 1984 amendments to its basic Regulation as well as interim-
review procedures which were used in 165 cases between 1980 and 1995. Canada also introduced a five year 
sunset clause in 1984, while Australia, which supported the introduction of a sunset clause in multilateral 
negotiations, introduced one as part of packages of reform gradually introduced between 1988 and 1996 
(Australian Customs Service 2000). Besides the US, among major Anti-Dumping users only New Zealand did not 
have a sunset clause before the Uruguay Round agreement. 
373
 Supra CADOT, de MELO, TUMURCHUDUR. 2007. 
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New users have shifted the balance of anti-dumping use since the decade of the 
nineties. The cumulative effect of anti-dumping activity by new users was such that 
the five traditional users accounted for only slightly more than half (56%) of the 
cases filed in the nineties. This fact emphasises the manner in which the increased 
anti-dumping filings by non-traditional users eclipsed traditional user behaviour. An 
interesting fact of the development of anti-dumping is that most countries were 
subject to anti-dumping measures against them before they started applying their 
own anti-dumping regimen. This means that the countries were familiarised with the 
anti-dumping process as well as the fact that some of the measures started by the 
new users were animated by a policy of strategic retaliation374. The statistical trends 
clearly indicate that anti-dumping has not been understood and it has been used 
several times as a way of punishing unfair trade375.  
 
4.2 General perspective 
Trade remedies are laws used by countries to diminish the negative effect of 
different trade practices on local industries and workers. Anti-dumping laws are 
intended to neutralise the material injury suffered by domestic industries as a result 
of competing imports being sold at prices shown to be less than their fair market 
value. Anti-dumping laws and actions have been controversial as they have proven 
to be used as protectionist tools and trade experts have pointed this out376. On the 
other hand, governments and industries see them as fundamental tools to reduce 
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the undesirable impact of unfair trade on domestic companies, workers, and the 
communities in which they are located377. 
 
It is important to understand that dumping per se is not a censurable practice. 
Indeed, it is recognised that producers sell their goods at different prices to different 
markets. It is also not unusual for prices to vary from time to time in the light of 
supply and demand conditions. It is also known that price discrimination in the form 
of dumping is a common international commercial practice, and it is not strange that 
the export prices are lower than the domestic prices. Therefore, from the point of 
view of anti-dumping practices, there is nothing inherently illegal or immoral about 
the practice of dumping378. It is quite obvious though; that the consumers of a 
dumped product gain while the producers of a like product may suffer a loss. Anti-
dumping is, therefore, viewed as having no economic justification379. Anti-dumping 
measures are applicable only in the event the dumping practice causes damage to 
the local industry. This rests in the logic that in a competitive market, dumping that 
causes damage to the domestic producers is creating an unfair competitive 
advantage, which affects domestic industries and also affects international markets 
as it encourages the creation of monopolies and dominant positions of a few 
suppliers, which is against the purposes of liberalisation and wealth creation of the 
WTO. Once dumping and injury have been determined, there is place for imposing 
anti-dumping duties which are aimed at levelling the playing field for the domestic 
producer facing the imported product. 
 
The Anti-Dumping Agreement stipulates fairly detailed procedural rules governing 
dumping investigations. These comprise the rules relating to the complaints of 
domestic producers and to the establishment of transparency provisions on 
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investigation and decision-making. Additionally, the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
contains substantive rules with regards to the methods that are applicable in the 
evaluation and measure of the dumping margin, the determination of the existence of 
injury and the establishment of the causal link between dumping and injury. 
 
According to the Anti-Dumping Agreement, a product is being dumped if the export 
price is lower than the normal value, which is generally calculated by using the 
comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined 
for consumption in the exporting country380. A member cannot impose an anti-
dumping measure unless it determines, after having performed an investigation that 
is compliant with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The requirements are: (a) there are 
dumped imports; (b) the domestic industry is materially injured or is threatened with 
material injury, or that the establishment of a domestic industry is being materially 
retarded; and (c) there is a causal link between the dumped imports and the injury. 
 
The Anti-Dumping Agreement expresses that the only remedy against dumping 
available to the contracting parties, is the application of anti-dumping measures. The 
measures allowed by the Anti-Dumping Agreement are provisional measures, 
definitive anti-dumping duties and price undertakings381.This should be read without 
prejudice to the other provisions of the GATT agreement and the most logical way of 
understanding it is that whenever there is a situation of dumping, the contracting 
parties have the Anti-Dumping Agreement as a sole recourse within WTO law.  
 
However, this has more than one dimension because the passive party who is 
receiving the application of an anti-dumping measure according to the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement is able to use not only the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in 
its defence with regards to substantial aspects contained therein, but also Article 
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XXIII in the case that any of its legitimately expected benefits are nullified or impaired 
in the exercise of the anti-dumping prerogative.  
 
In other words, the application of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is not carte blanche 
for the importing members to reduce the benefits granted by virtue of all the WTO 
agreements by the exporting member. It is proposed in this review that it is plausible 
that in the event that nullification or impairment of rights or legitimate expectations 
are experienced by exporting members in application of legitimate anti-dumping 
measures, the exporting member may act towards the re-establishment of its vested 
or legitimately expected benefits by using the provision of Article XXIII in WTO 
litigation. It is necessary then to know the composition and constitutional aspects of 
the anti-dumping system of rules in detail in order to understand its application and 
to explain a possible interaction with Article XXIII in the status quo of the WTO 
dispute resolution system.  
 
As a response to the increasing trade liberalisation and globalisation of the markets, 
anti-dumping measures have been applied in an exponential way for the protection 
of local industries against unfair competition. The WTO has reported and 
documented, between January 1995 and June 2011, 3922 anti-dumping initiations 
and 2543 anti-dumping measures applied. The ideal is that anti-dumping is used to 
ensure fair competition between domestically produced products and imports. In 
practice, and depending on the local implementation procedures and practices, it 
could be misused as a protectionist measure to raise trade barriers382. 
 
It is important to note that even before the creation of the WTO, the need for an 
international mediator was envisaged383 as a necessary relief in order to implement 
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international trade in fair conditions, or at least to contain the overwhelming 
protectionism of major players in the international trade arena to a moderate extent. 
In the United States, for example, anti-dumping was applied in an unreasonable 
manner by imposing minimum revenue for exporters384 and punishing exporters who 
sold at lower prices abroad; thus heavily limiting the variety of products allowed in 
the market and significantly raising the consumer‘s costs385. Therefore, the creation 
of the WTO was warmly welcomed386 by academics and practitioners387 who hoped 
that the creation of an authority and international agreement would significantly 
reduce the intervention of the US government in the international markets.  
 
Anti-dumping, in spite of the great de iure effort and success achieved in the 
Uruguay Round, has partially failed in both its original purposes a) as an expression 
of bilateral rearrangement of the WTO agreements whenever needed in order to 
restore the conditions of the original negotiation and b) as an instrument to rectify 
economic policy of the Member States whenever their law and policy was restrictive 
of the free market proposed by the WTO agreements.  
 
4.3 Anti-Dumping as an expression of specific reciprocity 
More than a mere trade remedy, anti-dumping could be understood as a kind of 
specific reciprocity on the market for market-access rights and as an exception to the 
Most-Favoured Nation rule. In other words, the provisions contained in the Anti-
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Dumping Agreement can be explained as the possibility of bilateral renegotiation of 
trade conditions within the WTO agreements388 in cases where the balance has been 
disturbed by the income of new members or conducts that only have an impact on a 
particular trade partner. In those cases, the renegotiation of a whole agreement 
would have impossible transactional costs and the operation of actual trade would be 
unreasonably hindered. The anti-dumping regulations, then, were meant to allow a 
bilateral mechanism for renegotiation to restore the original parity of conditions. This 
is coherent with the aims of GATT and with the ultimate beneficiary of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement itself, which is the consumer.  
This system is partially flawed in the sense that in not all cases this unilateral 
restoration of the trade balance is possible. There are several scenarios where this 
can be escaped by the protectionist countries but the most salient is the case in 
which cross subsidies are used in order to avoid the dumping factual proposition, 
that is, the case in which internal prices are artificially raised in order to protect a 
certain industry and dumping is impossible to prove. 
 
4.4 Anti-Dumping Use, Laws and Practices 
In order to understand the interaction between the anti-dumping application and the 
nullification and impairment provision, it is necessary to observe the actual use that 
countries give to the Anti-Dumping Agreement. An aggregate of statistics can show 
which countries are the most frequent users, and a review of these countries can 
offer reasons and possibly expose internal practices where anti-dumping may have 
been used as a protectionist tool. 
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Table 2: Top ten Anti-Dumping Users up to 2012
389. 
1. India 677 
2. US 469 
3. EU 451 
4. Argentina 303 
5. Brazil 279 
6. Australia 247 
7. South Africa 217 
8. China 200 
9. Canada 166 
10. Turkey 162 
 
There are several reasons why anti-dumping laws and practices need to be studied 
on a country by country basis. The first is the need to ascertain which countries are 
using anti-dumping measures as hidden protectionism and single out problematic 
rules and practices390 that could be subject to a nullification and impairment action. 
The second reason is to explore the domestic procedures that are applied to the 
anti-dumping measures as the procedures and actual application of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement is a prerogative of each government. Some governments 
decide to centralise the management of the anti-dumping regulation in a single 
institution – which is called a singular or unitary system – and some others have 
separate institutions to deal with different aspects of the application of the agreement 
– what is called a bifurcated or binary system391 – and each country is free to decide 
the timing for hearing and other procedural aspects392. Country-specific knowledge 
will allow conclusions to be drawn for each of the most representative members, 
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leading to clarity on the application of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provisions and, 
most importantly, if some of the practices, laws and uses are actionable under Article 
XXIII in cases of nullification or impairment. 
Some general remarks on anti-dumping flawed practices affecting exporting 
members which may be subject to generalisation are: 
 (a) Vaguely established key terms such as: ―Related Party‖, ―Costs‖, ―parts‘ 
costs‖, ―Value Added‖, ―Price Ex Works‖393. 
 (b) Tendency from domestic authorities to apply anti-dumping measures in 
cases where dumping is circumstantial/ incidental and not a systematic 
practice: i.e. in the event of currency fluctuations, uneven economic cycles or 
the countries variation of models used to calculate the dumping margin394. 
 Cost calculations are made by comparing the domestic and the foreign 
market instead of considering the real cost of production395. This distorts the 
objectiveness of the calculation by subjecting the exporting country to the 
economic reality to the importing country and not its real costs of production. 
Despite the general considerations mentioned above and due to its specific features 
in each country; the study of anti-dumping is better done as a matter of comparative 
law rather than an exclusive issue of public international law or a trade law issue that 
can be studied as a conglomerate. Hence, the study of the international legal status 
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quo must be combined with comparative legal analysis of the most salient anti-
dumping users in order to obtain the whole picture of anti-dumping396. 
Additionally it is important to note that the study of anti-dumping by the traditional 
users397 has been overly documented and its consequences are well understood. It is 
clear to the WTO membership when the traditional users, especially the United 
States and the European Union398, have used anti-dumping as a trade remedy as 
well as when it is abused and it becomes a protectionist tool399. 
Many studies have been dedicated to observing and explaining the conduct of the 
traditional users and therefore they will not be explored in this study. The increase in 
anti-dumping users and measures applied is, on the other hand, an interesting 
phenomenon where the new users, who have either recently joined the WTO or 
whose economies have recently grown in a significant way, play an important role. 
This poses the question of who the main new users are and how they are managing 
the prerogative given by the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and for the purposes of this 
study, whether that use and management could possibly lead to nullification or 
impairment either in the form of violations or in the form of Non-Violations.  
                                                          
396
Supra NAKAGAWA (2007) p. 20. 
397
 The United States and the European Union are considered the most representative traditional users of Anti-
Dumping. Anti-Dumping sanctions were imposed almost exclusively by four trading powers: the United States, 
European Communities (“EC”), Canada, and Australia—collectively known as the “traditional users” of 
antidumping, later New Zealand was also an early adopted of Anti-Dumping, but it did not use Anti-Dumping 
measures as frequently as the other four countries. See WU M. “Antidumping in Asia’s Emerging Giants”. 
Harvard International Law Journal Volume 53, Number 1, winter 2012. p. 8. Although South Africa has been a 
heavy user of Anti-Dumping since the 1950s, it has not been classified as a traditional user.  
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 This has eroded the new negotiations because traditional Anti - Dumping users, especially the United 
States, have shown strong resistance to further reform and have implemented past reform in a minimalist 
fashion. See MOORE M. Antidumping Reform in the Doha Round: A Pessimistic Appraisal. Paper prepared for 
“The Economics of the Doha Round and the WTO" University of Hong Kong December 16-17, 2005. 
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PONG WONG K. Anti-Dumping Measures as a Tool for Protectionism: A Mechanism Design ApproachThe 
Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'Economie Vol. 34 No. 3 2001. BOWN C. Antidumping, 
safeguards, and protectionism during the crisis: Two new insights from 4th quarter 2009. Development 
Research Group, Trade and International Integration (DECTI), World Bank. 2010. Available at 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4635. 
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Fortunately, the increase in the use of anti-dumping measures has been well 
documented; the interesting part is that the increase of anti-dumping use does not 
necessarily come from the traditional users, but developing economies have 
increasingly become significant users of the Anti-Dumping Agreement400. The 
statistics can be found by sector, by initiating country, by exporting country and by 
reporting country. It is interesting to see that the statistical report of anti-
dumping measures by sector presented below, updated to 2011, perpetuates the 
pattern presented from 1995 to 2008, where the heavily protected sectors of the 
industry such as metals401 and chemicals402. 
In a number of disputes brought before WTO panels, it has been the case that 
occasionally new users of anti-dumping have applied measures which are 
inconsistent with WTO rules403. This may be due to their inexperience in dealing with 
                                                          
400
 Traditional users are the five countries that have applied Anti-Dumping measures frequently during the 
1970s-1980s: Australia, Canada, The European Community, New Zealand and the United States. New Users, on 
the other hand, are all the countries that started applying Anti-Dumping measures with frequency from the 
decade of the nineties regardless of the existence of Anti-Dumping Laws from the early twentieth century. 
NAKAGAWA J. “Anti-Dumping Laws and Practices of the New Users”. Cameron May. London (2007). Despite 
being a user of Anti-Dumping since its early stages, with at least 653 investigations conducted up to 1975, 
South Africa has not been considered as a traditional user by the academic literature.  
401
 MAVROIDIS P, MESSERLIN P, WAUTERS J. “The Law and Economics of Contingent Protection in the WTO”. 
Edward Elgar Publishing. 2010. p. 141. 
402
 BANKS G. “The Anti-Dumping Experience of a GATT Fearing Country” in FINGER, NELLIE & ATIS (Eds) “Anti-
Dumping, How it Works and Who Gets Hurt”. University of Michigan Press, 1993.p. 194. 
403
 See for example: Venezuela - Anti dumping Investigation in respect of Imports of Certain Oil Country 
Tubular Goods OCTCDS 23; Guatemala Cement I DS 60; Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation on High 
Fructose Corn - Syrup HFCS from the United States DS 101; Thailand – H- Beans DS 122; Mexico - Corn 
Syrup DS 132; Guatemala Cement II DS 156; Argentina - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of 
Drill Bits from Italy DS 157; South Africa - Anti Dumping Duties on Certain Pharmaceutical Products from India 
DS 168; Ecuador - Provisional Anti-Dumping Measure on Cement from Mexico DS 182; Trinidad and Tobago 
– Anti-Dumping Measures on Pasta from Costa Rica DS 185; Trinidad and Tobago – Provisional Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Macaroni and Spaghetti from Costa Rica DS 187; Argentina – Ceramic Tiles DS 189; Ecuador – 
Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Cement from Mexico DS 191; Mexico – Measures Affecting Trade in Live 
Swine DS 203; Turkey – Anti-Dumping Duty on Steel and Iron Pipe Fittings DS 208; Philippines – Anti-
Dumping Measures regarding Polypropylene Resins from Korea; Mexico – Provisional Anti – Dumping Measure 
on electric Transformers DS 216; Brazil – Anti-Dumping Duties on Jute Bags from India DS 229, Argentina – 
Poultry Anti – Dumping Duties; Peru – Provisional Anti-Dumping Duties on Vegetable Oils from Argentina DS 
272; South Africa – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Blanketing from Turkey DS 288; Mexico – Anti-
Dumping Duties on Rice DS 295; India – Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports from Certain Products from the 
European Communities DS304; India – Anti-Dumping Measure on Batteries from Bangladesh DS 306; Korea 
– Certain Paper DS 312; India – Anti Dumping Measures on Certain Products from the separate Customs 
territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu DS 318; and Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes DS 331. 
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the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which may mean that the new users are still in the 
process of learning how to use anti-dumping measures in a WTO consistent way, but 
it also evidences that there is an increasing interest in developing, and specially 
emerging economies to protect, encourage and safeguard their domestic industry, 
sometimes in detriment to their international commitments.  
The traditional users of anti-dumping which are more relevant in understanding the 
intricacies of the anti-dumping practice are the United States and the European 
Union. Their cases have been overly documented by scholars around the world. This 
study will therefore be limited to essential remarks on their most controversial laws 
and practices without making a detailed analysis of their institutions and specific 
regulations on substantial and procedural aspects. 
The new users whose domestic laws and practices will be considered in this study in 
detail are China, Brazil, India and South Africa. The choice of countries is based 
firstly on their anti-dumping use; secondly on the fact that they are, except for South 
Africa, frequent targets of anti-dumping action by other Member States. Additionally, 
they are all the main representatives of their region, and their cases pose interesting 
questions on the use and understanding that they have given to the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement. Some of the other top ten users that have been excluded either do not 
represent the region in size and importance or have a very specific reason to use 
anti-dumping the way they do, as is the case of Argentina404.  
The economies and legal systems chosen for this study are important because they 
combine natural resources, a considerable market, fair technological development 
and regional influence. An additional consideration is that they are all starting to 
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 Since the crisis of the peso in 2001, Argentina has increased protectionism in many forms, including more 
frequent and stricter Anti-Dumping Measures and to a limited extent Countervailing Duties and Safeguards. 
This was exacerbated by the global economic crisis in 2008. See MOORE M. “Argentina: There and Back 
Again?”Institute for International Economic Policy. Working Paper Series No. IIEP-WP-2011-06. Elliott School of 
International Affairs. The George Washington University. 2011. p. 24. 
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compete in the international market with the traditional users of anti-dumping, which 
makes the competition considerations in international trade more relevant than ever.  
This means that the way that these particular countries understand and apply the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement is likely to shape the future negotiations on this topic. Also, 
their use of anti-dumping measures may clarify when and how such use can become 
a trigger for Article XXIII, and gives clues as to how an exporter country can use the 
existing legal resource of the nullification or impairment complaint. The conclusions 
drawn by this analysis cannot be deemed as general for all membership of the WTO, 
but they can be used as an indication of practices and regulations that, despite being 
in formal adherence to the WTO agreements, could in fact be affecting the benefits 
of other members and thus be covered by Article XXIII. 
4.4.1 United States and European Union 
4.4.1.1 United States 
The United States has traditionally been the most frequent405 user of anti-dumping 
measures and its system of anti-dumping is sophisticated and complex. The uses 
that the United States have given to anti-dumping have been documented 
thoroughly, thus this study will not replicate the previous analysis but just refer to it 
on the most pertinent aspects. It is submitted that one of the reasons for the 
proliferation of anti-dumping duties in the post Uruguay Round era is that the 
codification of U.S. and European Union anti-dumping practices into accepted WTO 
                                                          
405
 The United States was the major user of Anti-dumping under GATT. Under WTO and upon the raise of 
emerging economies, the use of Anti-Dumping increased in developing countries, which surpassed the United 
States in their use of this trade remedy. India, Brazil, China and Argentina are some of the countries who have 
recently used Anti-Dumping in a higher proportion than other developing countries. See VILJOEN W. “Trade 
Remedies and Safeguards in BRICS countries” TRALAC Working Paper. Stellenbosch. 2013. p. 5. 
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practices in the Uruguay Round has made it easier for Member States to adopt and 
administer WTO-consistent anti-dumping policies of their own406. 
The United States provides anti-dumping measures as a relief to domestic industries 
when the US Department of Commerce determines that a product is being sold in 
the US markets at less than its fair value; and the International Trade Commission 
(ITC) determines that an industry is suffering material injury or threat thereof. An 
investigation is initiated either upon verification of the existence of dumping in terms 
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by the Department of Commerce on the basis of the 
available information, or upon request from a domestic industry that claims injury. 
Dumping margins are obtained by calculating the average amount by which the fair 
market value of the alleged dumped product exceeds the price of the like product in 
the United States407. 
It is proven that in the United States there is a disconnection between the rhetoric of 
anti-dumping supporters and the reality of anti-dumping practice since the late 
nineties. The law as currently written and enforced in the United States does not 
reliably identify either price discrimination or below-cost sales408. The most artificial 
practices that the United States has adopted, and the weak justification of them 
which has led the use of anti-dumping as a protectionist tool instead of a fair trade 
facilitating instrument, can be summarised as: 
 
 1. Omission of certain factors in the calculation of losses: The Department of 
Commerce initiates investigations upon request of the interested industry regardless 
of whether the loss is not acute, severe or chronic, or prolonged in time. It also fails 
                                                          
406
 BLONIGEN B. U.S. Antidumping Filings and the Threat of Retaliation. University of Oregon and NBER. 
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 LONG Q. Conflicting Positions but Common Interests: an Analysis of the United States Anti-Dumping Policy 
towards China. 7 Richmond Journal of Global Law& Business 2008 p. 135. 
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LINDSEY B. The U.S. Antidumping Law: Rhetoric versus Reality. CATO Institute. Centre for Trade Policy. 
Trade Analysis Number 7.1999 p. 20. 
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to take into account normal commercial practices such as market positioning of new 
products or externalities outside the control of the exporter, for example, when the 
product originates in a non-market economy. When these factors are taken into 
account, the margins of dumping are diminished to zero or reduced significantly409. 
Another factor that is omitted by the Department of Commerce in the determination 
of damages is the size of the foreign market which can have an influence on the 
price of the exports. A small domestic market offers no potential for significant cross-
subsidisation of export sales410. 
 
2. Comparison of Like Products: When the U.S. Department of Commerce compares 
physically different merchandise; it adjusts for differences in materials, direct labour, 
and variable overhead costs. This is in line with the Anti-Dumping Agreement and 
the objectives of the WTO. However, in practice the comparison happens without 
explaining that actual price differences may be more or less than the differences in 
variable manufacturing costs and duties are imposed on those calculations which 
may or may not be true indications of the existence of dumping and significant 
injury411. 
 
3. Protectionist Standards of Anti-Dumping due to the pressures of the big domestic 
industries who see their monopolies and big revenues threatened by the influx of 
                                                          
409
 “With respect to acute losses, the dumping margins of Liaoning (respondent in the NME investigation of cut 
to- length steel plate from China) and Dieng/Surya Jaya (respondent in the constructed- value investigation of 
preserved mushrooms from Indonesia) were recalculated for purposes of this study by comparing U.S. prices to 
an estimate of variable costs (as opposed to full unit costs plus profit). Dumping margins for both companies 
disappeared completely: Liaoning’s margin fell from 17.33 percent to zero, and Dieng/Surya Jaya’s fell from 
7.94 percent to 0.04 percent (de minimis). These results show that the Commerce Department’s affirmative 
dumping determinations cannot be taken as reliable indicators of acute below-cost sales. For chronic losses, the 
period investigated by the Commerce Department in antidumping cases is only 12 months. Consequently, 
Commerce lacks the evidentiary record to determine whether a company’s losses are abnormally persistent. 
Because Commerce does not take a longer view, it cannot determine whether losses reflect a temporary market 
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company or a new product.” Supra LINDSEY 1999 p. 17 
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foreign imports. It is true that import-competing industries (especially the steel 
industry) use anti-dumping laws in their interest regularly. These industries exercise 
a strong lobby and hold relevant positions in government, which makes them 
politically powerful. ―For them, results are all that count: anything that makes it easier 
for domestic industries to win protection makes the law better, and anything that 
makes protection harder to achieve is a step backward. That standard, of course, 
has nothing to do with any notions of fair trade; it is a protectionist standard, pure 
and simple”412. 
 
4.4.1.2 European Union 
The European Union has also been criticised for their use of anti-dumping to protect 
their domestic industry. In the EU anti-dumping practice, five main tendencies have 
been identified by empirical corroboration413: 
 
1. The main targets of investigations and measures are exporters from emerging 
markets, particularly in Asia – a growing source of global competition; 
 
2. Targeted products are concentrated in sectors where European comparative 
advantage is declining, i.e. raw materials, industrial input goods and textiles; 
 
3. Dumping margins reflect this pattern, being particularly high in the chemical and 
steel sectors;  
 
4. Duty levels are significantly higher than bound tariffs, particularly in the higher-end 
technology sector. 
 
5. Once an anti-dumping investigation has been initiated, definitive measures are the 
most likely outcome414. 
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Other objections to the European anti-dumping practice are: 
 
1. Definition of like products in spite of the requests of the investigated countries: 
The European Authority does not take into account that lower prices of imported 
products from developing economies do in fact reflect the low level of technology 
and value added415.The EU practice has shown that once a product is defined, it is 
almost invariably found as a like product despite a possible difference in its technical 
characteristics416.  
 
2. In the Determination of Injury: The European Union takes into account all the 
factors required in the Anti-Dumping Agreement but it gives important weight to 
market share evolution of the foreign importer, price undercutting417 and price 
depression within the EU markets. However, other key aspects that could favour the 
foreign exporters are seldom taken into account by the Commission such as EU 
employment and capacity utilisation418. This suggests that the injury determination is 
biased to a certain extent. 
 
3. Causal link determination: It has been verified empirically that in the determination 
of causal link between dumping and injury, the Commission tries to understand 
whether other factors may explain the condition of the EU industry apart from 
dumped imports. However, these factors are limited to the evolution of demand in 
the community market, imports from third countries and the situation on the world 
market. If the Commission is not satisfied that these factors cause or contribute to 
the injury experienced by the EU domestic industry, it makes the immediate 
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assumption that injury was caused by dumped goods without undertaking a proper 
causation test419.  
 
4. Application of a Community Interest Test: When the benefit for consumers is 
weighed against the detriment to the domestic industry in terms of short term gains 
for consumption and long term losses for production for the EU, the Commission 
supports the domestic industry by arguing that not supporting it would lead to the 
domestic industry closing down, and explaining the collateral impact of this situation. 
In reality, most of these endangered domestic producers are in a highly 
concentrated industry, often involving only one producer420, with a fair amount of 
political influence. Some academics have linked this to the causation issue by 
explaining that if a domestic industry that is a monopoly or an oligopoly is threatened 
with closing down because of cheaper imports, this is more likely to be due primarily 
to their economic inefficiencies than to an unfair practice from a foreign exporter421. 
 
5. Concentrated EU Industries: In most of the cases filed in the EU, it is interesting to 
observe the very concentrated nature of the EU industry filing for protection. In the 
majority of cases, a small number of EU complainants represented well over 50% of 
total EU production. This seems to confirm political economic studies that have 
indicated that concentrated industries are more successful when applying for 
protection than diffused industries422, which gives monopolies and oligopolies that 
are already overly protected a stronger chance of obtaining further protection 
through anti-dumping action.  
                                                          
419
“An example is a reviewed case silicon carbide originating from China, Russia and Ukraine. As a result of the 
previous antidumping measure, China and Ukraine had lost significant sales volume and their market share 
was minimized over time. However, the Russian imports did not decrease sharply and remained stable, and 
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6. Targeted subjects of investigation: The economic trends and statistic information 
available show that there are some trade partners that are systematically being 
targeted by the EU complainants for dumping, amongst which China and India are 
the primary targeted partners, which encourages a retaliatory attitude from all trade 
partners and anti-dumping users in the WTO.  
 
It is known that the EU has a highly protected agricultural industry and other 
industries, cartels and oligopolies that claim protection cause a threat of increasing 
their dominant position by using anti-dumping rules to strengthen their position in the 
market423. Indeed, the anti-dumping practices of the EU can perpetuate unfair trade 
rather than level the playing field by protecting European industries that are 
becoming obsolete or being threatened by the impact of globalisation424. 
 
4.4.1.3 Non-Market Economies of the EU and the United States. 
One of the issues that both the United States and the European Union have shared 
in the past decades is the issue of non-market economies. As international trade law 
offers no guidance on how to define a non-market economy, it is up to each state to 
decide which countries qualify as market economies for the purposes of anti-
dumping law425. Non-market economies are considered to exist when it is not 
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See Supra DAVIS L. 2009 p. 15: “Some recent cases illustrate the point. For example, definitive duties were 
imposed on imports of polysulphide polymers from the US, following a complaint from the sole EU producer in 
Germany. The US Company ceased trading in the EU as a result, leaving a monopoly in the EU market. 
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United States. OJ L255, 17 September 1998, p.1). What is striking about this case is that the EC’s defence of 
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possible to calculate the margin of dumping comparing the price at which the product 
is sold to importers in the importing country (the export price) and the ‗normal value‘ 
of the product because there is no reliable home market price. In these cases the 
price can be construed either making the comparison with a surrogate market which 
is a comparable third country or by constructing a synthetic price426. A surrogate 
market is a country that is classified as market economy that has comparable 
conditions of the country subject to the examination, whereas a synthetic price is 
constructed with hypothetic assumptions. 
To assess whether a country has market economy status, the EU examines the 
aspects that they consider essential for a market economy on a case by case basis. 
These aspects are the degree of government influence over the allocation of 
resources and decisions of enterprises and the existence of state-induced distortions 
in the operation of enterprises linked to privatisation. It takes into account the 
existence and implementation of transparent and non-discriminatory company law, 
the enactment of a coherent, effective and transparent set of laws relating to 
property rights and bankruptcy, and the establishment of a genuine, independent 
financial sector subject to adequate supervision427. The EU has done this 
assessment of China and has considered it an economy in transition because, 
despite the big improvements in the abovementioned aspects that have taken place 
in the past two decades, not all aspects are fulfilled. However, the EU has granted 
Market Economy Status to some Chinese companies that meet all the criteria on a 
case by case basis428. 
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 In 1998 the EU adapted its trade defence rules to permit that individual companies claim market economy 
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implies that, in the event of antidumping measures being imposed, the company would be subject to its own 
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The United States, instead, has implemented a law that contains a broad description 
of what a non-market economy is. According to Section 771 (18) of the Tariff Act of 
1930, a non-market economy is a country that does not operate on market principles 
of cost or pricing structures so that sales of merchandise in such a country do not 
reflect the fair value of the merchandise. The criteria used in the United States to 
determine whether a country is a market economy is similar to the EU approach in 
certain ways only.  
 
One similarity is that the Department of Commerce, just like the EU, takes into 
account the extent of government control over the means of production and over the 
allocation of resources and companies‘ business decisions. It also looks at currency 
convertibility, free wage bargaining and openness to foreign private or public 
investment. However, a clause allows the Department of Commerce to take into 
account other factors that it may consider appropriate, such as the existence and 
operation of anti-monopoly laws and the operation of a securities exchange429.  
 
The Department of Commerce applies a standard test called the Market Oriented 
Industry Test430 which is not in their written regulations but is applied in their 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Individual treatment can be granted where an exporting producer can show that its decisions concerning 
export sales (in terms of prices and quantities) are made independently from the State. In this context, 
emphasis will be put on whether the export activities are totally free from State intervention and thus that 
there is no risk of circumvention of anti-dumping measures by the exporting producer requesting individual 
treatment, should the investigation result in the finding that there is injurious dumping and that anti-dumping 
measures are not contrary to the interests of the Community. The granting of individual treatment on export 
sales means the determination of an individual dumping/injury margin for an exporting producer, which applies 
as an exception from the single country-wide dumping/injury margin. An exporting producer receiving 
individual treatment on its export sales would, in the event of anti-dumping measures being imposed, be 
subject to its own individual duty-rate, if any, instead of the country-wide duty. For companies receiving 
individual treatment but not market economy status, normal value will be established on the basis of 
information obtained in the analogue country, which will then be compared with the exporting producer’s own 
export prices to the Community.” 
429
Supra INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION. pp. 11–12. 
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 The test is aimed to establish “Whether the NME government exercises de facto control is indicated by (a) 
whether the company’s export prices are set by the government; (b) whether the company is free to sign 
negotiate and sign contracts without government involvement or approval; (c) whether the company retains its 
export sales revenue and makes its own decisions regarding how to use its profits or finance its losses.” 
Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings 
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investigations, and no economy that has been subjected to it has approved it. There 
is no provision in the WTO that specifies which methods can be used to determine 
the normal value in cases where goods are imported from non-market economy 
countries so the countries are free to apply what they consider convenient. 
 
This is important because of the interaction of the United States and the EU as trade 
partners with one of the non-market economies, China, which is at the same time 
one of the most active users of anti-dumping as well as a frequent target of them, 
and the treatment that is given to its status by the most significant anti-dumping 
users will set the trend for the rest of the countries until a formal provision is made or 
until the terms provided in the protocol of accession of China expires431. 
 
The fact that China is classified as a non-market economy by both the EU and the 
US means that the surrogate country method is applied to Chinese exports in anti-
dumping investigations carried out in these jurisdictions. This method is often 
perceived – not only by the Chinese Government and industry but also by some 
European and American anti-dumping lawyers – as inaccurate, unpredictable and 
arbitrary because the country that is chosen as a surrogate can either be a 
developing country with great differential economic elements or a developed country 
with significant differences in population and income like Norway, Austria and 
France432. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Involving Non–Market Economy Countries: Surrogate Country Selection and Separate Rates” 72 Federal 
Register 13246, 13248.March 21, 2007. See also, GANTZ D. Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags: Non-Market 
Economy Status and U.S. Unfair Trade Actions against Vietnam” North Carolina Journal of International Law 
and Commercial Regulation, Vol. 36, 2010. p. 103. 
431
 Despite the fact that the United States and the EU insist in exercising their right to treat China as a non-
market economy, at least 57 countries granted China Market Economy Status. Some of those countries are 
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Russia and Malaysia. See RAVENHILL & JIANG. “China’s 
Move to Preferential Trading: An Extension of Chinese Network Power?” Paper presented at the international 
conference “Made in China vs. Made by Chinese: Global Identities of Chinese Business”. University of Durham. 
United Kingdom. 2007. p. 23 note 41.   
432
 See generally Supra LONG 2008. 
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4.4.2 China 
China joined the WTO in December 2001 and as a preparation to their accession, a 
major institutional transformation and development has taken place in order to adapt 
to the WTO regulations. China agreed in its protocol of accession to the WTO to be 
granted non-market economy status for 15 years from the date of accession433, and 
China has always been the principal target of anti-dumping actions by all WTO 
Member States434. It is important to understand the structure of the authorities and 
procedures in place for anti-dumping investigations, measures and duty collections 
since it is in them and in the international trade policies that practices originate.  
Due to its rapid industrial development, China has been the target of an increasing 
and significant amount of anti-dumping litigation, but also in its short membership of 
the WTO it is one of the largest anti-dumping users435. China has a low incidence of 
targeting developing countries, which could be explained by the fact that China 
naturally cannot target itself436, which does not impede action against traditional anti-
dumping users and developed countries such as the United States and the 
European Union. In fact, China was implementing anti-dumping actions previous to 
its consolidation as a WTO member. ―Before its accession to the WTO, China 
initiated 33 anti-dumping investigations, under the 1997 regulations”437. Almost half of 
                                                          
433
 This is contained in paragraph 15(a) of China’s accession protocol. The automatic consideration of China as 
a Market economy upon expiry of the 15 year period has been subject of much debate. It is argued that the 
accession protocol allows for discretionary interpretation of paragraph 15(a), and thus, China can be treated as 
a Non-Market Economy after 2016 until it satisfies the market economy criteria stipulated in domestic laws. 
However, a reading of paragraph 15(a) as a conditional derogation clause and its clear text establish that upon 
expiry of the prescribed term, China must be automatically treated as a Market Economy by other WTO 
members. For a more detailed illustration on this debate see O’CONNOR B. “The Myth of China and Market 
Economy Status in 2016”, available at http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/files/oconnorresponse.pdf, see also 
RAO “China’s Market Economy Status under WTO Anti-Dumping Law after 2016”. Tsinghua China Law Review. 
Vol. 5:151. 2013. p. 155. See also WT/DS397/AB/R European Communities- Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures 
on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China. 2011.  
434
Supra INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION. pp. 13–14. 
435
 China is the eight biggest user in the world of Anti-Dumping Measures having reported 148. See statistics of 
Anti-Dumping Measures : By Reporting Member 01/01/1995 -30/06/2011: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm 
436
KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM/NATIONAL BOARD OF TRADE, Sweden. Report: The Use of Antidumping in Brazil, 
China, India and South Africa – Rules, Trends and Causes. Stockholm. 2005. p. 10. 
437
 The Regulations on Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures were issued by the State Council of People’s 
Republic of China on March 23, 1997. 
  
181 
 
such cases were not reported to the WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practice 
because they were finalized before China‘s accession to the WTO438. The first anti-
dumping investigation was initiated in 1997 on import of newsprints from Canada, 
United States and South Korea439. 
 
In industry, despite the fact that the chemical industry is China‘s third largest 
following textiles and machinery440, ―China has a trade deficit in that sector. Indeed, 
China is the world‟s second largest consumer of basic chemical products and relies 
greatly on imports of these products441. With the commitment to lower tariffs on 
chemicals after its WTO accession, domestic producers in the sector are facing 
increasing competition from imports; hence, the increase of anti-dumping 
investigations and imposition of anti-dumping measures in that sector”442. 
 
The following chart briefly describes the legal framework of anti-dumping in China 
and the authorities who are in charge of the different aspects related to anti-dumping 
procedures. The most substantial procedures will be explored in order to find out 
whether: 
- They formally comply with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
- They lead to practices which are adjusted to the WTO‘s principles and objectives. 
                                                          
438
 Supra THI THUY VAN L & TONG S (2009) p.12. THI THUY VAN L & TONG S in their text also indicate that “Six 
of the 33 cases were terminated without the imposition of Anti-Dumping duties due to a negative 
determination on injury”.  
439
 “Receiving complaints from nine domestic newsprint companies, Moftec and SETC started an antidumping 
investigation in December 1997. The investigators concluded that the invasion of newsprint from the U.S., 
Canada and South Korea had serious material injury for Chinese newsprint industry. Newsprint prices dropped 
9.1%, the total profits of the nine companies dropped 88%, leading to inventory build up and large-scale 
layoffs. Moftec and SETC issued its final verdict of China’s first antidumping case in June 1999, imposing 
punitive antidumping tariffs on newsprint imports from the U.S., Canada and South Korea. The antidumping 
tariff rate for each country was based on a normal price, which is determined based on the CIF value of the 
product. Due to the variation in costs and market prices from company to company, the U.S., Canada, and 
South Korea were subject to tariff rates of 78%, 57-78%, and 55% respectively”. Citing NING & ROSS (2001) YIN 
J. Z., “China: How to fight the Anti-Dumping war”. China and Global Business. Stillman School of Business.  
Selton Hall University, 2003. P.8  
440
Sectoral distribution of AD measures by China by CZAKO J. Anti-Dumping selected Statistics and Trends 
Rules Division WTO Secretariat. Sep 2010. 
441
 Supra THI THUY VAN L.  TONG S. 2009 p. 14. 
442
 Supra THI THUY VAN L.  TONG S. 2009 p. 14. 
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- They could be triggering Article XXIII and in which form this article would be 
applicable to anti-dumping practices in China. 
 
Table 3.  Anti-Dumping Legislation and Implementing Authorities in China
443
 
Local regulation of the Anti-
Dumping regime 
Administrative and Judicial Authorities 
for Anti-Dumping Matters 
1. Article 142 Civil Law of 
China: If any international 
treaty concluded by or 
acceded to by the People‘s 
Republic of China contains 
provisions differing from those 
in the civil laws of the People‘s 
Republic of China, the 
provisions of the international 
treaty shall apply, unless the 
provisions are ones on which 
the People‘s Republic of China 
has announced reservations. 
2. the regulations of the 
People‘s Republic of China on 
Anti- Dumping – 2004 The 
regulations: The 2004 
regulations are the result of a 
long process of regulatory 
adaptation to be able to 
comply with the WTO 
agreements and they contain 
the regime under which all 
1. Bureau of Fair Trade for Imports and 
Exports BOFT: this office reports to the 
Ministry of Commerce MOFCOM is in 
charge of dumping investigations. 
2. Bureau of Industry Injury BII: also 
depends on MOFCOM and it is in charge of 
injury investigations and causal link 
investigations not only for anti-dumping 
investigations, but also for countervailing 
duty and safeguard investigations 
3. State Council Tariff Commission SCTC: 
the SCTC is in charge of making decisions 
on the imposition of provisional and 
definitive anti-dumping duties and the refund 
of extra duties based on the proposal by 
MOFCOM. Its powers are more formal than 
substantial 
4. Customs General Administration CGA: 
Customs offices in China are under the 
control of the State Council. The CGA 
controls China‘s customs offices. Regarding 
                                                          
443
 Substantial table contents sourced from regulations referred by Supra NAKAGAWA P.37 
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anti-dumping procedures are 
to be held.  
anti-dumping, their function is to collect 
provisional and definitive anti-dumping 
duties. In addition they are in charge of 
refunding extra duties. They also verify the 
data of exports of the products subject to 
price undertaking444. 
 
 
The substantial aspects that the authorities take into account to determine whether 
they will impose an anti-dumping duty or not are essential to understand when and 
how the anti-dumping laws and practices can be ―undercover protectionism‖, and 
which of those actions or omissions may be the subject of a nullification or 
impairment complaint. The five essential concepts are: 
1. Causality 
2. Dumping 
3. Material Injury 
4. Like Product 
5. Public Interest 
This review will focus on the last four elements mentioned above.  Anti-dumping 
investigations begin from the point of comparing products that are alike and 
determining whether one of those products has been sold at a price below normal 
value in order to obtain an unfair advantage in the foreign markets. Therefore, the 
first substantial consideration that is made in all anti-dumping procedures is the 
consideration of like products. Article 2.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides 
                                                          
444
Supra NAKAGAWA (2007) p. 37. 
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a stringent definition of the term like product445. Establishing what a like product is 
gives an object to the anti-dumping investigations and it is essential to determine 
whether there has been a material injury.  
In China, the procedure to identify like products is contained in the following norms: 
Article 12 of the 2004 Regulations, Article of the Rules on Investigations of Industry 
Injury for Anti-Dumping, Article 14 2 of the 2004 Regulations and Article 11 3 of 
the Provisional Rules on Initiation of Anti-Dumping Investigations446. These 
regulations require detailed descriptions and numerous facts to be taken into 
account to determine when there is a case of like products. Despite the fact that they 
are formally in force and that their requirements are clear, they are not followed as 
strictly in practice. Some of the flaws of the current practice of determining like 
products in China are: 
1. Application documents for the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation that 
cover a broad range of products which are not limited to the dumped product. 
Furthermore, when the application documents specifically mention the dumped 
product, they contain sales data of a broader range of products. This is not normal 
practice in China but it has occurred in more than one case. It is not a flaw exclusive 
to the Chinese practice. Indeed, it can be observed in a variety of countries. In 
China, when faced with this situation, the exporter has the possibility of correcting 
the problem by submitting a request for an adjustment of product scope within twenty 
days from the date of public notice of initiation of an investigation447. Also, it is 
possible to submit simplified requests with brief descriptions and a detailed 
description at a later stage of the investigation, and a similar request is allowed after 
the preliminary determination.  
                                                          
445
 Anti-Dumping Agreement Art 2.6: Throughout this Agreement the term "like product" ("produit similaire") 
shall be interpreted to mean a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under 
consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, 
has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration. 
446
Art 113 of the Provisional Rules on Initiation of Anti-Dumping Investigations describes the requirement to 
provide a detailed description of the allegedly dumped product.  
447
Art 5 1 of the Provisional Rules on the Procedure for Adjusting Product Scope in Anti- Dumping 
Investigations. 
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2. Investigations by the MOFCOM may be initiated without specification of the 
product scope. Investigations initiated without specification of the product scope are 
a violation of Art. 12.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. However, in practice, China 
does publish the scope of the investigation in its initiation notices in a very vague 
manner. This does not allow the exporters to cooperate properly. 
3. Some products are considered like448 products by the MOFCOM when in 
reality they have different composition, presentation, uses and target users449. This 
practice in itself constitutes a breach of Article 2.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
and therefore is subject to the remedies contained therein. Additionally, should the 
classification of like products affect the benefits of the WTO agreements vested in a 
member state who is a trading partner of China, Article XXIII 1:a is applicable 
without prejudice to the other remedies available. In this situation it is possible to 
conclude that the affected party has a choice of remedies that can be used either as 
a principal and a subsidiary or independently, but not concomitantly, as the remedies 
are different in their form and their consequences exclude each other.  
In order to determine the existence of dumping, the regulations have established a 
method to ascertain the normal value of goods450: 
Where there is a comparable price for the like product of the import in the ordinary 
course of trade in the domestic market of the exporting country or region, such 
comparable price shall be either i the comparable price of the like product when 
exported to an appropriate third country or region, or ii) the cost of production of the 
like product in the country or region of origin plus a reasonable amount for expenses 
and profits.451 
                                                          
448
 MOFCOM has understood to have discretion to decide whether to apply the likeness factors indicated in 
the AD Rules as it say that the authorities may consider them to establish the likeness of two products. See 
MOFCOM Public Notice No. 51/2010 in WT/DS427/R China – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures 
on Broiler Products from the United States. See also Evaluation of the European Union Trade Instruments. 
Contract No. SI2.581682. Final Evaluation Study. Volume 1: Main Report. BKP Development Research and 
Consulting. 2012. p. 150. 
449
 See Supra NAKAGAWA (2007) pp. 59-60. 
450
 2004 Regulations. 
451
 Art 4 of the 2004 Regulations. 
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China applies the methodology of constructed value (ii) as a standard procedure. 
The methodology (i) that refers to third party exports price has never been applied 
despite the fact that it is formally allowed by the regulations.  
In order to establish a potential dumping margin, a price comparison must be made. 
Price comparison in China is always made on the basis of a comparison of weighted 
average normal value with weighted average of prices of all comparable export 
transactions. The method of comparing the normal value and export price on a 
transaction by transaction basis is not used despite being compliant with the Anti-
Dumping Agreement and formally included in the 2004 regulations452. A comparison 
between weighted average normal values with prices of individual export 
transactions is allowed in the cases where export prices differ significantly among 
buyers, provinces or time periods and it is too onerous to make a comparison with 
any of the previous two methodologies453. However, this last methodology is also not 
used by China despite being contemplated as possible and compliant with the Anti-
Dumping Agreement. 
The price comparison methodology used in China can be problematic in the cases 
of: 
A Processing Trade: when parts and materials imported under the processing trade 
regime which are exempt from duty454 are included in the calculation of the margin of 
dumping. This is a case of lack of transparency because MOFCOM does not 
disclose the details of its calculation of the margin of dumping and the methodology 
of calculation may be affecting the exporters by including the parts and materials that 
are supposed to be exempt of duty in the calculation. 
                                                          
452
 Art 6.3 of the 2004 Regulations. 
453
 Art 6.4 of the 2004 Regulations. 
454
 Under the processing trade regime, first introduced in 1979, China designates export processing zones and 
invites foreign investors to establish manufacturing facilities there for processing and export. Those parts and 
materials imported for processing are exempt from Chinese Customs Duties and export value added taxes 
tariffs, on the condition that the processed products are exported. See Guide to Doing Business in China 
Hong Kong Trade Development Council HKTDC Research Department (2004/ 2005), Sec 2.3. See also 
NAKAGAWA (2007) pp. 62–63. 
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B Transactions not conducted in the ordinary course of Trade: transactions not 
conducted in the ordinary course of trade are exempt from the determination of a 
normal value as per Article 4 of the 2004 regulations. MOFCOM has recognised, 
upon request from exporters, two types of transactions under this category and 
accepts to exclude them from the calculation of a normal value. The transactions 
accepted by MOFCOM are swap transactions455 and consignment production456 
(C) Transactions between related companies: in the case of the transactions 
between related companies MOFCOM has some procedures that despite being 
legitimate may lead to the inclusion of some transactions that are technically 
considered to be between related companies, in the dumping margin calculation. 
(D) Price Adjustments: MOFCOM has not accepted including the increased indirect 
sales costs for exports in the price adjustments, which are naturally higher than costs 
for domestic sales due to the incremented need for sale promotion activities. 
Additionally, MOFCOM has not disclosed under what conditions it conducts an 
adjustment of the levels of trade. 
The events that could be subject to nullification and impairment complaints are the 
most evident cases of a breach committed in the price adjustment calculation of 
dumping margins and price comparisons in the case of processing trade in which the 
MOFCOM process is not transparent enough. Again, the breach of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement has a specific remedy contained in the Agreement which is not exclusive 
of the application of Article XXIII until it has been chosen by the complainant. 
                                                          
455
 A Swap refers to an agreement between two parties to exchange one or more cash flows measured by 
different rates or prices with payments calculated by reference to a principal base (notional amount). See 
YOUND, DUNCAN, KAPLAN "CFTC Adopts Large Trader Reporting Rules" Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom 
LLP, July 22, 2011. Available online at: http://www.skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentID=51&itemID=2490. A 
Swap transaction is subdivided in two: location swap, which refers to the place of production where the price 
of a commodity does not have real economic importance; and time swap which refers to inventory cycles of 
different producers. 
456
 Consignment manufacturing, as opposed to turnkey manufacturing can be best thought of as “partial” 
outsourcing. It describes a model in which the technology producer maintains some portion of the overall 
manufacturing supply chain in-house – typically, purchasing and/or system assembly (box and build). Under a 
consignment model, in-house purchasing, shipping and receiving groups are responsible to obtain materials, 
sort and package them for production and deliver them to the contract manufacturer for assembly. 
Definition by OCM Manufacturing available at: 
http://www.ocmmanufacturing.com/resources/tip_docs/OCM_TurnkeyVsConsignment_ShortPaper_FINAL.pdf 
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The determination of material injury is mostly compliant and respectful of the rules 
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The main controversial issues with regards to the 
material injury do not originate in the rules themselves but in the practices of 
MOFCOM. For example, the rules on cumulation are almost a transliteration of 
Articles 3.3 and 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Nonetheless, the MOFCOM 
applies them without making a full examination of substantive factors such as 
conditions of competition between the imported product and the like domestic 
product457. The complaint is that MOFCOM rejects requests for non-application of 
cumulation from responding companies based on detailed evidence and data and 
conducts the cumulation without explaining substantial grounds for their decision.  
One practice of MOFCOM that may affect benefits granted by the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement occurs during the injury investigation when there is insufficient disclosure 
of the bases of the assessment. In its preliminary determination and final 
determination, the MOFCOM provides the data on the factors contributing to injury 
without explaining how it reached injury determination458. In aspects like this, 
disguised protectionism can operate freely as there is no information available to the 
exporter on the basis of the anti-dumping investigation. In the process there may be 
opportunities to refute some of the findings, but if the data that is used to establish 
an injury is not disclosed to the respondent exporter, it is impossible to contest the 
injury determination. 
Another situation that may result in an Article XXIII complaint is when the MOFCOM 
initiates investigations without specifying the product scope and which is concluded 
with a wide range of products. Again, this is not an exclusive practice of the Chinese 
trade authorities and can be seen almost everywhere in the world. However, this 
does not mean that this practice is acceptable or that it would not be a cause of 
action in an eventual Non-Violation complaint, or even in a violation complaint as a 
breach of the agreement.  
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 As mandated by Art 15.1(2) of the Rules on Investigations of Industry Injury for Anti-Dumping. See Supra 
NAKAGAWA (2007) p. 65. 
458
 NORTON P.M.  BUSH N.G. Anti-Dumping: Investigations in China: Developments and Problems. Fair 
Trade Center. 2005. 
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In the determination of a causal link, a similar flaw has been detected in the 
practices of the MOFCOM. There is insufficient information given to the exporters of 
the foundations of their causal link evaluation which on occasion leads to arbitrary 
determinations of a causal link that can be unreasonable. Also the cumulation 
practice by MOFCOM does not allow them to differentiate between imports that 
cause injury and imports that do not459, leading to the imposition of measures on 
imports that do not pose a material or potential injury. 
Finally, the consideration of public interest is contained in Article 37 of the 2004 
regulations which state that: imposition and collection of anti-dumping duties shall 
be in the public interest. No other elaboration on the implementation of this rule has 
been enacted. Anti-dumping investigation remains without public participation 
mechanisms. The progress made by China can be seen in the injury investigations 
where public hearings are held and written submissions from the public are 
admitted460.  
Possible Non-Violation complaints are more difficult to spot in the substantial aspects 
of the implementation of anti-dumping rules as protectionism is rarely contemplated 
in the substantial regulations and considerations and it becomes more evident in the 
practices and procedural aspects of the Anti-Dumping Agreement implementation. In 
order to understand the practices, the procedure established by the 2004 regulations 
must be examined. This will assist in the process of spotting compliant situations 
where a Non-Violation complaint may exist and also will assist in understanding the 
structure and steps of an anti-dumping procedure in China: 
Firstly, the conditions that give place to applying anti-dumping measures are: 
(a) An imported product is dumped into China‘s market461; 
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Supra NAKAGAWA 2007 pp. 66- 67. 
460
 Art 17 and 30 of the Rules on Investigations of Industry Injury for Anti-Dumping. 
461
Unless the margin of dumping is less than 2% (Article 27, the 2004 Regulations). 
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(b)The dumping action causes or threatens to cause material injury to an established 
domestic industry; or causes material obstruction to the establishment of such an 
industry462. 
Initiation of the process: 
MOFCOM shall formally initiate the investigation by publishing a notice of initiation, 
within 60 days from the date of receipt of the complaint, which is normally filed by 
Chinese domestic producers or their association, if MOFCOM is satisfied with its 
examination of the complaint. As a normal practice, MOFCOM will notify the relevant 
exporting countries prior to the publishing date of the notice of initiation (initiation 
date)463.  
Appearance registration: 
Any interested party such as domestic industry, foreign exporter or producer, 
importer, end-user, association and governmental agency that is willing to participate 
in the investigation, is required to file an appearance registration within 20 days from 
the initiation date464. The interested party could file its preliminary comments on 
product scope, complainant‘s standing, subject, country and other relevant matters, 
as stated in the notice of initiation with MOFCOM, within 20 days of the initiation 
date465. 
Preliminary Determination and Provisional Measures: 
The MOFCOM does not establish the investigation schedule for specific cases. In 
the preliminary findings, MOFCOM normally grants 20 days to all interested parties 
                                                          
462
Unless the volume of dumped imports is negligible (Article 27, the 2004 Regulations). The volume of 
dumped imports shall normally be regarded as negligible if (i) the volume of dumped imports from a country 
(region) is less than 3% of total like products imported or (ii) the volume of dumped imports from several 
countries (regions), which individually accounts for less 3%, is less than 7% Item 2, Article 9, the 2004 
Regulations). 
463
 YANG L. China - Overview. The Handbook of Trade Enforcement.Global Competition Review: Special 
Report. 2011. 
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Supra YANG 2011. 
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Supra YANG 2011. 
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to present their comments on the preliminary findings466. The MOFCOM has usually 
made the preliminary findings within six to eight months from the initiation date467. On 
the basis of the findings, the MOFCOM must make a preliminary determination on 
dumping and injury as well as on the existence of a causal link between dumping 
and injury. This determination must be published in accordance with the terms of 
Article 24 of the 2004 regulations which states that the MOFCOM must terminate the 
investigation in the following circumstances: 
(i) The application has been withdrawn by the applicant; 
(ii) There is insufficient evidence of the existence of dumping, injury and the causal 
link between the two; 
(iii) The margin of dumping is less than 2 per cent; 
(iv) The actual or potential volume of dumped imports or the injury is negligible; 
(v) Other circumstances that MOFCOM considers not appropriate to continue the 
anti-dumping investigation. 
According to Article 7.1 iii of the Anti–Dumping Agreement, provisional measures 
may be applied only when the authorities consider that there may be a danger of 
damage due to the dumping during the course of the investigation468. In practice, 
MOFCOM has never applied (v), and the provisional measures are always applied 
without justifying its concern of possible injury during the course of investigation. This 
attitude may be read under two plausible interpretations. The first one is that 
MOFCOM understands that in all the cases when there is determination of dumping, 
injury and a causal link, there is automatically a reasonable concern of possible 
injury during the course of the investigation. In this case this attitude of MOFCOM 
would be formally compliant with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and a Non-Violation 
complaint could be brought about by a member state whose industry has been 
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Supra YANG 2011. 
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Supra YANG 2011. 
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 Anti- dumping Agreement Art 7.1 Provisional measures may be applied only if: 
(…)(iii) the authorities concerned judge such measures necessary to prevent injury being caused during the 
investigation 
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affected by the provisional measures, provided that the complainant can prove that 
there was no reasonable danger of injury during the investigation.  
The second possible interpretation is that MOFCOM, by failing to justify its concern 
and the need to prevent injury during the investigation is not applying the text of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement in the strict sense. This could in itself constitute a violation, 
but the probability that a panel decides this in detriment of the country‘s prerogatives 
and sovereignty in the implementation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is remote.  
When MOFCOM makes an affirmative preliminary determination it is entitled to apply 
one of the following anti-dumping measures: 
1. Imposition of provisional anti-dumping duties 
2. Provision of deposits, bonds or other forms of security469. 
For practical reasons, the MOFCOM always has required the provision of deposits, 
as the imposition of provisional anti-dumping duties could result in having to 
calculate them and return them should the results of the investigation favour the 
exporter. Also, the provision of deposits is an autonomous decision of MOFCOM, 
whereas the imposition of provisional duties requires a joint effort between SCTC 
and MOFCOM470, making it a more complicated process. 
The period for applying provisional measures is four months that can be extended to 
nine months in special circumstances in accordance with Article 30.1 of the 2004 
regulations. The special circumstances are defined by Article 7.4 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement471. In a strict sense, this means that China accepts applying a 
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 Art. 28 of the 2004 Regulations. 
470
 In order to impose provisional duties, the MOFCOM must make a proposal to the SCTC, which in turn must 
make a decision accepting the MOFCOM proposal.  
471
 Ant-Dumping Agreement Art 7.4: The application of provisional measures shall be limited to as short a 
period as possible, not exceeding four months or, on decision of the authorities concerned, upon request by 
exporters representing a significant percentage of the trade involved, to a period not exceeding six months. 
When authorities, in the course of an investigation, examine whether a duty lower than the margin of 
dumping would be sufficient to remove injury, these periods may be six and nine months, respectively. 
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lesser duty rule. In practice it has not been applied but it remains a possibility in the 
Chinese anti-dumping system472. 
Price undertakings: 
Foreign producers or the government of an exporting country (region) can offer price 
undertakings to MOFCOM after the preliminary findings. The MOFCOM may suggest 
price undertakings to an exporter but it may not force an exporter to enter into price 
undertakings473. This is a measure is compliant with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  
In anti-dumping investigations, price undertaking offers shall be filed with MOFCOM 
within 45 days from the publishing date of preliminary findings. The consent of the 
government of the exporting country (region) is not a precondition of MOFCOM‘s 
acceptance of an offer of price undertaking474. 
Under a price undertaking the exporter should increase its selling price by an amount 
equivalent to the dumping margin established in the preliminary determination. It can 
be less than that as long as the increase in price removes the actual or potential 
injury to the domestic industry475. In case where the MOFCOM considers that a price 
undertaking is acceptable and it benefits the public interest476, the MOFCOM may 
suspend or terminate the investigation without imposing provisional or definitive 
measures. 
There are two aspects of the Chinese practice on price undertakings that can be 
problematic and may give rise to a nullification or impairment complaint. The first one 
is related to the provisional rules on price undertakings where MOFCOM is allowed 
to accept only those proposals submitted by exporters who have been sufficiently 
cooperative during the investigation procedure477. The Anti-Dumping Agreement 
provisions mention that the undertakings offered are not of mandatory acceptance 
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NAKAGAWA (2007) pp. 41–45. 
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 Art 31 of the 2004 Regulations. 
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Supra YANG 2011. 
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According to Art 15 of the provisional rules on Price Undertakings in Anti-Dumping Investigations. 
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For example by benefiting consumers with a wider offer and a price moderation. 
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Article 11, Provisional Rules on Price Undertakings in Anti-Dumping Investigations. 
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and do not need to be accepted if the authorities consider their acceptance 
impractical or for reasons of general policy; the exporter must be given reasons for 
rejection of the undertaking and the opportunity to comment478. However, there is not 
a clear standard of what it means to be sufficiently cooperative, and the 
understanding of sufficient cooperation varies from case to case. Therefore, this 
standard is likely to be formally consistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, but 
substantially detrimental to the benefits given by Article 8.3 to the exporters479, which 
could give rise to a nullification and impairment claim, either as a violation, if the 
imposition of a standard that is not consistently applied is considered a breach of the 
agreement; or in the event that the Chinese authorities do not provide reasons of 
rejection or an opportunity to make comments. Also, it can be considered a Non-
Violation if the standard of sufficient cooperation is found to be compliant, but its 
inconsistent application implies a material impairment for the exporter. 
In its written reply to questions from Mexico to the Committee on Anti-Dumping 
Practices, China explained that if a company does not cooperate during the 
investigation process, it would be hard to ascertain whether the company‘s 
adherence to such price undertaking could in fact be monitored480. Hence, China 
considers it impractical to accept those offers. This reasoning is not convincing 
because there is no necessary correlation between the conduct of the companies 
during the investigation process and their undertaking of the implementation 
process481.  
Furthermore, Article 8.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has already provided the 
anti-dumping authorities with effective tools of monitoring uncooperative exporters, 
                                                          
478
 Art 8.3 Anti-Dumping Agreement on Price Undertakings: 8.3 Undertakings offered need not be accepted if 
the authorities consider their acceptance impractical, for example, if the number of actual or potential 
exporters is too great, or for other reasons, including reasons of general policy. Should the case arise and 
where practicable, the authorities shall provide to the exporter the reasons which have led them to consider 
acceptance of an undertaking as inappropriate, and shall, to the extent possible, give the exporter an 
opportunity to make comments thereon. 
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CHOI WM  GAO HS.Procedural Issues in the Anti-Dumping Regulations of China: A Critical Review under 
the WTO Rules. Chinese Journal of International Law (2006) 5 (3): 663-682.p. 675. 
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 Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Notification 
of Laws and Regulations Under Articles 18.5 and 32.6 of The Agreements, Replies to the Questions from 
Mexico Regarding the Notification of China, G/ADP/Q1/CHN/43, G/SCM/Q1/CHN/43, 23 April 2004, 7. 
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Supra CHOI WM  GAO HS. 2006. pp. 675-678. 
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i.e. the power to collect information from the exporters and to apply provisional 
measures using the best information available in the event of violation of an 
undertaking482. 
 
The second objection to the Chinese rules and practice on price undertakings 
emerges from the rules on breach of price undertaking arrangements. In them, it is 
stipulated that Chinese authorities may resume investigations based on the best 
information available, and decide to apply provisional measures and levy anti-
dumping duties retroactively on the products imported within 90 days prior to the 
application of such provisional anti-dumping measures, provided that the products 
imported before violation of the undertaking are not subject to such retroactive 
duties483. The provisional rules on price undertakings also specify that if the definitive 
anti-dumping duty imposed in the final determination is lower than the amount of 
cash deposit established in the preliminary determination, the difference must be 
refunded. This is all compliant with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  
 
The potential breach of the Anti-Dumping Agreement arises with the part of the rules 
stating that „„if the definitive Anti-Dumping duty established in the final determination 
is higher than the amount of cash deposit established in the preliminary 
determination, the difference shall be levied‟‟484, which is in clear contradiction of 
Article 10.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement which states that „„if the definitive Anti-
Dumping duty is higher than the provisional duty paid or payable, the difference shall 
not be collected‟‟. The norm is evidently in breach of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, 
and its justification in policy considerations is remote, as the exporters are already 
exposed to a less advantageous situation when evaluated with the best information 
available on a breach of price undertakings, which would make the collection of cash 
deposits a double and unjustified punishment to the exporter485.  
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Final Determination and Final Measures: 
In conformity with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the anti-dumping investigation shall 
be concluded within 12 months as per Article 26 of the 2004 regulations. However, 
the practice indicates that investigations took approximately 18 months up to 2007486. 
From 2007 onwards, most investigations have concluded within the  compliance 
period487. Anti-dumping duties are applied on products after the date of publication of 
the final determination and, in special cases where the final determination 
establishes an injury or a serious threat thereof; they are applied prior to the final 
determination. The anti-dumping duties can be collected retroactively in the following 
cases488: 
 
a. When there is a history of the dumped imports causing injury to the domestic 
industry, or the importer of the dumped import was, or should have been, aware 
that the exporters practice dumping and that such dumping would cause injury 
to the domestic industry; and 
b. The dumped imports were massively imported in a short period of time and 
were likely to seriously undermine the remedial effect of the definitive anti-
dumping duty to be applied489. 
 
These two circumstances have never been present simultaneously; hence there has 
been no retroactive application of the anti-dumping duties490. 
The maximum period for the collection of an anti-dumping duty is five years, which 
means that a duty can be imposed for a shorter period, although a reduced period 
has never been applied in practice. This is not an exclusive practice of China and it 
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 Supra NAKAGAWA 2007. 
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 WU X. “Antidumping Law and Practice in China”. Global Trade Law Series. Kluwer Law International. The 
Netherlands. 2009 p. 321 
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 Naturally, Anti-Dumping Duties always have a retrospective effect. The situations described refer to the 
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is understood by most of the countries as a standard procedure to apply the 
maximum period of anti-dumping duties. The possibility of a shorter period is a 
benefit deriving from the Anti-Dumping Agreement for the exporters and could 
substantiate a Non-Violation complaint, depending on the dimension of the duty 
imposed.  
Review: 
In the Chinese regulations on anti-dumping there are three types of review: 
administrative review, sunset review and judicial review. The administrative review 
takes place upon the request of an interested party who must submit substantial 
evidence, as long as a reasonable period of time has elapsed491. The administrative 
review should be completed within the same time period as an initial investigation, 
that is, it should be completed within twelve months492.  
The sunset review is the review that allows the imposition of an anti-dumping duty to 
be extended beyond the maximum of 5 years493 imposed by the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement and contained in the 2004 regulations. A sunset review can extend the 
anti-dumping duty in the event that its termination could lead to a new incident of 
dumping and its related injury or threat of injury to the domestic industry. The norm 
that allows and regulates sunset reviews in China is contained in Article 48, Chapter 
V of the 2004 regulations. 
Finally, a judicial review may be requested by an interested party in the event that 
one of the following reasons to impose a duty is not satisfactory to the interested 
party:  
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 Art 49, Chapter V of the 2004 Regulations. 
492
 Art 59 of the 2004 Regulations. 
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 Members can reduce this term in bilateral trade agreements or unilaterally. Currently, New Zealand and 
Singapore are the only countries to have signed a bilateral trade agreement modifying the maximum duration 
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(a) The final determination of dumping, injury or causal link between the two; 
(b) The decision on whether or not to impose an anti-dumping duty or the decision to 
impose anti-dumping duty retroactively; 
(c) The decision on a duty refund or imposition of an anti-dumping duty on a new 
exporter; 
(d) The results of an administrative or sunset review494. 
 
China has a generally compliant system of anti-dumping regulations and provides a 
fairly complete procedure which also contains mostly compliant substantial rules for 
determination of dumping and calculation of damages, with the exception of some 
problematic rules that are not as exhaustively constructed as is required by the Anti-
Dumping Agreement495. Additionally, some of the regulations do not adjust 
themselves to the requirements of the Anti-Dumping Agreement496. That does not 
mean that China is necessarily operating in violation of the WTO agreements, but 
some of the practices rather than the gaps in regulation may be the basis of Non-
Violation complaints, albeit with the intrinsic difficulty in their standard of proof. 
 
4.4.3 Brazil 
Brazil has been a contracting party of GATT since its beginning in 1947. However, it 
only started implementing anti-dumping regulations as late as 1987, after the 
congress ratified the Tokyo Round anti-dumping code in 1986497 and enacted an 
implementing decree in January 1987498. After the creation of the WTO the Brazilian 
Congress adopted the final act of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations and proceeded to update the legislation related to trade accordingly. 
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In Brazil, the sectors which have dominated anti-dumping investigations are natural 
or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad 
with precious metal and derived articles; imitation jewellery, base metals and articles 
of base metal and plastic and rubber499. 
 
Brazil is an interesting case in international trade with regards to anti-dumping 
measures because despite its late growth as an emerging economy, and the fact 
that it does use anti-dumping measures enough to be included in the top 20 users of 
anti-dumping in the world500, it has been considered a restricted user of anti-dumping 
measures due to the frequent use of the lesser duty rule501, the low success rate of 
anti-dumping investigations in relation to the requests, the size of the Brazilian 
market, and the non-WTO prescribed anti-dumping procedures that go beyond the 
basic requirements of the Anti-Dumping Agreement502. This can be the consequence 
of several reasons: 
 
a. The reaction to the Brazilian experience of having been victims of foreign anti-
dumping measures, specially by the United States, 
b. As it experienced a series of hyperinflation in the eighties, domestic price 
depressive effects of dumping tend to be welcome; and 
c. The Brazilian domestic industry tends to be reluctant to file requests for 
initiation of investigations which are very costly503. 
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The following chart contains a summary of the current anti-dumping authorities and 
the legal status of the WTO agreements in Brazil: 
Table 4.  Anti-Dumping Legislation and Implementing Authorities in Brazil
504 
Local regime of 
Anti-Dumping 
Administrative and Judicial Authorities for Anti-
Dumping Matters 
 The Final Act of the 
Uruguay Round, 
which included the 
Anti-Dumping 
Agreement was 
approved by a 
Legislative Decree 
and incorporated 
into the local 
legislation through 
an Ordinary Decree. 
In Brazil, 
international 
agreements which 
are incorporated 
into the domestic 
system have the 
same status as 
ordinary laws, and 
are subordinate to 
the Constitution of 
the Federal 
Republic of Brazil. 
1. SECEX: Secretaria de Comercio Exterior of the 
Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism 
(Minsterio do Desenvolvimiento Industria e 
Comercio Exterior.  
2. DECOM: Departamento de Defensa Comercial – 
Commercial Defence Department: This department 
is a subdivision of the SECEX and its functions are: 
a. To examine the merit of anti-dumping 
investigation petitions with a view to protecting 
domestic industry; 
b. To open and conduct investigation for the 
application of Anti-Dumping measures; 
c. To recommend the application of commercial 
defence measures according to the WTO 
agreements; 
d. To accompany the discussions related to rules 
and application of the commercial defence 
agreements along with the WTO; 
e. To participate in international negotiations 
related to commercial defence, and 
f. To accompany and follow the investigations of 
commercial defence opened against Brazilian 
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Ordinary decrees 
are ranked lower 
than ordinary laws. 
The provisions of 
the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement are 
applicable directly in 
the case that the 
decrees have a gap 
in specific rules. 
exporters and to assist their cases in 
coordination with other government 
departments and with the private sector505. 
3. CAMEX: The Chamber of Foreign Trade (CAMEX) 
is responsible for the formulation and changes of 
the tariff and for its approval. The function of the 
CAMEX is to provide the country with better 
institutional coordination between the various 
ministries and agencies with decision-making 
power in the Brazilian foreign trade506. The CAMEX 
is governed by a Council of Ministers, composed of 
the Ministers of Finance; Development, Industry 
and Foreign Trade; External Relations; Agriculture; 
and Planning and Budget; as well as the Civil 
Cabinet Minister; it is presided over by the Minister 
of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade. The 
CAMEX also comprises an Executive Management 
Committee, in which representatives from other 
ministries and agencies participate, an Executive 
Secretariat, and a Private Sector Consultative 
Council (CONEX), comprising 20 representatives of 
the private sector507.  
 
In the substantive aspects, it is necessary to study how Brazil understands and 
applies the concept of like product, dumping, material injury and public interest as 
well as the practices around these concepts.  
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 Functions available in Portuguese in: 
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The 1995 Decree makes a WTO compliant definition of like product which not only 
includes the definition of like product but also the definitions of domestic industry and 
the exceptions to it, which are also compliant with the Anti-Dumping Agreement as 
they are almost a literal reproduction of it508.  
Likewise, in order to determine dumping, the concept of normal value is included in 
the 1995 Decree. Normal value in Brazil is considered the price that is charged for 
like products in the ordinary course of trade for internal consumption in the exporting 
country, is compliant with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as well as the 
supplementary rules for deciding the normal value of a specific product509. The 
Decree contains two different methods to determine the normal value of a product 
representative export price and constructed value. In practice, DECOM does not 
give priority to a specific method, but in each case it uses a method which is decided 
upon by the information provided by the interested parties510.  
The price comparisons made to establish the dumping margin are drafted in 
accordance with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. It is required to make a fair 
comparison between the export price and the normal value at the same level of 
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 Art 5.1 of the 1995 Decree: The term like product shall be understood as an identical product that is equal 
in all aspects to the product being examined, or, in the absence of such a product, another product that 
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510
 WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Replies of Brazil to questions posed by Mexico, 
G/ADP/Q1/BRA/9 9of July 1998 p. 2. 
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trade511. DECOM gathers the information necessary by requesting it from the parties 
without imposing too onerous a burden on them512. Price adjustments, transactions 
between related companies, sales below cost are all compliant with the Anti-
Dumping Agreement and their appearance in the Decree resembles closely the 
workings of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  
The Lesser Duty Rule contained in Article 42.1 of the 1995 Decree is worthy of 
remark because as was mentioned above, it is drafted in accordance with the 
Agreement but, in practice, it is actually applied by Brazil, which is not a common 
practice amongst the majority of Member States of the WTO513. DECOM calculates 
the injury margin according to the mode of injury, evaluates the degree of 
competition between the investigated product and the domestic product, and then 
establishes the definitive anti-dumping duty. 
In terms of material injury, the requirements to determine its existence and the 
factors to be taken into account as well as the establishment of threat of injury 
conform to the Anti-Dumping Agreement as the wording of the provisions is almost a 
reproduction of the Anti-Dumping Agreement514. Nonetheless, in some cases, 
DECOM has added some other injury factors besides the ones stipulated in the Anti-
Dumping Agreement515. One of them is the consideration of whether market 
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reduction or technological obsolescence has occurred in the affected industry516. 
DECOM has also considered the variation on tariff, the reduction of the consumer 
market, the entrance of new competitors, and imports from other sources517. A third 
determination of injury was based on the rapid build-up of stocks of the dumped 
imports, which in turn led to the conclusion of injury, once compared with the 
reduction of market share518.  
In terms of causal link, Article 15.1 of the 1995 Decree introduces a norm that is not 
considered in the Anti-Dumping Agreement and that provides that the impact of the 
process of liberalisation of imports on domestic prices is among the relevant factors 
to be considered that could cause injury to a domestic industry besides the dumped 
imports519. The reason behind this exception is that a substantial amount of the trade 
liberalisation conducted by Brazil was made through tariff reductions and 
suppression of quantitative restrictions during the decade of the nineties; these 
liberalisations lead the government to expressly exclude the impact of trade 
liberalisation on a local industry in the determination of a causal link between the 
dumped import and the injury to the domestic industry520. 
DECOM is strict in the injury determination and this means that the amount of anti-
dumping measures imposed in comparison to all the initiation cases is rather low. 
Indeed, the majority of the cases that end without the imposition of anti-dumping duty 
are cases where DECOM found no injury521. 
The public interest is taken into account in two possible ways in the anti-dumping 
investigations in Brazil. The first one is when SECEX or CAMEX make anti-dumping 
determinations based on the recommendations of the DECOM. Either SECEX or 
CAMEX may take the public interest into account in order to make their own 
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determination. A recommendation by the DECOM to impose a definitive anti-
dumping measure may be rejected by SECEX or CAMEX in view of the public 
interest. This is not a widespread practice and it has been exercised scarcely, but it 
is a possibility within the Brazilian system. Some remarkable cases where it has 
been used are: 
1. Investigation on the imports of soda ash (barrilha) from Bulgaria, Poland and 
Romania522. In this case, the public interest clause was used. It was assumed that 
the application of an anti-dumping measure could severely affect the glass and 
cleaning industries523. 
2. Investigation on the imports of bicycle tyres from India and China524. In this case, 
the national interest clause was broached arguing that the measure would possibly 
negatively affect Brazilian relationships with China and India.  
The second possibility to include considerations of public interest is when an 
investigated product is sold on the Brazilian retail market. In this case, the DECOM 
notifies the initiation of the investigation to both the representatives of the consumers 
and the representatives of the industrial users so that these parties also have the 
opportunity to participate in the investigation by providing relevant information. 
DECOM has the prerogative to decide whether that information is acceptable and if it 
will use it in the context of the investigation or if it must be rejected and not taken into 
consideration525.  
The procedural aspects of the anti-dumping investigations in Brazil are also 
regulated by the 1995 Decree and most of them are in strict compliance with the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement.  
Initiation of the Investigation: 
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The anti-dumping investigation may be initiated by request of the domestic industry 
or ex officio526. However, ex officio investigations are more the exception than the 
rule as the majority of the investigations are initiated upon the request of an 
interested party. The only situations where ex officio investigations are launched are 
when there is an application against one country and the DECOM finds that there 
are, in fact, dumped products, but not from the exporter country that originated the 
application from another country for which there is no application. 
The authority that can decide whether or not to initiate an investigation is the 
SECEX, which is also in charge of making the preliminary examinations. The 
applications shall be rejected in a case where: 
a. There is insufficient evidence of the existence of dumping or of injury caused by 
dumping. 
b. The application was not submitted by the domestic industry on its behalf. 
c. The domestic producers supporting the application account for less than 25% 
of the total production of the like domestic product527. 
The period of investigation to establish whether there is dumping is 12 months and 
under exceptional circumstances it can be 6 months but never less than that. The 
period to determine the existence of injury shall be no less than three years. 
Dumping and injury are separate matters but are supposed to be examined 
simultaneously, giving a longer term to the injury determination. However, the period 
of injury determination includes the time during which dumping is investigated as 
they are not seen as two completely separate investigations528.  
Provisional measures are only applicable if the four criteria established in the 1995 
Decree are fulfilled: 
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 Art 24 of the 1995 Decree. 
527
 Art 21.1 of the 1995 Decree. 
528
 Art 25.1 and 25.2 of the 1995 Decree. 
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1. An investigation has been initiated, a public notice of the decision to initiate an 
investigation has been published, and the interested parties have been given 
an adequate opportunity to submit information and make comments; 
2. The DECOM has made a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping and 
consequent injury to a domestic industry; 
3. The CAMEX judges such measures necessary to prevent injury being caused 
during the investigation; and 
4. At least 60 days have passed since the date of the initiation of the 
investigation529. 
The provisional anti-dumping measures are taken as duties or securities from four to 
nine months depending on the case. The general rule is that the provisional measure 
shall remain in place no longer than four months, but the DECOM may request it to 
be extended for six months; and in case that the measure imposed is less than the 
provisional margin of dumping to eliminate injury, it can be extended up to nine 
months530. 
Price Undertakings: 
Exporters are not obliged to propose price undertakings and should they propose 
them voluntarily the DECOM shall recommend to the CAMEX to accept them as long 
as in the understanding of the DECOM, those undertakings eliminate the injury 
generated by dumping. The DECOM can also propose undertakings to the 
exporters, who are free to accept them or reject them. Once price undertakings have 
been accepted, the exporters acquire some obligations towards the DECOM 
regarding the submission of information and verification of data. Breach of these 
                                                          
529
 Art 34 of the 1995 Decree. The CAMEX came to be the competent authority to judge the imposition of 
measures as necessary from 2001. The original text of the 1995 Decree gave this competence to the Ministry 
of Industry, Trade and Tourism, which was later changed to the current MDCE. 
530
 Arts 34.1, 34.2, 34.9 of the 1995 Decree, Art 9.1 of the Provisional Measure No. 926 of 1995. 
G/ADP/N/1/BRA/1, G/SCM/N/1/BRA/1 
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obligations is considered a violation of the undertakings and the DECOM is entitled 
to resume the investigation with the best information available531.  
Final Determination and Final Measures: 
At any time during the investigation the applicant may request the termination of it. 
This request may be approved or rejected. If approved, the investigation shall be 
finished, if rejected the decision shall be notified to the applicant532. Termination 
without imposition of anti-dumping measures may occur in any of the following 
cases: 
1. When there has not been sufficient evidence of the existence of dumping or of 
any injury; 
2. When the margin of dumping is de minimis, namely, below two percent of its 
export price; or 
3. The volume of actual or potential dumped imports, or the injury caused, are 
negligible, that is, individually less than three percent, or collectively, less than 
seven percent of the total imports of the like product in Brazil533. 
In the event that SECEX determines the existence of dumping, injury and causal link 
between them, a final determination shall be made by CAMEX and published in the 
official gazette. The imposed duty can be ad valorem or specific duties that can, in 
turn, be variable or fixed. The ad valorem duty shall be imposed on a CIF basis 
whereas the specific duty is set is USD and then converted into Reals, the Brazilian 
currency. 
The duration of the duty shall be no more than five years and can be removed as 
soon as there is no need for it to counteract an injury534. 
Review: 
                                                          
531
Arts 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the 1995 Decree. 
532
 Art 40 of the 1995 Decree. 
533
Art 41, 14.7 and 14.3 of the 1995 Decree. 
534
Art 45 1995 Decree. 
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There is no initial administrative review procedure for the anti-dumping measures, 
but the affected exporters can request a mid-term review to the SECEX once the 
measure has been in place for at least a year. Only in exceptional cases can the 
mid-term review be made in a shorter period than the one mentioned above. It is the 
burden of the interested party to demonstrate that the duty is no longer necessary, 
the injury is not likely to recur or the duty is not sufficient to actually neutralise the 
dumping which is causing injury. This procedure is drafted in accordance with Article 
11 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  
Furthermore, Brazil has an interesting procedure of willingness to suspend anti-
dumping measures provided that provisional alterations occur in market conditions 
and it is clear that the injury will not revive after the suspension of the measure and 
the domestic industry is consulted535. The suspension may be initiated upon request 
of the interested parties or ex officio and the duration thereof can be a year which 
can be extended for another similar period. This procedure is not very exhaustive 
and has not been applied but the fact that it was considered and included in the 
implementing regulations shows the will to implement the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
in a way that serves the purposes of the WTO agreements of liberalisation, as 
opposed to being a clear tool of protectionism as has been used in other countries. 
In Brazilian law, there is a sunset review as prescribed by the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement, but with the particularity that Brazil gives the opportunity to the 
interested parties to have a period of five months prior to the end of the definitive 
anti-dumping duties to respond in writing about the suitability of the review and to 
request a hearing. In the Anti-Dumping Agreement the term prescribed is a 
reasonable period of time prior to the expiry of the definitive Anti-Dumping 
measures536. The effect of the five month term is that anti-dumping measures and 
price undertakings are extended for as short a time as possible537, whereas in other 
                                                          
535
 Art 60.1 of the 1995 Decree. The consultation to the domestic industry is mandatory but the opinions of the 
representatives of the local industry are not binding upon the DECOM at the moment of making a decision. 
536
Art 11.3 Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
537
Supra NAKAGAWA 2006 pp. 302-303. 
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regulations it extends unreasonably despite the fact that the sunset review later 
denies the extension of the sanction. 
The judicial review of anti-dumping measures is not regulated in the 1995 Decree or 
in any norm of the same level. Access to judicial review stems directly from the 1988 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Brazil which in its Article 5 35538 guarantees 
recourse to the judicial system to any person. This is also applicable in the matters 
related to the application of specific provisions of the legal instruments on trade 
defence. Judicial recourse should pertain to the application by the investigative 
authority of a specific provision, and may be based on due administrative process, 
legal interpretation, or offence to upper rules (including constitutional principles)539. 
Thus, judicial review in the Brazilian legal system is remarkably broad, which 
explains why some trade measures have been reviewed by means of recourse to the 
judiciary, including appeals to the Superior Court of Justice540. 
In practice, the judicial system is not too strong and is not aware of the many 
technicalities involving the anti-dumping system. It is a general perception that the 
Brazilian judicial system is unreliable and unpredictable with respect to reviewing 
administrative matters541. In the event that an exporter is affected by compliant anti-
dumping measures and wished to put them under judicial review, the lack of judicial 
reliability and transparency could eventually substantiate the recourse to a Non-
Violation complaint. This possibility is remote because, as has been explained 
above, the administrative system is strong and fair, and the overall tendency in Brazil 
                                                          
538
Article 5. All persons are equal before the law, without any distinction whatsoever, Brazilians and foreigners 
residing in the country being ensured of inviolability of the right to life, to liberty, to equality, to security and to 
property, on the following terms: 
35. The law shall not exclude any injury or threat to a right from the consideration of the Judicial Power. 
539
Supra BARRAL and BROGINI.2005 p. 21. 
540
 The Superior Court of Justice (STJ) is the highest federal court in Brazil, and appeals to its jurisdiction shall 
be grounded on the violation of federal law or international treaties (1988 Brazilian Federal Constitution, 
article 105). Cases: STJ, MS 4516/DF, 13.Nov.96 [revoked Anti-Dumping measures on procedural grounds]; MS 
5628/DF , 06.Nov.98 [refused claim for revocation of Anti-Dumping measures]; MS 7045/DF 22.Nov.00 [did not 
concede claim for nullification of Anti-Dumping measure]; STJ, MS 8236/DF, 29.Sep.02 [asserted its jurisdiction 
to review administrative acts related to trade measures]; STJ, MS 8913/DF, 25.June.03 [did not suspend Anti-
Dumping measure against the non-investigated company]. 
541
Supra NAKAGAWA 2006 pp. 302-303. 
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is to reduce the measures imposed to the minimum for the different reasons already 
explored.  
In the Doha Negotiations, Brazil was part of the friends of Anti-Dumping group and it 
proposed many changes to the Anti-Dumping Agreement as it considers it an 
important matter to be re-negotiated. It is important to note that Brazil perceives anti-
dumping measures to affect Brazilian exports in a negative manner. Some of the 
proposals are briefly listed below to give a clearer idea of the Brazilian position in the 
rounds of negotiation:  
a) Lesser duty: As Brazil already frequently applies the lesser duty rule, it has 
proposed to amend Articles 9.1, 9.3 and 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in order 
to implement the mandatory application of the lesser duty rule. Additionally, Brazil 
has proposed that in Annex III, Article 2.4, including the prohibition of zeroing, 
applies mutatis mutandis to the calculation of the lesser duty level542. 
 
b) Sunset reviews: Similarly to the lesser duty rule, Brazil already has somewhat 
shorter periods of sunset review, so as to extend the existing duty as little as 
possible. In the Doha Round, Brazil proposed that a new anti-dumping investigation, 
either at the member‘s own initiative or based on a petition, should only take place 
no sooner than one year following the termination of the anti-dumping measure, 
unless there are exceptional circumstances that justify the initiation in a shorter 
period, which shall not be less than six months543. 
 
c) Facts available: Brazil has proposed to amend Article 6.8 to explicitly state that 
―facts available‖ are to be used only for the purpose of substituting missing or 
rejected information. Brazil proposed to amend Annex II.1 to state that the authorities 
must make all reasonable efforts to obtain necessary information from the 
respondents instead of resorting to ―facts available‖ in an investigation or review544.  
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WTO, TN/RL/W/119. 
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d) Reviews: Brazil has proposed that the provisions of Articles 2 (Determination of 
Dumping), 3 (Determination of Injury), 4 (Definition of Domestic Industry), 5 (Initiation 
and Subsequent Investigation), and 6 (Evidence) should also apply to the reviews, 
whenever applicable, under Articles 9.3, 9.5 and 11.2, with the exception of the 
specific rules concerning these reviews. In particular, the de minimis rule and/or its 
threshold in Article 5.8 should be applied to these reviews to the extent that it is 
appropriate. Brazil has proposed to specify that the request for Article 9.3 reviews 
can only be made by exporters or importers. In addition, Brazil has proposed that the 
margin of dumping in an Article 9.3 review shall be based on all imports from a 
specific exporter that were entered into the importing member for not less than one 
year, and not on an individual import basis. Brazil seeks to improve the rule so that 
the reviews are not unfairly extended to the prejudice of the responding parties. 
Finally, Brazil would like to clarify, through the development of harmonised indicative 
lists relating to the assessment of dumping and the ―likelihood of injury‖ under Article 
11.2, that the burden of proof is on those parties advocating the continuation of the 
anti-dumping order545. 
 
e) Price undertakings: Brazil has proposed to reduce the national authorities‘ 
discretion to refuse offers of price undertakings, such as requiring authorities to 
provide, in a public notice, the criteria and reasons for non-acceptance of a price 
undertaking offer546. 
 
f) Special treatment (Article. 15 Anti-Dumping Agreement) for developing countries: 
Specify the obligations of developed countries when investigating exports originating 
from developing countries. Developed country authorities should offer advice to 
exporters involved in the process of the possibility of price undertakings, and the 
obligation rests on the investigating authorities to take the initiative to explore 
constructive measures before the imposition of the preliminary duties547. 
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WTO, TN/RL/GEN/10. See also Supra BARRAL and BROGINI. 2005 p. 23. 
546
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4.4.4 India 
India imposed its first anti-dumping duty in 1992548. The absence of earlier use of 
anti-dumping is explained by the highly protectionist trade regime that was in place 
from independence in 1947 to 1991549.In the words of an academic: on the customs 
tariff side, the import-weighted average tariff for all imports was as high as 87 
percent – for consumer goods as high as 153 percent and for manufactured goods 
92 percent550. Combined with restrictive licensing and quantitative restrictions, there 
was no need for anti-dumping551. 
 
As that system of protectionism was being dismantled, the use of anti-dumping 
increased with the liberalisation of policies. Up to 1997 it increased slowly, only to 
find a peak since 1997-8552. The use of anti-dumping in India was originally restricted 
to the traditional users. As the local industry started experiencing the impact of 
foreign imports from other countries besides the traditional users, the use of anti-
dumping measures in India spread to other non-traditional users553. Despite the 
general policy to liberalise, domestic industries demand protection which pressures 
the government to increase the initiation of investigations and end the investigations 
with the imposition of measures for the importers. According to previous studies, the 
most frequently offered justification for anti-dumping measures is predatory pricing554. 
However, economic studies have concluded that in the majority of the cases an anti-
dumping policy cannot be justified on economic grounds; instead the political 
economy argument is the strongest argument in explaining India‘s current anti-
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 Nonetheless, Anti-Dumping enforcement was first authorised in India in 1985 and the existing regulations 
were modified in 1995 in order to make them WTO compliant. 
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 FEINBERG R.M.  Trends and Impacts of India’s Antidumping Enforcement.Office of Economics Working 
Paper.US Trade Commission. October 2010. Available at: 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working_papers/EC201010A.pdf 
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NARAYANAN P. “Antidumping in India – Present State and Future Prospects,” Journal of World Trade, 
December, Vol. 40, No. 6, 2006. pp. 1081-1097. 
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Supra FEINBERG 2010. 
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Infra TAIRA S, HAMADA T, AND MAKINO N 2006. 
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Supra FEINBERG 2010. 
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dumping actions. Such actions have given protection to highly concentrated 
industries, where dominant producers lobby and litigate anti-dumping cases. In the 
process, they incur huge expenditure, sacrificing economic efficiency555. 
The industries that have been most protected through the use of anti-dumping in 
India are the chemical, petrochemical, pharmaceutical, plastics, rubber and 
manmade fibre industries. Due to the fact that these are competing with China, 
which is another emerging economy, India has targeted anti-dumping investigations 
towards China and the United States in these sectors556. 
The structure of the anti-dumping system in India is organised as explained in the 
chart below: 
Table 5.  Anti-Dumping Legislation and Implementing Authorities in India
557
. 
Local Anti-Dumping regime Administrative and Judicial 
Authorities for Anti-Dumping 
Matters. 
The anti-dumping legislation was 
introduced in India in 1982 when the 
Custom Tariff (Identification, 
Assessment and Collection of Anti-
dumping Duty on Dumped Articles 
and for Determination of Injury) Rules 
1985 were framed. These rules were 
amended in 1995 [hereinafter the 
Anti-Dumping Rules 1995 or simply 
the Rules] and they form the legal 
basis for anti-dumping investigations 
Directorate General of Anti-Dumping 
& Allied Duties (DGAD): The 
Directorate is a division of the 
Department of Commerce that 
depends on the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry. The DGAD 
is responsible for carrying out 
investigations and to recommend, 
where required, under the Customs 
Tariff Act, the amount of anti-
dumping duty/countervailing duty on 
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Supra AGGARWAL 2002 p. 65. 
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Supra FEINBERG 2010 pp. 6–7. 
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 Anti-Dumping, a guide. Directorate General of Anti-Dumping & Allied Duties Ministry of Commerce. 
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and for the levying of anti-dumping 
duties. These laws are in 
consonance with the WTO 
Agreements on Anti-Dumping 
measures. Since 1995, three 
amendments have been incorporated 
into the Rules558. 
 
the identified articles which would be 
adequate to remove injury to the 
domestic industry559. 
Investigations and 
Recommendations by Designated 
Authority, Ministry of Commerce 
Imposition and Collection by Ministry 
of Finance560. 
Customs, Excise and Service Tax 
Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT): The 
law provides that an order of 
determination of existence, degree, 
and effect of dumping is appealable 
before the CESTAT. An appeal 
against the order of CESTAT can be 
made to the Supreme Court of India. 
Various High Courts also hear these 
matters under their writ jurisdiction561. 
 
The DGAD is a very responsive authority to allegations affecting the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement. In the early years of the WTO, India saw an exponential growth in anti-
dumping initiations, which led the European Union to complain to the WTO of the 
abuse of this agreement. This situation would have also been a possible trigger for 
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 These were introduced in 1999 (vide Notification No. 44/1999), 2001 (vide Notification No. 28/2001) and 
2002(vide Notification No. 1/2002). See also Supra KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM 2005. 
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the complaints based on nullification or impairment, as this is a unique case where 
the use and abuse of measures contemplated within the WTO agreements is 
detrimental to the very objectives and purposes of such agreements562.  
In substantial aspects, Indian law has taken into account all the rulings of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement by implementing norms for like products, establishment of 
domestic industry, dumping determination, normal value, injury, causal link and 
public interest. They have also made a procedure available that is formally compliant 
although may incur some challenges in practice, especially the resistance of the 
authorities to revise and waive measures in place during the set review periods. In 
the majority of the investigations, the petitioners hold a considerable amount of 
market share, 50% or more, having a clear dominant position in the Indian market563. 
The substantial definitions and application thereof are generally not problematic 
except for some of the features explained below: 
The definition of like products contained in Rule 2 b has practically the same 
wording as the definition of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. However, the DGAD 
interprets it liberally and this interpretation gives flexibility to the scope of like 
products564. This has occurred in different cases565, where different criteria have been 
applied for the definition of like products. This is due to the discretion offered by the 
rules to the designated authority to include or exclude such producers who are 
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 TAIRA S, HAMADA T, AND MAKINO N. “India” in NAKAGAWA ed. “Anti Dumping Laws and Practices of the 
New Users”. Cameron May. London (2007) pp. 165-166. 
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Supra AGGARWAL A. in KOMMERSCOLLEGIUM 2005. 
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Supra TAIRA S, HAMADA T, AND MAKINO N. (2007) p. 185. 
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 I.e. Ministry of Commerce Notification 14/1/96ADD 19
th
 of March 1998: investigation against Purified 
Terephtalic Acid (PTA) from Thailand, Korea and Indonesia. In this case, the Designated Authority decided to 
initiate the investigation on the basis of an application filed by a domestic producer of Di-Methyl Terephtalate 
(DMT). When the domestic producer of DMT filed an application, a domestic producer, which produced in 
India but also imported PTA to India, was excluded from the scope of the domestic industry. According to the 
Designated Authority PTA and DMT are like products since they have closely resembled characteristics. 
Ministry of commerce Notification 18/1/97/ADD 2
nd
 of February 1999: investigation against Fused Magnesia 
from China. In this case the authority accepted an application filed by a domestic producer of Sintered Sea 
Water Magnesia. According to the authority both products were closely resembled and used for the same 
purpose. Ministry of commerce notification 14/1/97/ADD 18
th
 November 2000: investigation against hot rolled 
Coils/Sheets from Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. In this case the designated authority did not exclude the 
domestic producer who held 7.17 percent of the shares of the importing company and had one common 
director. See also Supra TAIRA S, HAMADA T, AND MAKINO N. (2007) pp. 186-187. 
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related exporters or importers themselves of the challenged products, or are 
importers themselves of such products566. The DGAD tends to extend the measures 
to all related products despite the fact that some of them are not even included in the 
initial application567.  
These practices leave a sense of uncertainty and lack of transparency from the 
administrative authorities. They certainly do have the prerogative to decide what 
products are like and to impose the measures that they consider appropriate, in 
compliance with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. However, erratic behaviour regarding 
the definitions in an arbitrary manner can affect the legitimately expected benefits 
from the exporters who, in a case like this, are entitled to use the provision of Article 
XXIII. Practices like the one mentioned above are generally subject to criticism 
because they erode the confidence in the local authorities and act in detriment to the 
free flow of goods across the international markets.  
The determination of normal value is a difficult process in India because of its 
characteristics in the international market. Since India is an inconsequential trade 
partner of most countries, exporting firms abstain from investing on defence. 
Therefore, the DA is faced with a major problem of non-response or incomplete 
/inaccurate / inconsistent information on prices and costs provided by the exporters. 
It has also been observed that many exporters do not cooperate, citing concerns 
over confidentiality. In a majority of the cases therefore, normal value needs to be 
constructed. In a large number of cases, the investigating authority, for constructing 
normal values, rely on the best available information568. 
The margin of dumping is calculated based on rules that are identical to the ones 
established in Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The special feature of the 
Indian regulations in comparison to the Anti-Dumping Agreement is the 
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Supra TAIRA S, HAMADA T, AND MAKINO N. (2007) p. 186. 
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 I.e. Ministry of Commerce Notification 32/1/97/ADD of 24
th
 December 1998: Acrylic fibre from Japan, Spain, 
Portugal and Italy. Defensive Anti-Dumping duties were imposed to both acrylic staple fibres and acrylic 
filament tow. However, the initial claim had only requested the investigation of acrylic staple fibres. 
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establishment of the margin of dumping. In India, the existence of the margin of 
dumping is determined on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal 
value and export prices on a transaction to transaction basis569. In the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement570 the margin of dumping must be established on the basis of the 
comparison of a weighted average of prices for all comparable export transactions or 
by a comparison of the normal value and export prices on a transaction to 
transaction basis571. The issue that is criticised by the exporters is that the authority 
does not divulge a comprehensive procedure to calculate the normal value, or for 
comparing between a normal value and export prices. This could be considered a 
violation of the agreement572, but even if it does not fit into the violation criteria, for 
the deference given to the governments in implementation or interpretation of the 
agreement, this practice is detrimental to the benefit of an explanation provided by 
Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  
In order to establish material injury the Indian rules are mostly compliant with Article 
3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and have created a procedure where the 
authority objectively examines the volume of dumped imports and the effect on 
prices in the domestic market for like products, as well as the impact of dumped 
imports on domestic producers and their potentially negative effect on cash flow, 
inventories, employment, wages, ability to raise capital investments, and other 
economic factors such as declines in sales, declines in profits, loss of market share, 
declines in productivity, slowdown of investment return rates, and fall of the capacity 
usage. The Indian authorities have expressed that all the factors are taken into 
account, not as a mere checklist where some bureaucrat ticks boxes, but as part of a 
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 Principle 6, Annexure I of the Anti-Dumping Rules 1995. 
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 Anti-Dumping Agreement Art 2.4.2:  Subject to the provisions governing fair comparison in paragraph 4, the 
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meaningful assessment to examine the existence and consequences of injuries that 
are a consequence of dumped products573.  
In order to be able to impose an anti-dumping measure, the causal link must be 
proven. The rules for causal link examination are contained in Principle V, Annexure 
II of the Anti-Dumping Rules 1995. Those rules reproduce in great part the 
provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In practice and despite the fact that the 
rules exclude the attribution of injury to dumped goods whenever there is injury 
caused by other factors, the designated authority makes an analysis that is unclear. 
This makes it difficult to ascertain whether the non-attributable factors are being 
taken into account or not at the moment of imposing an anti-dumping duty. The anti-
dumping rules do not make any provision for public interest in the anti-dumping 
investigations. In practice, it may be taken into account in the investigation in the 
form of a public hearing, or by accepting submissions from the interested parties. 
The decision to admit written submissions and listen to the spoken interventions 
during the public hearing is at the discretion of the designated authority. There are a 
few cases where public interest has influenced the decision of not imposing an anti-
dumping duty in spite of the proven existence of dumping and injury. This tends to 
occur whenever there is strong public participation and domestic interests may be 
affected by the imposition of an anti-dumping measure574.  
The procedure for anti-dumping investigations and the imposition of measures is 
contained in the Anti-Dumping Rules 1995. Initiation may be done upon application 
by or on behalf of the domestic industry. An application is understood to be made by 
or on behalf of the domestic industry when it is supported by at least fifty percent of 
the total local production of the like product challenged. An initiation may only take 
place if there is sufficient evidence of dumping, injury and causal link. Also the 
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initiation only takes place if at least 25 percent of the total product of the like product 
by the domestic industry actively supports the petition or application575. 
In the table below a comparison between the times scheduled by the rules and the 
times that the procedure takes in practice is illustrated.  
Table 6.  Regulation vs. Normal practices in Anti-Dumping procedures in India
576 
Procedural Stage 
 
Law Normal time taken in 
practice according to 
the government of 
India 
Preliminary Findings  90-105 days of the 
initiation of 
investigation. 
Provisional Duty No such duty before the 
expiry of 60 days from 
the date of initiation. 
Imposed within four-six 
weeks of the date of 
issue of provisional 
findings. 
Period of provisional 
duty 
The provisional duty will 
remain in force only for 
a period not exceeding 
six months, extendable 
to nine months under 
certain 
circumstances577. 
Remains in force for a 
period not exceeding six 
months. 
Final Finding One year not 
extendable beyond six 
One year not 
extendable beyond six 
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 Anti-Dumping Rules, Rule 5. 
576
 Supra AGGARWAL A. in KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM/NATIONAL BOARD OF TRADE, (2005) p. 43. 
577
Anti-Dumping Rules. Rule 13. 
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months. months. 
Levy of Duty Within three months of 
the date of publication 
of final findings. 
Within three months of 
the date of publication 
of final findings. 
Withdrawal of Duty [if 
final finding is negative] 
Within 40 days of the 
date of publication of 
final findings. 
 
Preliminary findings must be substantiated according to Rule 12 1, with enough 
information on the determination of dumping and injury. According to the rule, 
preliminary findings must contain: 
a. Names of suppliers, or when this is impracticable, the names of the countries 
involved.  
b. Description of the product which is sufficient for customs‘ purposes. 
c. Margins of dumping established. These margins must contain a full explanation 
of the reasons for the methodology used in the establishment and comparison 
of the export price and the normal value. 
d. Considerations relevant to the injury determination. 
e. Main reasons leading to the determination. 
The preliminary findings with this information shall be notified to the parties by 
means of a public notice578. The Central Government may impose provisional duties 
as long as they do not exceed the margin of dumping on the basis of preliminary 
findings of the designated authority579. 
Lesser Duty Rule: 
                                                          
578
Anti-Dumping Rules. Rule 12. 
579
Anti-Dumping Rules. Rule 13. 
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Under the Indian law (as amended in 1999), the Government is obliged to restrict the 
anti-dumping duty to the lower of the two i.e. dumping margin and the injury 
margin580. The designated authority must estimate a non-injurious price for the 
domestic industry. In the estimation they must include an analysis of relevant 
factors581. The value for this purpose includes CIF value + one percent towards 
landing charges + any applicable customs duty. As a result, the anti-dumping duty 
actually levied is normally a variable duty equal to the injury margin582.  
Price Undertakings: 
There are a few price undertakings: some of those in force in the past were the 
cases of Hexamine from Iran, White Cement from UAE, Potassium Carbonate from 
Taiwan, Lead Acid Batteries from Korea and Black & White Photographic Paper583. 
This shows that price undertakings are not common in the Indian anti-dumping 
practice as they are in some other members. 
Review: 
The anti-dumping rules provide for new shipper, administrative (known as mid-term 
reviews), sunset and judicial review. According to Rule 23, the designated authority 
may review the need for the continued imposition of anti-dumping [administrative 
review] duty and shall, if it is satisfied that there is no justification for the continued 
imposition of the duty, recommend to the Central Government to withdraw it.  
The rule is unclear as to whether that review should be made ex officio or by 
demand of the affected party. Also, it does not establish whether the affected party 
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 Supra AGGARWAL A. in KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM/NATIONAL BOARD OF TRADE, (2005) p. 43. See also, Anti-
Dumping, a guide. Directorate General of Anti-Dumping & Allied Duties Ministry of Commerce. Commerce 
Secretary Government of India New Delhi-110 011. Available at: 
http://commerce.nic.in/traderemedies/Anti_Dum.pdf 
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 Some relevant factors are usage of raw materials, usage of utilities, captive consumption, expenses during 
the time of the investigation: investments, capacity utilization. See Ministry of Commerce  Industry, 
Department of Commerce: Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Measures, Answers to Frequently Asked Questions 
Available at http://commerce.nic.in/faqh1  
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Supra TAIRA S, HAMADA T, AND MAKINO N. (2007) p. 177. 
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 Supra AGGARWAL A. in KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM/NATIONAL BOARD OF TRADE, (2005) p. 44. 
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has a vested right to request the review or not. In practice, the administration initiates 
a mid-term review on request from the affected party584. 
The sunset review can be initiated before the period of expiry of the measures – 
which expire in five years, in line with the anti-dumping rules and the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement. The judicial review is structured in the form of an appeal against any 
anti-dumping related measure. It takes place before the Customs, Excise and 
Service Tax Appellate Tribunal – CESTAT. The CESTAT is empowered to hear the 
appeals against orders passed by the designated authority with regard to anti-
dumping duties585. Except in the matters relating to classification and valuation of 
goods, the Tribunal is the final appellate authority though a referral to the High Court 
can be made on a question of law. In classification and valuation matters, the appeal 
against the order of the Tribunal lies only with the Supreme Court of India586. 
In terms of substantial application, the judicial review in India follows the tradition of 
the rule of law and this contributes to its reliability in the appeal instances. The time 
that the procedure of judicial review takes, in practice, is too long, and hence it does 
not guarantee the rights of the importers. The average time taken to obtain a 
decision from the CESTAT is 518 days from the date of application until the day of 
final findings. In the world of international trade 17 months for deciding an appeal587 
may be normal in many countries, but it is an obstruction of the benefits provided by 
GATT to the exporters. 
Some experts have suggested that the anti-dumping policy that is designed to 
ensure fair competition and improve economic efficiency may in fact reduce them, 
and that a strategy that may help prevent the problem of abuse of anti-dumping is to 
integrate anti-dumping policies with competition policies. In other words, this would 
imply that the competitive merits of anti-dumping requests in that case will be 
evaluated by the competition authorities using the same standards and the 
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Supra TAIRA S, HAMADA T, AND MAKINO N. (2007) p. 179. 
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Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal website http://cestat.gov.in/ 
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 Supra CESTAT website http://cestat.gov.in/ 
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 See KUMARAN L. Law and Practice of Anti-Dumping Law in India. Research report on the Reality of Anti-
Dumping Instruments in Asian Countries and Regions. Fair Trade Centre.2005 pp. 369-421. 
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framework of competition policies. This will result in the adoption of stricter criteria for 
determining predation in such cases and will prevent its misuse. Moreover, the injury 
standard for anti-dumping cases should also be brought closer to the anti-trust 
standard, which takes into account the behaviour's effect on the competitive 
structure of the industry as a whole, rather than the material injury it causes to 
domestic firms. This however requires the implementation of comprehensive 
competition policies and credible enforcement agencies588, which is currently not the 
case in India and, despite the fact that it is a desirable outcome; it is impractical and 
unlikely that it will occur unilaterally and spontaneously. 
 
4.4.5 South Africa 
South Africa has one of the oldest anti-dumping systems in the world589, with 
legislation available since the inclusion of anti-dumping measures in the Customs 
Tariff Act, 26 of 1914. South Africa was an important user of anti-dumping measures 
during the early twentieth century and, upon its accession to the WTO, it became an 
assiduous user of the system. Indeed, South Africa has been considered the fifth 
biggest user of anti-dumping measures after the traditional four main users590. At the 
time of accession to the WTO, South Africa participated in the multilateral 
negotiations as a developed country and thus was bound to acquire more stringent 
commitments than developing countries591. 
The industrialised South African economy was founded during the late nineteenth 
century by diamond and gold mining. Mining encouraged industrial development and 
replaced agriculture as the major engine of economic activity. Since the mid-1920s 
successive governments have implemented policies to encourage industrialisation 
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Supra AGGARWAL A. 2002. 
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 It was the fourth country to acquire Anti-Dumping legislation after Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
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 EDWARDS L. Anti-Dumping in South Africa, from Proliferation to Moderation2011 in The Great 
Recession And Import Protection: The Role Of Temporary Trade Barriers, BOWN, C. P., ed.., London, CEPR and 
the World Bank, 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1871948 
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 Supra EDWARDS 2011during the Uruguay Round, South Africa committed to bind 98% of its tariffs, 
rationalize the over 12,000 tariff lines, and replace the quantitative restrictions with tariffs on agricultural 
products. 
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through import substituting protectionism592. In recent years, the anti-dumping policy 
has been re-directed to what could be called peer trade partners, or similar emerging 
economies like China and India593. South Africa has been one of the highest users of 
anti-dumping, which is disproportionate to the relatively small size of its market. This 
raises concerns amongst trading partners about its protectionist policies.  
However, there are some considerations that need to be made before jumping to 
conclusions. Firstly, it must be taken into account that South Africa was excluded 
from international trade due to trade sanctions generated by its policy of apartheid. 
This had an impact on its protection of domestic industry even after apartheid was 
abolished and South Africa joined the WTO594. Secondly, as the largest economy in 
Africa, South Africa receives and processes imports for other countries in the region. 
This also explains the unique arrangement 595of the customs union SACU and the 
Development Community SADC. Additionally, South African industry is atomised, 
which means that different industries operate in a reduced proportion, which makes 
them sensitive to injury shortly after the accession of dumped goods on the market. 
Finally, unlike the United States or the European Union, the South African market 
does not have medium or big markets for each type of product and generally, some 
of the industries are dominated by a monopoly or oligopoly, which diminishes their 
competitiveness and effectiveness. On the one hand, this makes dumped goods 
evident at the slightest increase of imports, also increasing the possibility of injury596. 
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McCARTHY C. Anti-Dumping in South Africa in KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM/NATIONAL BOARD OF TRADE, (2005) 
p. 49. 
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 Supra EDWARDS L. 2011 
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Supra MCCARTHY C. (2005) p. 50. 
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 DINKA T & KENNES W. “Africa’s Regional Integration Arrangements: History and Challenges.” European 
Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM).Discussion Paper 74. Maastricht. 2007. pp. 10-11. “The 
deep integration aspect of SACU is partly reflected in the mechanism of pooling of all tariff and excise revenue 
together with a formula to share the revenue in a manner that provides compensation for the polarisation 
effects within SACU. The new arrangement also introduced joint decision making on customs issues, which 
previously had been the sole responsibility of South Africa. While the revenue sharing approach is interesting 
from a development point of view, it also implies a high dependence of the BLNS, especially Lesotho and 
Swaziland, on the customs revenue. All the SACU members are also in SADC, but because SACU has a unified 
trade policy this is not a problem. In other words SACU is an example of variable geometry within the wider  
SADC”  
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BRINKG  KOBAYASHI T. “South Africa” in NAKAGAWA ed. “Anti Dumping Laws and Practices of the New 
Users”. Cameron May. London (2007) p. 229. 
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On the other hand, the monopolies and oligopolies have a powerful political lobby 
that acts effectively in protecting their domestic market share597. 
 
Apart from minerals, the sectors that are most developed in South African industry 
are the manufacturers of non-durable and semi-durable consumer goods598. There is 
a fair investment in chemical, steel, paper and engineering sub sectors. Having 
developed in a relatively closed economy, South African manufacturing is also 
characterised by high levels of concentration and a lack of competition599.  
The structure of the South African anti-dumping institutions is peculiar and it has 
been marked by its very particular history and its recent integration to the Southern 
Africa Customs Union SACU. 
Table 7.  Anti-Dumping Legislation and Implementing Authorities in South Africa. 
Local regulation of the Anti-Dumping regime Administrative and 
Judicial 
Authorities for 
Anti-Dumping 
Matters 
1. Southern African Customs Union Agreement 2002 – 
SACU Part VArticle 19: The new SACU Agreement 
has important implications for the anti-dumping regime 
within the customs union. It changed the way in which 
tariff decisions, including anti-dumping tariffs, are 
made, and it also requires Member States to develop 
legislation on contingency trade remedies such as anti-
dumping for the region, and to establish national 
2. International 
Trade 
Administration 
Commission – 
ITAC: When South 
Africa wants to 
impose an anti-
dumping measure, 
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bodies to administer these remedies within the different 
countries600. 
2. International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002 – 
ITA Act: The ITA Act is the rule that was issued to 
establish the International Trade Administration 
Commission; to provide functions for this commission 
and for the regulation of its procedures; to provide for 
the implementation of certain aspects of the Southern 
African Customs Union SACU; and to provide, within 
the framework of the SACU Agreement, for continued 
control of import and export of goods and amendment 
of customs duties and to provide for matters connected 
therewith601. Detailed anti-dumping regulations were 
promulgated on November 2003 by ITAC through the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry. They consist of five 
parts with all the substantive and procedural aspects 
for the conducting of anti-dumping investigations 
 
3. Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No. 3 of 
2000 PAJA, S. 32 b: requires that the commission 
gives to all parties adequate notice of the proposed 
administrative action, a reasonable opportunity to 
make representations, notice of the review mechanism 
and the right to request reasons. It contains the 
principles of natural justice, audi alteram partem and 
nemo iudex in rem sua602.  
ITAC is responsible 
for conducting the 
investigation and 
under the new 
SACU Agreement, 
ITAC is now obliged 
to make any 
recommendations 
directly to the SACU 
Tariff Board603. 
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Substantive aspects regulated by the ITA Act are compliant with the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement as the ITA Act almost completely reproduced the agreement into South 
African law as South Africa has a dualistic system of international law in which the 
WTO agreements are not self-executing but need a national regulation to execute 
and implement them. 
The definition of like products is constructed by the characteristics established 
before the constitution of ITAC. Those criteria are physical characteristics, raw 
materials used, method of manufacture, tariff classification, end use sustainability 
and price. They are still being used to determine whether a product can be labelled 
as a like product, and one of the most important factors, being the end use of the 
product604. The commission tends to compare products that compete as like 
products, even if they are different in many aspects. There are no further specific 
criteria to match or adjust between the product under investigation and the SACU 
domestic like product605. The term domestic industry is defined in sections 1 and 7 of 
the anti-dumping regulations. However the administrative practice has shown 
inconsistencies in determining the existence of a domestic industry606. 
The determination of dumping is contained in S. 32 of the ITA Act, where the 
concepts of normal value, export price and fair comparison are defined. The 
definition of normal value includes the concept of constructed value: 
S 32 2b: For the purpose of considering an application alleging the dumping or 
subsidised exports of goods in the common area: 
b Normal Value, in respect of any goods means: 
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 JOUBERT N. The Reform of South Africa’s Anti-Dumping RegimeManaging The Challenges Of WTO 
Participation: Case Study 38. Available at 
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i the comparable price paid or payable in the ordinary course of trade for like goods 
intended for consumption in the exporting country of origin; or 
ii in the absence of information on a price contemplated in subparagraph i either- 
aa the constructed cost of production of the goods in the country of origin when 
destined for domestic consumption plus a reasonable addition for selling, general 
and administrative costs and for profit; or 
bb the highest comparable price of the like product when exported to an 
appropriate third or surrogate country, as long as that price is representative. 
In the calculation of normal value, South Africa initially uses the home market price, 
while in only a few cases is a constructed value calculated. Sometimes a 
combination of the two methods is used. This is reassuring, as the abuse of the 
constructed value method might indicate unnecessary protection, based on higher 
dumping duties607.  
The provision gives two options for the calculation of a normal value in the absence 
of information about the comparable price. In practice, the ITAC hardly ever uses the 
highest comparable price of the like product. This is a discretion that is given to the 
ITAC and they are free to choose any method according to the language of the 
provision that allows the ITAC to choose either of the alternatives. This practice is 
beneficial for the exporters as the calculation preferred by the ITAC generally tends 
to establish lower margins of dumping. If the calculations are too inaccurate this 
results in a lack of protection of the domestic industry in cases where it legitimately 
deserves to be protected608. Export prices are determined ex-works, with the 
appropriate adjustments to the invoiced FOB or CIF price609.  
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In spite of the fact that there is no formal obligation to apply the lesser duty rule, the 
Commission applies it whenever there are circumstances of full cooperation as per 
the provision in Section 17 of the anti-dumping regulations. The lesser duty is 
defined by Section 1 of the anti-dumping regulations610 and the margin of injury is the 
price disadvantage to which the domestic industry is subjected. This disadvantage is 
the extent to which the price of the imported product is lower than the unsuppressed 
selling price of the SACU product611. 
Fair comparison must be made in all cases. Special reasonable allowances must 
be made whenever the conditions of sale, taxation, physical characteristics, levels of 
trade and quantities of the product are different612. According to Section 11 of the 
anti-dumping regulations, adjustments must include those conditions but are not 
limited to them and they must be made at ex-works conditions. The Commission 
may only determine the margin of dumping on the basis of a comparison of a 
weighted average normal value to the export prices of individual transactions under 
prescribed conditions, and in such cases, it has to provide reasons for its decision in 
a published report613. 
For the determination of material injury the relevant provision is S.13614 of the anti-
dumping regulations. Section 13.2 lists the factors which shall be taken into account 
for the determination of material injury such as sales, volume, profit and loss, output, 
market share, productivity, return on investments, capacity utilisation, cash flow, 
inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments and 
any other relevant factors placed before the Commission. The rest of the factors 
required by the Anti-Dumping Agreement are included in S.16.1 of the anti-dumping 
regulations. This section is dedicated to causality and it lists import volumes, price 
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undercutting, magnitude of the dumping margin and other factors affecting domestic 
prices as related to the causality. All the elements required by Article 3.4 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement are listed in the anti-dumping regulations, scattered around 
different sections. In practice, the Commission provides abridged indications of each 
factor taken into account for injury determination, referred to in indexed data such as 
tables615. This does not meet the standard determined as acceptable by the WTO in 
its jurisprudence616, as the mere listing of the data is not considered an evaluation in 
the sense of Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Rather, there must be 
specific evaluations of total effect and positive indicators617. 
This can lead to an eventual problem for South Africa in WTO litigation, whether it is 
connected to an Anti-Dumping Agreement breach, a defence that will not be 
accepted by the panels in view of the existing jurisprudence or as grounds for a Non-
Violation complaint, should the determination of material injury lead to the imposition 
of definitive anti-dumping measures in detriment to the benefits of the trade partner 
subject to the investigation.  
There is currently no provision in the anti-dumping regulations that includes public 
interest in the determination and imposition of anti-dumping duties. However, as the 
acts of the Commission are considered administrative acts, they are covered by the 
PAJA, which contains some provisions to allow for written submissions and public 
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hearings in certain cases of administrative action. Submissions have been admitted 
in specific cases exposing considerations of public interest with regards to dumped 
goods in the South African market618. 
The anti-dumping procedure is contained in the anti-dumping regulations. Anti-
dumping investigations have three phases: the pre-initiation or merit phase, the 
preliminary phase and the final investigation phase. The pre-initiation or merit phase 
starts upon the application, which is evaluated to determine whether there is a prima 
facie case of dumping and material injury619. Once the investigation has been 
initiated and published in the Government Gazette, the preliminary determination 
phase takes place. The parties are granted a term of 30 days to fill in standard 
questionnaires developed by the Commission620. Once the parties have responded 
the Commission proceeds to make the preliminary findings. It does not have a 
deadline to submit it; hence preliminary determinations have historically taken from 
98 days to 504 days621. When the preliminary decision has been published, the final 
investigation phase is started. 
Price Undertakings: 
The anti-dumping regulations do not forbid price undertakings. Indeed, the 
procedures of offering, acceptance and violation of price undertakings are regulated 
in S.39 of the anti-dumping regulations. However, the Commission does not make 
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use of price undertakings because it seems to be ultra vires to the ITA Act622, so this 
is an aspect in which despite the existence of a formal adherence to the Anti-
Dumping Agreement in practice, there is, at least, a lack of implementation of it.  
Final Determination: 
Before making a final determination an essential facts letter is issued by the 
Commission where all the facts that will justify the final determination are explained 
to all interested parties, and the parties then have a seven day period in which to 
comment. In practice, the Commission has issued more than one essential facts 
letter to each party, which can become confusing and unnecessarily delay the 
completion of the investigations623. 
Review: 
Administrative and judicial reviews are available in South Africa, as well as the 
sunset review as contained in the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  
One form of administrative review for anti-dumping measures in South Africa is the 
Interim Review which is contemplated in Section 44 of the anti-dumping regulations. 
It can be requested by any interested party after the first year of the publication of 
the final determination and as long as the parties can prove significantly changed 
circumstances as required in Section 45 of the regulations. There is no clear 
definition of what constitutes significantly changed circumstances, but it has been 
understood that circumstances must have changed significantly either to the extent 
that the domestic industry does not exist anymore, the dumping has ceased to exist, 
or that injury will not occur if the duty is removed. The interim review can be quite 
lengthy in duration and it may lead to confirmation, increase, decrease or withdrawal 
of the originally imposed anti-dumping duty according to Section 49 of the anti-
dumping regulations. Interim reviews are very frequent in South African practice and 
all the outcomes possible have occurred in a number of cases. 
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The sunset review in the South African system has been strongly criticised by the 
domestic academia. They argue that it is much more difficult to maintain a duty in a 
sunset review than to impose it directly. Also, they bring into the discussions the fact 
that some of the sunset reviews that have denied the maintenance of the measure 
fail upon judicial review624. The legal foundation of the sunset review lies in the anti-
dumping regulations, from Section 53 to Section 59. There are no ex officio 
initiations; instead, an interested party that represents the domestic industry must 
submit information indicating that there is a likelihood of injury in the event that the 
duty is removed. Exporters and foreign producers also have the opportunity to 
present their submissions to the Commission625. The sunset review in South Africa is 
meant to have a single investigation phase. According to the High Court, in sunset 
reviews the ITAC must only investigate average dumping margins of dumping for 
export from countries that were found to be dumping, so that the likelihood of injury 
is not mistaken by the inclusion of margins of dumping from countries that were not 
dumping in the first place626.  
The judicial review of final determinations made by the Commission can be taken to 
the High Court and appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals. In the event of a 
constitutional concern in the decision of ITAC, the Constitutional Court can revise the 
case. The judicial review at the High Court and eventually at the Supreme Court of 
Appeal will explore the validity and legality of the administrative action by the 
Commission. It may be corrected, set aside, confirmed or a different remedy may be 
granted627. South African courts are generally reluctant to grant compensations as 
remedies against the government628.The anti-dumping regulations allow the 
possibility to have a judicial review of final and provisional determinations. Judicial 
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 BRINK G. Sunset Reviews in South Africa: New Direction given by the High Court  TRALAC trade brief No. 
XXX Stellenbosch: US Printers 2007. 
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Anti-Dumping Regulations S. 57. 
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Supra BRINK G. 2007. 
627
 HOEXTER C. The future of Judicial review in South African Administrative Law(2000) 117(3) South African 
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review of anti-dumping measures is infrequent in South Africa, but when it occurs it 
can be controversial due to the interpretations and explanations of the courts that 
show a lack of deep understanding of the issue of anti-dumping in the perspective of 
international trade629. 
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V.APPLICABILITY OF NON-VIOLATION COMPLAINTS TO ANTI-DUMPING 
MEASURES IN THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF THE WTO. 
5.1 Nature and essential elements of Nullification and Impairment 
Complaints 
It has been extensively explained in previous chapters that the nullification and 
impairment remedy, especially in its form of Non-Violation complaint, has not been 
applied recently by the WTO. The rule is obscure and its interpretation has led to 
discussions with scholars who have presented opposite views. The dispositions 
contained in Article XXIII have been both mistakenly approached by complaining 
parties630 and evaded by the panels as evidence of their lack of understanding of this 
provision. All rules are constructed with essential, natural and accidental elements. 
Essential elements of the rules are those that determine the very existence of the 
rule and if they are eliminated the rule itself is suppressed because they constitute its 
essence, hence the name essential. Natural elements of a rule are those that due to 
the nature of the situation are considered part of it in which the norm occurs and 
when applied but that are not fundamental for its existence. Although it is difficult to 
imagine a norm of a certain nature without certain elements, it is possible in abstract 
and practice. Accidental elements of a rule are those that are convenient, practical, 
accepted and used in the interpretation and application of a rule, but that are 
additional and their disappearance causes no effect to the existence or validity of the 
norm. 
The nullification and impairment provision contains three essential elements which 
are: 
1. Object: the benefits derived from the WTO agreements, including the Anti-
Dumping Agreement; and the attainment of the objectives of GATT and the WTO 
agreements. 
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2. Action: a nullification of the abovementioned benefits which means a complete 
suppression of them or an impairment of those benefits. This means the imposition 
of obstacles to obtain the benefits or to achieve the objective or purposes of the 
agreement. It is not defined to what extent the burden of the impairment has to be 
onerous for the member state in order for the action to constitute itself as one of the 
essential elements.  
3. Causation: a violation, Non-Violation or situation. The violation supposes a breach 
of the agreement which may have other remedies that can be applicable without 
prejudice to the preference of Article XXIII of the complainant. The Non-Violation 
provision essentially means that in the WTO system a member can claim against 
another member despite the other member‘s compliance with the agreement 
whenever the action of the latter deprives the complaining member of the benefits it 
expected to obtain when it entered the agreement631. The situation complaint is any 
event in which a nullification or impairment can occur that is not caused by a 
violation or a Non–Violation.  
These elements can be found in some of the practices of both traditional and new 
anti-dumping users to different degrees of intensity in each practice. Some of the 
most common anti-dumping burdens on the exporter members noted in the 
examination of the case by case anti-dumping law and practice were: 
1. The terms of the administrative procedure; 
2. The choice of methodology to calculate the normal value of the goods; 
3. Weak judicial protection: incompetence of judicial authorities; 
4. A negative attitude from the countries to accept price undertakings; 
5. The lack of wide application of the lesser duty rule; 
6. A lack of transparency in the administrative procedures; and 
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 ABBOTT F. M. “Commentary: The International Intellectual Property Order Enters the 21st Century”. 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law. [Vand. J. Transnat'l L] V. 29.p. 477. 
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7. Imprecision of some of the substantial and procedural rules; 
The question then arising is which other benefits vested through the provisions or the 
purposes of the GATT and the rest of the WTO agreements can be affected by these 
practices. 
 
5.2 GATT benefits restricted by the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
In order to pursue a deeper analysis of the cases in which Article XXIII of GATT 
would be applicable to measures emanating from the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
provisions, a detailed description of the benefits potentially impaired by it has to be 
done. 
In general, the immediate benefit that is impaired by the application of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement is market access, translated to mean significant reductions of 
exports to the country where those measures are applied. This reduction is desirable 
to the extent that it counterbalances the effect of dumping but further than that it is 
an actual unilateral tariff barrier to trade, which is being sponsored by the loopholes 
in the WTO legal order. 
As a rule, any adjudication within the WTO has to be based on an action that is 
incompatible with the WTO regulations and it must have an actual or potential 
adverse impact on the international trade of the member concerned632. In fact, the 
harmful impact of any breach of the WTO obligations is presumed633, thus the burden 
of proof falls on the respondent party634 regardless of whether the alleged damaged 
is actual or potential. The WTO obligations include, but are not limited to, eliminating 
or reducing to the maximum possible the impact of:  
a. High tariffs; 
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 GAZZINI T. The legal nature of WTO Obligations and the Consequences of their Violation. The European 
Journal of International Law. Vol. 17 No. 4.2006 p. 132. 
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 WT/DS189/R 28 Argentina- Definitive Anti-Dumping measures on Imports of Ceramic Floor Tiles from Italy. 
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 BHALA R. International Trade Law: Theory and practice. Lexis Nexis 3
rd
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b. Pervasive non-tariff barriers such as: (quotas, licences, registration 
requirements, ―Buy local‖ legislation, restrictive technical, labelling, and sanitary 
standards, and embargoes); 
c. Restrictive trading rights; 
d. Restrictive distribution rights; 
e. Investment restrictions; or 
f. Voluntary export restraints635. 
Also, in the Uruguay Round it was agreed by the members that more detail would be 
provided to GATT members with effective tools against ―dumping‖; understanding 
dumping as the importation of a product sold at an unfairly discounted export price. 
This gave birth to the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which regulates the way in which a 
country is allowed to impose a tariff barrier in order to repair the unfair advantage 
gained in a given internal market by the imports of products sold below production 
cost636. The Anti-Dumping Agreement is limited by Article III of GATT that obliges 
members of the WTO to provide equality of competitive conditions for imported 
products in relation to domestic products637. This means that all measures deriving 
from the WTO agreements must fulfill their particular aim always avoiding 
protectionism, requiring equality of competitive conditions and protecting 
expectations of equal competitive relationships638. 
Anti-dumping measures naturally limit the scope of GATT, so it is necessary to 
carefully review which of these limitations are legitimate according to the 
abovementioned premise and which exceed both the Anti-Dumping Agreement and 
the GATT. Finally, it is important to find out how many of those measures that have 
excessively limited the WTO agreements have had a tangible consequence in 
balancing the market, restoring the trade freedom intended by the members of the 
WTO. Measures exceeding the scope of ADA and GATT will be in breach and 
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normal procedures for breach should be followed. This means that Article XXIII 
GATT is not used in those cases because it refers to Non-Violation claims only. 
A brief review of the nullification and impairment claims presented will direct the 
analysis to the benefits that the members perceive to be the most affected upon 
application of an anti-dumping procedure. 
 
5.2.1 Non-Violation Anti-Dumping impaired benefits – unjustified falls of imports, 
proportionality and reduction of potential trade 
As mentioned above, these are the benefits that would give place to a Non-Violation 
nullification and impairment action based in Article XXIII. This means that a perfectly 
legitimate action within the limits of GATT and the WTO agreements could be 
subject to challenge within the WTO dispute resolution scheme. 
1. Anti–dumping investigations have a significant impact on trade. Even when an 
anti-dumping dispute is rejected, imports fall by about 20%639. This is a 
quantifiable benefit that can be legitimately expected by any member and that 
is directly impaired by anti-dumping investigations that are rejected.  
2. Anti-dumping duties are disproportionate to the metric extent of the unfair 
pricing640.Once dumping is verified, the anti-dumping duty does not have a limit 
of the percentage of the duty levied. This leads to the imposition of duties 
exceeding 100 per cent the price of the goods after elimination of the price 
discrimination below cost. This means that the anti-dumping complainant is 
protected against the competition of the dumping product beyond the mere 
correction of the market conditions for free trade. 
3. Uncertainty of future losses to exporters due to disproportionate anti-dumping 
measures applied regularly may prevent potential exporters from becoming 
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active641. This is impossible to measure but it is a possible claim within the 
scope of Article XXIII. 
Apart from these benefits, and considering competition as a public good in 
international trade, absence of competition can be regarded as an impaired benefit 
for the international market, rather than for a specific litigator. However, this must be 
considered by the adjudicator at least in their dictum if the Appellate Body selects to 
be overly cautious, or even more adventurously, in their ratio decidendi if they find 
enough merits for this public good to become a legitimate expectation made binding 
via judicial holdings or precedent.  
 
5.3 Non-Violation Nullification and Impairment Provision: An Option to 
Tackle Anti-competitive Anti-Dumping Measures? 
Taking into account the historical evolution of Article XXIII and the abovementioned 
consideration of the fact that Article XXIII was kept deliberately without modification 
in the GATT agreement, the question about its functionality and applicability arises in 
the midst of a dark panorama. After the Uruguay Round, the WTO agreements 
rearranged multilateral trade relationships by pushing governments to adopt more 
liberal policies642 with the ultimate idea of adjusting the WTO to the modern needs of 
international trade. It seems then inexplicable that this effort has not been able to 
include one of the most used legal trade tools in the domestic and regional trade 
system, such as competition regulation. 
There are a few aspects that have traditionally been untouchable for the adjudicating 
bodies of the WTO, and they have to do with the competition policy of the WTO as a 
whole. This excludes the possibility of having competition consideration in the ratio 
decidendi of the decisions and limits them to be part of the obiter dicta. However, on 
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a case by case basis, the Appellate Body has the authority to include competition 
criteria in their judgments because it is conceptually logical from the nullification and 
impairment point of view. This means that in a given situation (like the Fuji-Kodak 
case) it is coherent for the Appellate Body to include market access in competitive 
conditions within the benefits derived from the WTO agreements. A decision of such 
sort would not have ―welfare enhancing effects‖643 of a great scope; neither would it 
be using competition policy as a method of redistributing income and surplus644. The 
adjudicating body‘s action would be delimited by the clearly identified legitimate 
benefit impaired by an anti-competitive anti-dumping measure that under the WTO 
agreements would be a Non-Violation act.  
It is true that a challenge for the application of competition considerations is that 
there is insufficient guidance for the panels in the body of rules to establish if a 
conduct in general is anti-competitive645. Nonetheless, specific application of the anti-
dumping agreement with the procedural and substantial flaws illustrated above, with 
the clear effect and intention to restrict imports646 may allow the panels to allow the 
application of Art XXIII (b).  
Some arguments against the possibility establish that there are no WTO rules 
compelling for minimum standards of competition and even if there were using the 
Non-Violation complaint would be very burdensome to the complaining party due to 
the need to prove causal relationship between the challenged measure and the 
injury. This argument can be contested by providing the clear and limited definition of 
benefits, which would ease the burden of proof on the complaining party. 
Another argument against the use of Non-Violation complaints in the event of anti-
competitive situations is that if the focus of WTO agreements is on market access 
and competitiveness, many types of anticompetitive conduct that reduce global 
welfare would not necessarily be addressed through non-violation 
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complaints647because a) Should a non-violation complaint succeed, the respondent 
is not compelled to withdraw the measure and b) some measures that are 
anticompetitive are consistent with other underlying principles of the WTO. 
These arguments are valid, but they do not take into account the specific situation of 
Anti-Dumping where the anti-competitive conduct is formally consistent with the rules 
of the WTO agreement but inconsistent in effect with the same rules and the 
underlying principles of the institution. The argument of the impracticality is also 
valid, but it does not consider that even though the solution provided by Art XXIII (b) 
is not ideal, it is more practical both politically and economically than allowing no 
recourse at all. The effect derived from this possibility is that the countries would 
have more self-restraint in applying anti-dumping measures by using them only when 
strictly necessary and with the least detriment to trade as possible. In other words, 
the anti-dumping measures would be restricted by testing their proportionality, 
necessity and rationality, just like many other domestic and international rules 
subject to pondering by different adjudicating bodies. 
 A Non-Violation nullification and impairment claim can emerge from anti-competitive 
remedies. This complaint can be justified, exposing how the anti-competitive anti-
dumping measures are a barrier to trade that cause unjustified detriment in the 
reasonable expectations of exporter countries affected by them. Their effectiveness 
is yet to be proven as there is no unanimity in the existing jurisprudence. 
 
5.4 Concrete situations in which a Non-Violation Complaint might be 
applicable. 
5.4.1 Procedural Fairness 
According to the benefits mentioned above, there are two situations in which 
nullification and impairment can be invoked in anti-dumping cases. The first one is in 
the event of anti-dumping investigations which have been made in formal 
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compliance with the procedural framework outlined by the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
These undermine procedural rights of the investigated parties, and therefore, they 
are inconsistent with the WTO agreements.  
This understanding indicates that there could be a qualified obligation to comply with 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which goes beyond its textual content, and must be 
read in conjunction with the whole agreement by the domestic investigating 
authorities. This would ensure that they apply the highest standards of transparency, 
are stricter with deadlines and deliver their service with the utmost care. This 
procedural application of Non-Violation complaints to anti-dumping investigations 
can take place as the sole reason to dispute the imposition of a duty on the basis of 
procedural fairness.  
In different cases, actions which are consistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement in 
a strict sense could give rise to a Non-Violation complaint as an additional 
procedural requirement in the anti-dumping investigation to act with fairness and 
utilise a case by case criteria of evaluation instead of a general rule that does not 
necessarily fit all the cases of the importers.  
 
5.4.1.1 Zeroing 
In certain events, the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the interpretation made of it by 
the WTO has been enough to provide the required procedural fairness in the cases 
of normal value calculation and margins of dumping648. More specifically, the 
Appellate Body has created a jurisprudence that has grown more complete and 
comprehensive with regards to the practice of zeroing. Zeroing has been one of the 
most controversial procedural practices in anti-dumping, and it has been 
implemented mostly by the United States. Zeroing consists of reducing the negative 
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differences found between the normal value and US value of a foreign product, to 
zero.  
In other words, when the normal value calculated price from the originating countries 
is found to be lower than the US importing price, the US Department of Commerce 
considers such difference in price as zero649. In effect, the US applies the costs that it 
deems appropriate as the actual cost, zeroing out the cost differential claimed by the 
exporting country, and then applies a percentage duty to correct the price to their 
deemed appropriate amount.  
Zeroing has repeatedly been found inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
by different panels and by the Appellate Body. In the EU-Bed Linen case650 the 
Appellate Body found that zeroing is not compatible with the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement because the comparison it makes is not fair. In their own words: “we are 
also of the view that a comparison between export price and normal value that does 
not fully take into account the prices of all comparable export transactions – such as 
the practice of “zeroing” at issue in this dispute – is not a “fair comparison” between 
export price and normal value, as required by Article 2.4 and by Article 2.4.2”651. 
However, there is jurisprudence that indicates that zeroing is inconsistent with the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement only in one of its forms, and it has been understood that if 
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calculated in another manner, it could be consistent with the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement. 
In fact, in the EU-Bed Linen case, the Appellate Body concluded that zeroing is 
WTO-inconsistent because it prevents true average-to-average comparisons as 
called for by Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. This reasoning leaves it 
open to the possibility that zeroing may be permissible when dumping is calculated 
in another way. Indeed, since the Agreement explicitly allows individual-to-average 
comparisons under certain circumstances, and since those comparisons would yield 
exactly the same results as average-to-average comparisons unless zeroing is 
employed for the former, there is a plausible argument that zeroing is implicitly 
permitted under current WTO rules whenever individual-to-average comparisons are 
allowed. Thus, zeroing may be consistent with Article 2.4.2 as currently worded in 
targeted dumping cases652. 
There are many forms of crafting an anti-dumping investigation procedure, and 
domestic authorities have the prerogative of doing so, whilst the Appellate Body is 
not able to pre-empt all of the possible procedural nuances in the jurisprudence, as it 
is also an ex post facto judgment653. As such, the possibility of invoking Article XXIII 
in the event that the calculation methodology for normal value and margins of 
dumping is formally compliant with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, but objectively 
unfair, could be one of the practical applications of the nullification and impairment 
provision from a procedural point of view. 
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5.4.1.2 Provision and Cases subject to further procedural fairness requirements from 
Article XXIII 
A concrete provision whose interpretation would be affected by the interpretation of 
further procedural fairness requirements attributable to the inclusion of Article XXIII 
in the interpretation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is: 
a) Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement which provides: 
―In its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine whether the 
authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of 
those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper 
and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have 
reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned.‖ 
The panels have understood that the disposition above sets up a bonus pater 
familias or, in terms of US tort law, a reasonable person‟s standard to the importing 
countries‘ authorities in their assessment of the facts of the matter. This has been 
done by interpreting that a proper establishment of the facts and an unbiased and 
objective evaluation of them imply that the local authority limits itself to accept the 
documentation provided by the domestic industry654, and not encouraging further 
investigation from the authorities.  
Furthermore, the establishment of the facts has been assumed to be correct by the 
panels left to the discretion of the local authorities655, and only the unbiased and 
objective evaluation is actually scrutinised by the DSB in the event of a dispute. This 
keeps the examination of the establishment of the facts from the panel‘s scope of 
action and thus reduces the scope of the provision. Additionally, this norm is read to 
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mean that there is no need for the exigency of an objective standard of review at the 
point of the establishment of the facts. That reading of the norm is mistaken and has 
led the panels to declare proper establishment of the facts in cases that in reality 
have an incomplete establishment of the facts by the local authorities. 
Further, the panels have concluded that Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement does not impose any obligations on the investigating authorities of 
WTO Members in Anti-Dumpinginvestigations that could be the subject of a 
finding of violation656. It is true that the article itself and the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement in isolation do not impose extra investigation obligations on the domestic 
authorities. However, reading the Anti-Dumping Agreement in harmony with the rest 
of GATT is an obligation originating in the principle of single undertaking.  
Therefore, this provision should be read in conjunction with Article XXIII in order to 
raise the standard of the domestic authorities to the utmost care, without the false 
belief that this will unreasonably burden the local trade authorities whose job is, 
indeed, to undertake trade investigations with the interests of both domestic 
producers and consumers in mind. A shift on the interpretation of this sole 
procedural aspect could put some limits on the openly protectionist policies of 
regions such as the United States and the EU. Such practices in the calculation of 
normal value, currency conversion and investigation procedures have not always 
been found to be inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement but are, in fact, 
undermining trade and affecting trade partners in a way that their benefits acquired 
through GATT are nullified or impaired.  
Additionally, a retrospective analysis of the cases in which the interpretation of more 
comprehensive procedural requirements could have been applied, with the exception 
of the zeroing cases, allows for the hypothetical application of Article XXIII. Some of 
the cases where the nullification and impairment provision could have been relevant 
to keep the benefits of exporting countries from spurious procedural practices 
include: 
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b) US- Korea Measures on Stainless Steel657: 
In this case Korea challenges the imposition of anti-dumping measures by the DOC 
alleging that they are applying standards of investigation in detriment of the Korean 
industry. More specifically, they argue that the DOC in the case of stainless steel 
plate, made a mistake in the comparison of POSCO‘s (the domestic company 
representing Korean Industry) ‗internal exchange rate‘ to the wrong U.S. exchange 
rate. The mistake was recognised by the DOC. The panel however did not find an 
inconsistency in this because it considered that the mistake did not give rise to a 
violation. In other words, the panel understood that “(…) the question is rather 
whether certain factual errors vitiate a determination, thus giving rise to a 
violation‖658. 
Indeed, the findings of the panel with respect to "local sales" were consistent with the 
position of the DOC. ―The United States in the Plate investigation did not act 
inconsistently with its obligations under Article 2.4.1, Article 2.4 chapeau ("fair 
comparison"), and Article 12.2 of the AD Agreement nor with its obligations under 
Article X:3(a) of GATT 1994‖659. 
In a strict sense, a mistake in the exchange rate comparison is not considered a 
violation in itself of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the construction of the 
export price as a whole was not found to be in breach of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement. This is because the facts used by the DOC were assumed to be correct 
by the panel. However, this would be one of the events in which Article XXIII would 
provide a reinforced procedural guarantee for the investigated country and would 
force the investigating countries to provide transparency and fairness in their 
procedures. In this case, there are two questions that could have changed the 
outcome of the panel‘s report. The first one is whether multiple averaging in the 
calculation of the normal value is acceptable in the light of the benefits acquired 
under Article XXIII and despite being acceptable – according to the panel – in the 
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light of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. This leads to a second question that may seem 
pivotal to this issue but that in terms of the possibility of using Article XXIII results is 
key, which is if the establishment of facts made by the DOC was proper. Since 
deference is given to governments to establish the facts and organise a suitable 
procedure, the nullification and impairment norm could be a resource for the 
investigated country to ensure a fair procedure.  
In other words, the affected country has the possibility of defending its industry 
against procedural unfairness either at the stage of fact establishment or in the value 
calculations if it is understood that a fair procedure in anti-dumping investigations is 
one of the benefits acquired under GATT. This implies that the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement only offers a limited framework which must be complied with but is not 
comprehensive of all the requirements of the internal regulations affecting the 
domestic anti-dumping investigations. 
c) Non WTO cases: the problem of choice of surrogate economies to calculate 
Normal Value for Non Market Economies: the USA v. China pulse. 
The choice of surrogate economies is only applicable to those economies that do not 
have the recognition of market economies by the WTO, and yet participate in the 
international market as competitors in the production and export of goods and 
services. The case of China in this context is unique because of its rapid growth in 
the last two decades and the panic that its exports have caused in different 
productive sectors around the world. The United States has a well-known history of 
protectionism of its industries which has generated two situations that are specific to 
the United States – China economic relationship. The first one is the unique 
interpretation of the concepts of fair value held by the different industries in the 
United States as explained below. The second is the internal strength of the 
domestic industries of the United States to procure undue protection for themselves 
and to push through import restrictions in the form of anti-dumping investigations as 
a deterrent to competitive importers.  
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Hereunder, some of the cases are presented where this practice has been verified; 
in all these cases the proposed choice of surrogate economies has been accepted 
by the US authorities without further investigation. It is important to note that in some 
of these cases, the comparison to propose a surrogate economy is at least informal 
and so it can be confirmed by investigating the sources from which they come 
(newspaper articles and uninformed estimates). 
- Preserved Mushrooms Case: USA. Case No. USTIC 1998 A 3-6 
In this case the Department of Commerce of the United States initiated an 
investigation against 36 mushroom exporters from China upon petition submitted by 
a coalition of mushroom producers in the United States660. Due to the fact that China 
is not a market economy, the United States chose a surrogate economy with which 
to compare it. In this particular case Indian consumption data was used in order to 
ascertain whether canned mushrooms were being sold at less than normal value661. 
The preliminary investigation endorsed the petition and used the data provided by 
the coalition. 
- Carbon Steel Plate: USA Case No. USITC 1996a A: 6 
In this particular case, two big steel companies filed a petition662 against imports from 
Russia, China, South Africa and the Ukraine, alleging sales at prices below fair value 
and injury to the domestic industry. Initially the petition was under representing the 
industry, but at a further point, three big steel conglomerates joined the petition663. 
The surrogate country for comparing Chinese exports chosen by the petitioners was 
Indonesia, with the lowest port charges from Brazil based on information found in a 
news article. Additionally, the profit percentages were compared to the ones of India. 
The DOC accepted these surrogates without further investigation and estimated the 
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dumping margin to range from 10 to 45%. Agreement was reached and China limited 
its exports of steel plate to 150.000 metric tons between 1997 and 1998664. 
- Collated Roofing Nails: USA Case No. USITC 1997e A: - 5 & 6 
This petition was brought about by the Paslode division of Illinois Tool Works Inc, 
who alleged that Chinese imports of collated roofing nails were being sold below fair 
value. India was chosen as the surrogate country to calculate normal value with the 
argument that India produces similar merchandise and it has a similar per capita 
gross national product. No further investigation on the actual value of collated roofing 
nails was undertaken and a preliminary investigation calculated dumping margins 
from 106 to 118%. Final dumping margins ranged from 0 to 48%.  
- Brake drums and Rotors Case No. USITC 1997 e: A – 5 & 6 
The Coalition for the preservation of American Brake Drums and Rotors Aftermarket 
presented a petition against Chinese Brake Drums and Rotors which were, or were 
likely to be, sold below fair value. They used the Indian economy as a surrogate to 
estimate costs. An agreement was reached and exports were restricted 
unilaterally665. 
- Certain Non-Frozen Apple Juice Concentrate from the People‟s Republic of China: 
Notice of Preliminary Results of the New Shipper Review, 75 Fed. Reg. 47,270, 
47,273 (Aug. 5, 2010). 
The producers of non-frozen concentrated apple juice filed a petition against 
Chinese producers. At the time of the investigation, approximately 16 U.S. firms 
produced non-frozen concentrated apple juice using apples designated for juicing. 
About half of the production by these firms was processed further by these same 
firms into retail products, with the other half sold to outside processors666. 
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At the moment of choosing a surrogate country the authorities decided to use India 
without taking into account that India was not a competitor in terms of volumes of 
apple juice production. Furthermore, this choice of surrogate country was made in 
spite of the fact that juicing apples are heavily subsidised in India, which significantly 
alters the market667, and thus leads to an inappropriate calculation of normal value. 
This decision was appealed by the Chinese exporters, and two years after bearing 
high anti-dumping duties, it was found by the US Court of International Trade that the 
calculation was actually mistaken and another surrogate country should have been 
chosen. This decision lowered the duties imposed to almost zero. In this case, 
recourse to the nullification and impairment provision would not have provided a 
swifter solution to the unfair duty imposed on China, but it would have allowed the 
Chinese government to propose a suitable solution to their unique and troublesome 
situation of being a non-market economy. 
The Chinese situation is special because of its status as a non-market economy and 
its large-scale production of a variety of goods and services at rates that are highly 
competitive. Cases like the ones mentioned above lead to the conclusion that 
domestic producers in the United States confuse the notion of normal value with a 
very particular idea of fair value, which implies the protection of their industry and 
status quo against any sort of competition. This is deducted from the choice of 
different surrogate economies for different types of costs, and the assumption that 
the Chinese product is necessarily being dumped because the costs do not reflect 
the cost reality faced by the producers in the United States. 
It is in these scenarios that a greater degree of diligence should be asked from the 
domestic authorities as the information to construct, in this case, the normal value of 
a non–market economy, is provided solely by the petitioners, who are parties with a 
vested interest, which naturally compromises their impartiality in the choice of a 
surrogate economy. The lack of further investigation in the procedure, where the 
surrogate country has very different conditions from the non-market economy, or 
when several surrogates are chosen, leads to a clear nullification and impairment of 
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benefits through procedural deference, which is actionable behind the WTO under 
Article XXIII. 
Indeed, the recourse to Article XXIII could give China the possibility of creating a 
proposal that allows the solution of the surrogate country problem. In receiving and 
discussing a Chinese proposal of that nature, the United States gets a chance to 
assess the different positions and almost negotiate a mutually beneficial solution, 
whilst improving the bilateral relationships and solving one controversial aspect668 of 
the US internal anti-dumping procedure. 
Other procedural issues which could give rise to a nullification and impairment claim 
also exist in the world of international trade. However, the ones presented above 
strongly represent the abstract concept that generates the argument in favour of a 
more active interpretation and use of the nullification and impairment provision in the 
context of trade remedies and, more specifically, in the context of anti-dumping. 
 
5.4.2 Substantive Motives 
The second scenario where anti-dumping measures could be challenged by 
nullification and impairment complaints in the form of Non-Violation complaints would 
be the events in which regardless of procedural formalities, the substantive decision 
of initiating an anti-dumping investigation and imposing a duty is subjectively taken 
by the governments for different reasons than to defend their industries from unfair 
imports.  
This is the case of protectionism and retaliatory anti-dumping. This argument is valid 
only in the events where the subjectivity of the investigating country can be clearly 
elucidated. This interpretation of a subjective Non-Violation whilst somewhat 
problematic, is nonetheless necessary to give harmony to the system and to provide 
a solution to the abuse of anti-dumping. In the situations where subjective 
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protectionism is clear, the nullification and impairment provision must be a tool for 
relief available for the affected country.  
The case presented below is an example of the situation in which a member state is 
blatantly using protectionism to keep competition away and conserve an industry that 
has become uncompetitive under the disguise of the legitimate exercise of the rights 
agreed in the Anti-Dumping Agreement: 
Table 8.  Case review: EU shoe imports from China and Vietnam.
 669 
Chronology of the 
case 
Date  Evolution 
Complaint by the 
domestic industry 
30-May 
2005 
European shoe industry mainly from 
Spain and Portugal lodged an anti-
dumping petition alleging the injury to 
the domestic industry following the end 
of import quotas and the rapid increase 
of Chinese and Vietnamese imports670.  
Investigation 07-Jul 
2005 
The commission initiates the 
investigation on the imports of 
footwear from China and Vietnam671. 
Provisional Duties 06-Apr 
2006 
A duty of 4.8 % was imposed on 
Chinese imports of footwear and one 
of 4.2 % was imposed on Vietnamese 
imports. 
Definite duties 15-Sep 
2006 
19.4 % for China and 16.8% for 
Vietnam672. 
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Request for review 30-Jun 
2008 
A prolongation of the duration of the 
definite duties was requested by the 
domestic industry claiming that 
domestic production 
was harmed even whilst a restriction 
on imports from the dumping countries 
existed673. 
Economic data suggests that this was 
due to the domestic shoe producers‘ 
lack of ability 
to compete as a result of inefficiency in 
production, and not increased imports. 
Definite duties 03-Oct 
2008 
16.5% for China and 10% for Vietnam 
WTO Complaint 04-Feb 
2010 
China filed a complaint to the WTO 
DSB about the European Union‘s anti-
dumping duties on shoes with leather 
parts. 
China claimed that the anti-dumping 
duties were inconsistent with the GATT 
provision on Anti-Dumping Agreement 
(1994). 
Panel Report 28-Oct 
2011 
The panel found Article 9(5) of the 
Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation 
inconsistent with the European Union's 
WTO obligations, and that the 
European Union had acted 
inconsistently with the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement in some aspects of the 
original investigation and expiry 
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review, but rejected the bulk of China's 
specific claims of violation in 
connection with the original 
investigation and expiry review, 
resulting Definitive and Review 
Regulations674. 
Adoption 22-Feb 
2012 
At its meeting on 22 February 2012, 
the DSB adopted the panel report. 
 
In this specific case of footwear imports from China and Vietnam into the EU, 
protectionism has been clear since the beginning of the proceedings. This case goes 
beyond the procedural aspects and has proven with evidence that the restrictions 
were motivated by a decision (policy) to protect the shoe industry of the EU675. The 
report by the WTO panel found that the anti-dumping imposition was in contravention 
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. However, the shoe industry from China and 
Vietnam was subject to measures for four years before the case reached the WTO. 
Very few cases where a nullification and impairment of rights occurs make it to the 
DSB, or do so at a stage where the nullification has occurred and has had tangible 
economic effects for the affected country. In the case of shoe imports from China676, 
should China have had the possibility of bringing a nullification and impairment 
complaint at the point of imposition of the duty, and regardless of whether the case 
was a violation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement or not (in this case it was found to be 
a violation), the protectionist motives, which were evident from the beginning of the 
imposition of the duty would have, in the light of the proposed interpretation of the 
provision, allowed the affected countries to obtain a swifter resolution and thus 
shorten the period of time in which they were affected by the spurious duty.  
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Alternatively, the nullification and impairment complaint could have been used in 
addition to the normal dispute resolution procedure with the idea of obtaining a 
commonly agreed solution. This would have given China and Vietnam the 
opportunity to propose an outcome that went beyond the mere withdrawal of the 
measures and to give a deeper consideration to the damages already caused to the 
shoe industry in those countries. 
Indeed, even though the panel found the measure inconsistent with the Anti-
Dumping Agreement in some aspects of the original investigation and expiry review, 
it rejected the majority of China‘s claims in relation to the original investigation. More 
particularly, the panel rejected the claims in relation to: 
 
a. Article 6.10.2 of the AD Agreement in the examination of individual treatment 
requests of four Chinese producers in the original investigation; 
 
b. Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement in selecting the sample for the dumping 
determination in the original investigation;  
 
c. Article 11.3 of the AD Agreement in the procedure for and selection of Brazil 
as the analogue country in the expiry review; 
 
d. Articles 2.1 and 2.4 of the AD Agreement and Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 
in the procedure for and selection of Brazil as the analogue country in the 
original investigation;  
 
e. Article 2.6 of the AD Agreement, read together with Articles 3.1 and 4.1 of 
the AD Agreement, with respect to the scope of the product under 
consideration, or the like product; 
 
f. Articles 3.1 and 6.10 of the AD Agreement and Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 
in the procedure for and selection of the sample for the injury analysis in the 
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original investigation and the expiry review; 
 
g. Article 11.3 of the AD Agreement in the procedure for and selection of the 
sample for the injury determination in the expiry review; 
 
h. Article 3.3 of the AD Agreement in making a cumulative assessment in the 
original investigation; 
 
i. Article 11.3 of the AD Agreement in finding likelihood of continuation or 
recurrence of injury in the expiry review; 
 
j. Articles 3.4, 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement in the evaluation of injury 
indicators in the original investigation; 
 
k. Articles 3.5 and 3.1 of the AD Agreement in determining causation in the 
original investigation; 
 
l. Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement and paragraph 15(a) of China's Accession 
Protocol in allowing less than 30 days to respond to the MET/IT claim forms 
in the original investigation; 
 
m. Article 6.1.2 of the AD Agreement with respect to certain questionnaire 
responses in the expiry review; 
 
n. Article 6.4 of the AD Agreement, and as a consequence or independently, 
Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement, with respect to certain information in the 
original investigation and expiry review; 
 
o. Article 6.5 of the AD Agreement, and as a consequence or independently, 
Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement, in the confidential treatment of certain 
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information in the original investigation; 
 
p. Article 6.5.1 of the AD Agreement, and as a consequence or independently, 
Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement, in connection with the non-confidential 
summarisation of certain information in the original investigation; 
 
q. Article 6.5.2 of the AD Agreement, and as a consequence, Article 6.2 of the 
AD Agreement, with respect to certain information in the non-confidential 
questionnaire responses of the sampled EU producers in the original 
investigation; 
 
r. Article 6.5 in the confidential treatment of certain information in the expiry 
review; 
 
s. Article 6.5.1 of the AD Agreement in connection with the non-confidential 
summarisation of certain information in the expiry review; 
 
t. Article 6.5.2 of the AD Agreement with respect to certain information in the 
expiry review; 
 
u. Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement with respect to certain information in the 
expiry review;  
 
v. Articles 3.1 and 6.8 of the AD Agreement in not applying facts available in 
the expiry review; 
 
w. Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement with respect to the time provided for 
submission of comments on the Additional Final Disclosure in the 
original investigation; 
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x. Article 12.2.2 of the AD Agreement in connection with the information and 
explanations provided in respect of specific issues in the original 
investigation and expiry review; and. 
 
y. Articles 3.1, 3.2, 9.1 and 9.2 of the AD Agreement with respect to the 
imposition and collection of anti-dumping duties in the original 
investigation677. 
 
Additionally, Article 17.6 (i) was misinterpreted by the Chinese because it was read 
in isolation from Article XXIII. China erred in failing to invoke Art XXIII and in 
explaining its connection with Art 17.6.The given interpretation ignores the 
nullification and impairment of benefits in the anti-dumping investigation procedure 
and does not take into account the principle of single undertaking. It is important to 
note that Article 17.6 should be read with a wide interpretation to make a fair 
assessment in the anti-dumping investigation and that this is independent from the 
substantial findings or lack thereof of violations of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  
The claims that were rejected refer to situations in which the panel considered that 
the EU was acting formally in accordance with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Some 
of the claims may have been subject to rejection due to lack of evidence and some 
others due to judicial economy. However, some of the claims were rejected because 
the panel considered that the EU was legitimately complying with the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement.  
Each of the claims rejected by the panel individually shows a disagreement in the 
procedural behaviour of the domestic investigating authority, or a mild discretionary 
decision from it. However, read together, all the claims compound and show an 
intention and a positive attitude to protect the domestic industry that is difficult to 
dissimulate, despite the fact that the European authorities were covering themselves 
under the pretension of formal compliance with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. What 
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is clear in this case is that long before the dispute came to the attention of the WTO 
there was sufficient documented evidence of protectionism in the shoe industry of 
the EU which lead to the application of the anti-dumping measures in the first place. 
Hence, the nullification and impairment provision was applicable regardless of the 
compliance or non-compliance of the EU with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  
This case is only one example in a myriad of cases678 where there is publicly known 
protectionism in the form of anti-dumping measures and it is very difficult for the 
affected countries to protect their rights to trade using the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
in isolation. In some cases, they might find some remote procedural flaw and win the 
dispute, as occurred in the EU-China footwear case. However as it can be seen in 
the case presented above, formal compliance can hide a protectionist agenda, which 
is actionable with the provision of nullification and impairment as a Non-Violation 
complaint since it affects the importing country and undermines its benefits and 
vested rights conferred by the WTO agreements. 
 
5.5 Open ended Contract Theory: The spirit of the rule. 
Article XXIII contains a clear inclination of the open-ended contract theory, 
considered by some as the most adequate for international treaties of great scope. 
This inclination is evident in the discussions and writings of the drafters of GATT who 
decided to include Article XXIII in GATT despite the warnings of it being the 
punishment of anybody who commits a “sin which we have not discovered yet, and 
which after long examinations we cannot define”679. 
In other words, the drafters of the agreement were foreseeing the existence of 
conducts detrimental to trade, but impossible to isolate. As such, they anticipated 
and compiled an abstract set of rules. More specifically, the concern of the United 
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States and other members was that when the countries lowered the tariffs, they 
found replacing measures, not covered by the scope of GATT, to bypass the norms 
of the agreement thereby defeating the whole purpose of GATT. They understood 
that the course of performance of the members of GATT would create situations 
deserving a sanction, and even considered making the Non-Violation complaint a 
major dispute settlement mechanism680. It was precisely because of the dangers of 
making it a general rule instead of a mechanism of last resort that the drafters 
resisted making it a key dispute settlement mechanism, leaving it as a latent defence 
for indirect protectionism681. This was also in order to deal with the United States‘ 
worry during the negotiations about infringement of trade commitments682. Hence the 
provision of Article XXIII was finally included in the original agreement.  
 
5.6 Dispute Resolution, between activism and restraint 
The interpretation of Article XXIII has been difficult since the first implementation of 
GATT. The WTO has been unclear about the correct interpretation and there have 
been jurisprudential swings which have created even more confusion about the 
applicability of the Non-Violation remedy. In some areas of the WTO regulation, the 
rules that intend to distinguish conducts that are permitted from conducts that are 
forbidden are often incoherent. This results in a distortion of the full effects of 
domestic government intervention in trade683, amongst other interpretative 
inconveniences. 
The critics of Article XXIII as a remedy against an action not sanctioned by GATT 
defend an interpretation in which the Non-Violation nullification and impairment 
                                                          
680
 LAROUER C. “WTO Non-Violation Complaints: A Misunderstood Remedy in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System”. Netherlands International Law Review, 2006.LIII p. 99. 
681
 Indirect protectionism refers to measures that are intended to impede international trade and those which 
are not intended to do so, but that have that effect. 
682
DURLING & LESTER. “Original Meanings and the Film Dispute: The Drafting History, Textual Evolution, and 
Application of the Non-Violation Nullification or Impairment Remedy” 32 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 211 
(1999). pp. 215-220. 
683
 SKYES A. “The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective” Journal of Legal 
Analysis. Vol. 2 No. 2 Fall 2010. p. 474. 
  
264 
 
situation occurs within negotiations and multilateral decision-making, and not as a 
part of a binding judicial decision684. This is based on the initial idea of multilateral 
rules being constantly discussed and adopted by the members, who were supposed 
to be at the same time, the ones deciding about the benefits accruing to a provision. 
Therefore, according to this view, it would not be the task of the panel or the 
Appellate Body to determine whether a member has suffered impairment to the 
benefits accruing from the agreement and impose a consequence by giving effect to 
Article XXIII, because it might exceed or modify the points on which the members 
agreed. This would lead to accepting a judicial intervention in the law-making 
process which, according to this vision, is restricted only for the member parties in 
the negotiation rounds. 
The problem with this interpretation is that it is not consistent with the consequence 
contained in the rule. The interpretation is an elaboration that does not take into 
account the literary layout of the rule and is based on a mistaken premise which is 
that the concept of Non-Violation complaints is applicable in a priori scenario, almost 
as a pre-requisite for the law-making process in bilateral agreements. Instead, Article 
XXIII is clearly written as a standard norm, linking a factual proposition to a legal 
consequence in a multilateral context where the members were well aware of the 
existence of third party adjudication of some sort. Additionally, this interpretation 
reduces the reach from the adjudicating bodies of the WTO to the contents of Article 
XXIII having as a consequence its inapplicability. 
On the other hand, despite its reduced appearance in decisions, the active 
interpretation of Article XXIII has been demanded by complaining parties on several 
occasions. These demands have not succeeded in the Appellate Body, most of the 
time because there are not enough factual merits to consider the claim. However, 
the underlying point of the Appellate Body is that the WTO agreements to which 
Article XXIII would be applied are delicately crafted by negotiators in the search for a 
balance between different interests, generally on sensitive issues for the members. 
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The acceptance of a Non-Violation claim would disturb that balance and grant the 
adjudicating body legislative faculties that not even the negotiators themselves had 
when creating the WTO agreements. 
This reasoning appeals prima facie as logical and could be strongly defended if it 
was not for the incoherence that emerges when examining the content of the 
different WTO agreements with respect to this type of claim. Some agreements, like 
the TRIPS685and the Agreement on Agriculture686, have expressly excluded the Non-
Violation complaint from the scope of their dispute resolution mechanism for a 
specific period of time. Others, like GATS687, have limited the scope688 of Non-
Violation complaints, and some, like and the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing689, 
have gone even further by definitively excluding the Non-Violation complaints from 
their dispute settlement system690.  
It is then curious that other WTO agreements that have not taken into account the 
provisions of Article XXIII are excluded from the application of the Non-Violation 
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provisions only due to the specific nature of the commitments contained in them. 
Some WTO agreements such as the Anti-Dumping Agreement contain restrictions to 
the benefits initially acquired from GATT. Thus they provide the ideal scenario for a 
Non-Violation claim. By allowing this interpretation, the scope of the specific 
agreements post GATT would be significantly limited by the possibility of Non-
Violation claims, despite the heavily negotiated filigree of their wording. Not allowing 
the Non-Violation prescription to permeate those agreements would, on the other 
hand, implicitly dismantle the original GATT clauses, rendering them void.  
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VI. COMPETITION AS A PUBLIC GOOD IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
Anti-dumping measures share a common origin with the pro-competitive regulations 
of anti-trust or competition regulations. They both hold the same original purpose to 
obtain economic efficiency691 and depending on their enforcement, they can assist or 
conflict with one another.  
 
Competition laws all over the world have understood certain behaviours by private 
economic actors as anti-competitive. These behaviours normally include the 
formation of cartels, monopolies, trusts, abuse of a dominant position and restrictions 
to market access. Due to the fact that anti-competitive conducts are clearly framed 
and regulated, competition procedures are generally more transparent, procedurally 
fairer and less discriminatory against foreign firms than trade remedy laws692. 
 
Governmental action can also have an anti-competitive outcome which is not 
foreseen in domestic antitrust law. Anticompetitive trade action693 fostered by 
governments may result in the restriction of markets that are supposed to be free.  
 
Anti-dumping is often used as an anti-competitive tool to protect domestic industries. 
Undue protection of domestic industries is counteracted by competition rules 
included in bilateral agreements (as is the case of the United States that signs free 
trade agreements with its relevant trading partners including Canada, Chile, Mexico 
and Peru amongst others) or in regional cooperation treaties (such as the European 
Union). If these tools are unavailable in the jurisdiction of the trading countries, anti-
dumping measures have more probability of becoming barriers to trade by promoting 
protectionism.  
                                                          
691
 On the common objective of Trade and Competition policies, see 1992 OECD Ministerial Meeting Note 
Trade and Competition Policies have a common objective: economic efficiency. But these policies have 
sometimes impinged on each other. In NOONAN C. “The emerging principles of International Competition 
Law”. International Economic Law Series. (Gen Ed. John Jackson) OUP. New York 2008. p. 139. 
692
Supra NOONAN. p. 140. 
693
 For example trade petitions can diminish competition and trade by allowing otherwise forbidden price 
fixing (via sharing of information towards structuring a trade petition), or the acceptance of Voluntary Export 
Restraints in dispute settlement (which is currently not permitted under WTO law). See supra NOONAN . pp. 
140-141. 
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A number of studies have analysed the links between competition and anti-dumping 
law and have concluded that there is a gap in the international economic law 
regulations that creates an imbalance which affects international trade in a significant 
manner694.One of the causes of the phenomenon is that domestic competition law 
and Anti-Dumping regulations sometimes overlap and both sets of rules are 
applicable to the same situation in the same country but instead of having 
complementary results, they are contradictory695. This can lead to the unfortunate 
results of industries colluding in pursuit of trade remedies undermining competition in 
detriment of a foreign industry. 
 
Lack of progress in industries which have a secure position shows the 
disadvantages of such behaviour. They do not see themselves as obliged to raise 
standards of quality, lower prices and innovate to attract clients. These negative 
effects form a cycle in which other measures such as safeguards, tariffs and quota 
restrictions are used to maintain the status quo696. This premise is true for developed 
economies, and for fast growing emergent economies, such as China, India, Brazil 
and South Africa; but does not apply to developing countries in the lower middle 
level697or to least developed countries. This is because developing countries do not 
have the infrastructure and wealth to resist economic liberalisation. They are 
dragged into a state of greater poverty due to the flooding of their economies with 
cheaper products than what they can actually compete with, lack of durable 
investment, and privatisation of the public industries which provide basic services.  
 
                                                          
694
 See for example BAYLIS, K. & NISHA MALHOTRA.Predatory Pricing: The Effect of Anti-Dumping on 
Domestic Competition Policy. University of British Colombia: Vancouver.2008 and MESSERLIN. Anti-
Dumping Regulations of Procartel Law?: The EC Chemical Cases. World Bank Working Paper WPS 397. World 
Bank: Washington DC. 1990. 
695
Supra NOONAN p. 141. 
696
GUASH & RAJAPATIRANA. “Total Strangers or Soulmates? Antidumping and Competition Policies in Latin 
America and the Caribbean” Policy research Working Paper 1958. The World Bank. Latin America and the 
Caribbean Region. Finance Private Sector, and Infrastructure Group. 1998. p. 5. 
697
 Developing countries are defined by the world bank according to their Gross National Income per capita, 
“based on its GNI per capita, every economy is classified as low income, middle income (subdivided into lower 
middle and upper middle), or high income.” http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications 
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In developed countries, companies are big enough to exercise market power698; 
therefore, the government‘s intervention in the market to keep its competitiveness is 
justified. However, problems arise from both the recipient country‘s inability to control 
the anti-competitive company and the exporting nation‘s absence of interest in 
controlling it699. To avoid this and also preclude resurrecting trade barriers, countries 
have opted to apply anti-dumping measures, which are allowed by multilateral 
agreements and which are politically more easily justified, even though the economic 
justification is improbable. 
 
Some academics have proposed a multilateral comprehensive and flexible statute of 
competition law as an ideal solution to the issue of competition in international trade 
designed and enforced by the WTO. This should include ―core principles‖ of 
competition to be implemented by each country and compliance would be 
supervised by the WTO. The adoption of competition standards within the WTO 
would guarantee all member countries‘ participation and therefore their serious 
commitment. On the other hand, previous attempts to include competition by the 
WTO, and the failure of the last rounds of negotiation700, show that a multilateral 
solution by consensus is likely to be the most difficult option.  
 
A possible approach that the WTO may take is to include the trade values more 
actively in its adjudication, which would mean that the WTO could consider 
competition issues in anti-dumping adjudication. This would be possible because 
competition is indeed a trade value701 underpinning the WTO agreements and 
especially the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  
                                                          
698
 Companies with market power have the ability of setting prices and may create a monopoly for themselves. 
Without government intervention, competition may be diminished and the interest of the consumers affected. 
In this sense government intervention in the form of Competition or Antitrust regulations is justified. See BRUX 
J. “Economic Issues and Policy”. Cengage Learning. 2010. p. 300. 
699
WOOTON I & ZANARDI M. “Anti-Dumping vs. Antitrust. Trade and Competition Policy” in CHOI K. & ARTIGAN 
J (editors), Handbook of International Trade. Volume II: Economic and Legal Analysis of laws and Institutions. 
Oxford UK and Cambridge, MA. Blackwell Publishers. 2005. p. 3. 
700
 In both Cancun Ministerial meeting and Doha rounds the issue of competition has failed to succeed in the 
negotiations due to the differences in understanding and policy of developed and developing countries.  
701
As opposed to non-trade values which have been increasingly brought up to the Appellate Body with the 
request for them to be actively including them in the WTO regulation. Inclusion of non-trade values has been 
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This would imply that a country which is affected by the use of anti-dumping as a 
strategy to hinder competition (both as a private or governmental initiative, and with 
credible proof), could advance a case. For example, a claim might be that its benefit 
to market access is being blocked. Therefore, Article XXIII would be operative and 
the WTO could intervene.  
 
The logic of the argument is that if the benefits of liberalisation are being hindered by 
the application of anti-dumping measures, countries would be allowed to invoke the 
nullification or impairment clause (Article XXIII: 1 (b)), even if the measures are 
allowed by other provisions of the agreement. This is because the other country 
would be failing to comply with its obligations to allow market access. The problem 
with this reading, apart from the strict mandate given by the DSU to the adjudicators 
in the WTO, is that the burden of proof in the WTO always requires that the 
complainant provides some initial proof of its claim as it was established in the WTO 
jurisprudence: 
 
Within the terms of reference of the working party, the examination of the 
relevant provisions of the General Agreement thus led it to the 
conclusion that no evidence had been presented to show that the 
Australian Government the respondent had failed to carry out its 
obligations under the Agreement702. 
 
There is also a conceptual problem with the possibility posed above which is 
the causation provision to be invoked. Impeding market access could be 
technically a breach of the agreement, in which case the violation complaint 
could take place. However, applying anti-dumping measures legitimately is not 
a violation of the agreement, so a Non-Violation complaint could be relevant. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
understood as unacceptable as it is illegitimate and creates norms away from the consensus established by the 
Members. See KELLY. “Judicial Activism at the World Trade Organization. Development Principles of Self 
Restraint”. Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business. Vol. 22 Issue 3 (spring). 2002. p. 387. 
702
Supra Australian Subsidy para.11. 
  
271 
 
This is not a minor discussion on the choice of an applicable provision, as to 
consider the WTO agreements applicability when the issue at stake is an issue 
of competition, which is not covered by the agreements, may hardly find 
conceptual foundations to be justified by a WTO panel.  
 
A practical difficulty of the attempt of including competition considerations in the 
WTO agreements through the nullification and impairment provisions is that it may 
not be swift enough to respond to anti-competitive anti-dumping measures as it is 
swift and effective in the domestic systems that have competition law. By the time 
the controversy is resolved through WTO litigation, which is costly, long and 
politically burdensome for both members; permanent damage could have been 
caused to the industry suffering the anti-competitive measure. For instance, when 
the company using the benefits of anti-dumping measures is a big enterprise and the 
affected one is a small or medium enterprise (hereinafter SME), by the time 
processes of consultation and investigation are finished, the SME could be 
permanently damaged, or even failed. 
 
There is still a long way to go before a ―global single market‖ can be structured. 
There is no doubt that one of the first steps is to include competition regulations in 
the international trade system. Those regulations should be binding and enforceable 
within the WTO and its existing systems of dispute resolutions. Anti-dumping 
measures must be re-evaluated and renewed so they are part of the evolving 
international trade system.  
 
Alternatives like the nullification and impairment clause could be used to protect 
international competition until consensus has been reached because it is unlikely 
that the most negative consequences from its application would come into effect. 
Political will from all parties is needed, as are positive actions to show this. This 
should create reliability in the international trade system and its representative 
institution, the WTO. 
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It is clear that anti-dumping measures are not going to disappear because they have 
proven politically convenient for many governments. They represent an escape valve 
that cannot be closed for the moment despite all the negative economic implications 
of maintaining them. The next rounds of negotiation should produce regulations that 
prevent them being used for anti-competitive purposes following the spirit of the 
negotiations and the rules emanated from the Uruguay Round. This is urgent 
because as trade increases, interaction between competition and anti-dumping will 
increase as well; thus controversies of this nature will become more frequent. 
International trade operates in a soft law environment of international law with 
different authorities which have diverse scope of reach. In this context, the WTO as 
one of the multiple mediators is the strongest law maker and adjudicator. Within the 
multilateral and supranational economic system it is important to define the role of 
the adjudicator and law maker in order to find the boundaries of its action as well as 
to understand its role within its range of authority which is framed in the perspective 
of the WTO agreements – it must necessarily be understood as a single undertaking. 
In order to meet the dogmatic declarations of the WTO it is necessary to apply an 
economic model that suits them and yet is flexible enough to cater for the demands 
of international markets. At this point it is important to remember that all participants 
in the dispute resolution system of the WTO are entities of public law. Thus the 
international economic law herein applied is ruled by the principles of international 
public law703. 
 
6.1 Economic Constitution704 
                                                          
703
 Despite the great influence entities of private law in most of the trade action of the Member States, the 
participation in the Dispute resolution system continues to be restricted to the Member States. This means 
that internally, the branch of law that occupies itself of the revision of any issues pertaining international trade 
with relationship to the WTO is the administrative law of each Member State.  
704
 “Constitutional economics brings a positive analytical perspective to constitutions. Under this approach, 
constitutions are simply instruments of human interaction: mechanisms by which to share authority in order to 
facilitate the establishment of rules. Constitutional rules are not natural law; instead, they are political 
settlements designed to maximize the achievement of individual citizens’ preferences. In a transaction cost or 
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Domestic policy in tax, trade, property and contracts shape the internal markets 
making them more or less prone to receiving foreign competition. This also pre-
disposes the industries to adapt to a highly competitive or highly protected market 
and has a direct impact in the lives and minds of workers and political actors. The 
policy choice is at the discretion of the sovereign nations, which are free to incline 
their legal system more or less to international trade. This discretion however, affects 
the international markets in a substantive manner, especially when coming from the 
major players in the global economy. Thus the need for a clear general economic 
policy emanating from the WTO that can be, at least, operative in the field of dispute 
resolution. 
There seems to be a basic understanding within the WTO about the conditions in 
which international trade will take place. However the interpretation of these 
conditions has not been harmonised leading to the misunderstandings that end up in 
situations like the abuse of trade remedies as protectionist strategies from the 
Member States; yet the system survives through the adjudicating body which fairly 
responds to the needs of the ever evolving international markets at a much faster 
pace than the legislative institution, which is far too big and complex to react 
efficiently to the urgency of the demands of trading parties.  
The WTO is just an institutional framework for a number of contractual obligations705, 
but the existence of a constitution and its composition is evident from its structure 
and the course of performance given to it by the Member States. At this stage of 
development of international law, the WTO is the only multilateral and open 
institution706 with enough coactive power to discipline its members and to develop a 
coherent interpretation of the multiplicity of rules applicable in it‘s the world trade 
system. Such power was received in a perfect exercise of ―social contract‖. 
Consequently, scrutinising the constitutional character of the WTO as the only 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
strategic model, constitutions are designed to overcome transaction costs or strategic barriers to Pareto 
superior outcomes. TRACHTMAN J. “The Constitutions of the WTO”. Eur J Int Law (2006) 17 (3): 623-646. 
Available at http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/17/3/623.full#sec-4  
705
 BOVARD J. “Two cheers for GATT” Policy Backgrounder No. 135. The National Centre for Policy Analysis. 
New York, Nov 1994 p. 9. 
706
 As opposed to closed institutions such as the regional economic communities (NAFTA, MERCOSUR, CAN) 
and more sophisticated, yet closed, institutions of regional cooperation such as the EU. 
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international institution that replicates the domestic government‘s structure will lead 
to finding an acceptable economic model that will be suitable for the needs of 
international trade in its current state of affairs. Such model is much needed so that 
all the parties can have homogeneous expectations and a harmonising interpretation 
of the legal provisions can be produced by the Appellate Body in the resolution of the 
coming disputes.  
In the words of the Freiburg scholars707, an economic constitution refers to the formal 
legal institutional framework (in this case the WTO agreements as a whole) and 
informal conventions and traditions that govern the economic activity in the 
respective communities (in this case, in the international community of trading 
nations)708. Naturally, none of the models developed for national economies can be 
transplanted into the international system because all of them rely heavily on 
national government institutionalism, which at the international level is absent.  
What would produce better results is the apprehension of the applicable principles of 
liberal economies that do not depend on governmental action, that is, those that refer 
directly to the market and are structured based on market logics. Also, other 
principles can be assumed to fit the incipient international institutionalism, and may 
delimit its scope of action and strengthen it in the areas where its authority is clear 
and uncontested. 
Along these lines, considering competition as a public good, or as an intrinsic benefit 
that is legitimately expected by the Member States in the system of dispute 
                                                          
707
 VAN SUNTUM S, BOHM T, OELGEMOLLER J and ILGMANN C. “Walter Eucken`s Principles of Economic Policy 
Today”. CAWM [Centrum fürangewandteWirtschaftsforschung Munster] Discussion Paper No. 49. Available at 
http://www.wiwi.uni-uenster.de/cawm/forschen/Download/Diskbeitraege/DP-49_Euckens-Principles-of-
Economic-Policy-Today.pdf: “Walter Eucken was the head of the Freiburg school of economics, a circle of 
German ordoliberal scholars of the interwar period, whose thoughts were highly influential in the immediate 
post war period. Being disillusioned by what he called the “age of experiments”- the failure of both classical 
liberalism and socialism - he formulated eleven principles for what he called a market economy, in which 
competition would not only limit the extent of private economic power, but also lead to an efficient allocation 
of resources and hence to economic prosperity. Although the principles never received much international 
attention, in light of recent economic research on both institutions and welfare economics, the essence of 
Eucken’s work appears to be very modern indeed.” 
708
 See EUCKEN, W. “A Policy for Establishing a System of Free Enterprise”.In Ludwig-Erhard-Stiftung, Standard 
texts on the Social Market Economy, pp. 115–31.Stuttgart 1982. 
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resolution in the WTO, would have a considerable impact in the decision-making 
process of the Appellate Body. This would solve the problem of anti-competitive 
internal policies as a non-tariff trade barrier as well as the abuse of remedies 
(namely subsidies and anti-dumping duties) for protectionist purposes. Another 
benefit that emerges from adopting competition as a principle of adjudication is legal 
surety which would give predictability to the judgments, and would, eventually, 
facilitate an agreement on more sophisticated international competition rules.  
It is relevant to note here that both the Cancun Ministerial meeting and the Doha 
Round have failed precisely because of the lack of consensus over what should and 
what should not be included in a system of international anti-trust. The position of 
both developing and developed countries is confused and contradictory and it seems 
difficult to understand what their point of disagreement is709. Adjudication, as a 
positive corollary, may lead to the clarification of the economic policy position of 
Member States through reflection in the actual litigation with a minimum of pro-
competition activism from the Appellate Body.  
The state of the art is clear for all Member States and the fact that international trade 
can‘t flourish unless in a system of free competition seems to be a concept in all 
theories of international trade. The question that remains is then, how could the 
Appellate Body substantiate a pro-competitive judgment without disturbing the 
harmony of the already delicate and slightly contradictory coexisting agreements.  
 
6.2 Ordo Liberal principles applied to the WTO agreements as an Economic 
Constitutional Foundation. 
                                                          
709
 See KEKTAR P. “Deadlock at Cancun: A New Beginning”. Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies Issue Brief 
No. 12. September 2003 available at http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/1906937507IB12-PrafullaKetkar-
DeadloackAtCancun.pdfSome of the key concerns for developing countries at Cancun were: Agriculture, TRIPs, 
Public Health, Non Agricultural Market Access – NAMA. For a detailed analysis of the issues of Competition, 
Investment, Transparency in Government Procurement and Trade Facilitation, otherwise known as the 
Singapore Issues See: WOOLCOCK S “The Singapore Issues in Cancun: a failed negotiation ploy or a litmus test 
for global governance?”London School of Economics. International Trade Policy Unit. Available at 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalRelations/centresandunits/ITPU/docs/woolcocksingaporeissues.pdf 
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It is possible to grasp from the preamble of GATT and from the very text of the WTO 
agreements that the Member States are engaged in a contract that presupposes a 
market economy on an international level. An economic model that is compatible 
with this idea fits the definition of Ordo Liberalism as delivered by the Freiburg 
scholars in which an economic constitutional order is developed to be the 
underpinning fundamental base of the legal framework that the Member States have 
accepted and adopted as a single undertaking.  
To have international unhampered markets710as defined by the Ordo Liberalism from 
the Freiburg school means that policy intervention or dogmatic ruling is 
acceptable as long as the ruling body711does not interfere in the operations of 
businesses by means of orders and prohibitions712. This can be achieved by a 
minimum of legislative work that allows the market to be self-regulating up to the 
maximum level of market freedom, yet contains administrative supervision in order to 
prevent major market distortions. The areas that should be guaranteed in order to 
provide a planned order of economic and legal nature are: 
- Competition; 
- Levels of law compliance; and 
- Supervision of international cartels713. 
 
6.3 The issue of legitimacy in the WTO 
                                                          
710
VANBERG VJ. “The Freiburg School: Walter Eucken and Ordoliberalism”. Freiburg Discussion Papers on 
Constitutional Economics.Institut für Allgemeine Wirtschaftsforschung; Abteilung für Wirtschaftspolitik; Albert-
Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, 04/11. p. 4. 
711
 In the atypical case of the WTO the ruling body is considered to be the adjudicator(Appellate Body) firstly 
because of its permanent dedication to the Member States issues; secondly because the legislative body of the 
WTO, the Rounds of negotiation of the Member States is also, under other conditions, the very same party in 
the trade disputes that arise; and finally because the decisions of the Appellate Body create stare decisis or 
precedent rulings that are considered binding for the Member States and for the Appellate Body itself . 
712
Supra, VANBERG. 
713
BOHM F. “Das problem der privaten Macht. Ein Betrag zur Monopolfrage”. Grundtexte zur Freiburger 
Tradition der ordnungsőkonomik. Walter Eucked institutUntersuchungen zur Ordnungstheorie und 
Ordnungspolitik 50. Mohr Siebeck. Tubingen, 2008. p. 47. 
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Within the WTO, agreement has been reached about a) the system of dispute 
resolution and b) the principles and cooperative rules of non-discrimination. This can 
be understood, in principle, as the constitutional configuration of the organisation714. 
The problem of legitimacy has emerged on previous occasions where the limits of 
the jurisdiction of the WTO as an international trade authority were not clear for the 
public in general, and the legal questions to be answered were related to sensitive 
issues of current affairs. The Seattle demonstrations715 left a clear message that in 
order to have a coherent, yet operative system of international trade dispute 
resolution, legitimacy is of key importance. If an economic constitution is to be 
conceptually created and applied it needs to have a legitimate foundation in both its 
ontological (validity and scope) and deontological (justice) aspects in order to 
guarantee its material enforceability (efficacy) as a legal norm of constitutional 
status. 
The fact that the WTO already contains constitutional elements is reassuring and it 
feeds legitimacy into the system. 
Thus, it is not excessive to differentiate this form of judicial activism716 with other 
topics of a polemic nature in the WTO such as human rights and environmental 
affairs. Competition is, by its very nature, an essential element of free trade. It is 
essential because if its existence is suppressed from the imaginary of free trade, it 
                                                          
714
 ORCALLI G. “A constitutional Interpretation of the GATT/ WTO”. Constitutional Political Economy 14.Journal 
of Economic law. Padua. 2003. p. 151.       
715
 See, OLDHAM K. “WTO Meeting and Protests in Seattle (1999) -- Part 2” Essay 9213, Nov 2009, available at 
http://www.historylink.org/index.cfm?DisplayPage=output.cfm&file_id=9213 *…+ When Seattle elected 
officials and civic leaders won the bid to host the Third Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), they hoped to link Seattle's name to a new round of negotiations aimed at promoting and regulating 
international trade. What happened during the conference did indelibly link Seattle and the WTO, although not 
in the way that boosters hoped. Tens of thousands joined in rallies and marches against WTO policies that they 
said hurt the environment, farmers, workers, consumers, and others. Thousands more successfully (albeit 
temporarily) "shut down the WTO" through nonviolent civil disobedience. A much smaller group used property 
destruction to protest the WTO and big corporations. Seattle authorities responded with a massive show of 
police force and creation of a "no protest zone," drawing widespread criticism for both their lack of preparation 
and their subsequent crackdown. 
716
 There are strong dissident positions against this statement regarding the clear limitation for judicial activism 
in the WTO. They are based in the wording of the objectives of the DSU as it is tasked to clarify rather than 
interpret the existing provisions. While they are valid, they are also debatable under the light of the essential 
elements of trade. See STOLL & SCHORKOPF “WTO – World Economic Order, World Trade Law”. Max Planck 
Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Leiden. 2003 
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would stop being so. Competition adjudication is then natural to free trade as it 
comes by default in a hypothetical plan where free trade would occur, and this is the 
stage where the proposed economic constitution principles and procedures would fit 
in. Finally, competition regulations are accidental to the international markets to be 
framed within free trade, because they may or may not exist without affecting the 
very existence of it. That is precisely why these formalities are left to the rounds, 
where the Member States discuss whether they would like to widen or narrow the 
reach and span of the adjudicator without, in any event, considering the possibility of 
eliminating competition from the free trade panorama. 
An economic constitution as conceived by the Freiburg scholars could, in light of the 
abovementioned reflections, be adapted to the international system of trade law 
provided that the WTO keeps its openness and flexibility to new topics in the rounds 
of negotiation so that it keeps its legitimacy as a supra-national organisation. 
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VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The legal structure of the WTO is far from perfect. It contains contradictory 
provisions, substantial obligations that are in practice impossible to enforce and it is 
incomplete in its scope of application. However, it is the most developed institution in 
international economic law environment and it functions with a system that mirrors 
the division of powers within nation states. The powers in the WTO are divided into 
executive, legislative and judicial, with a reduced executive represented in the 
secretariat, an ample legislative, where all the membership is represented and a 
rotating first instance of adjudicating body which is composed of the panels, with a 
mechanism of appeal that has a more permanent seat. It is in this context that the 
study of the application of Article XXIII of GATT was portrayed taking into account 
the interpretative constraints, the normative boundaries and the institutional 
limitations. 
Article XXIII of GATT is applicable to all WTO agreements with exception to those 
that have either limited its scope to specific cases or the ones that have expressly 
eliminated its application to their subject matter717. This occurs by virtue of the 
principle of single undertaking without prejudice to the specific remedies contained in 
the particular agreements because its jurisdiction is not exclusive, but concomitant 
with them. The forms in which Article XXIII can be applied in a rational manner are 
violation and Non-Violation as a situation complaint would be politically unacceptable 
in any event. However, it is important to note that once a route of remedial action has 
been taken, it means that other available remedies are forfeited; otherwise the 
mandate of the DSU to settle the disputes in a definitive manner would be violated. It 
is not surprising that there are contradictory texts and interpretations as the WTO 
agreements are the result of a long process of negotiations. Article XXIII is a special 
case of WTO rules where one norm can call for different types of interpretation in its 
different sections. 
                                                          
717
TRIPS, Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Balance of Payments Understanding. 
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A completely formal interpretation is not acceptable because it renders the contents 
of the article null, but a completely abstract approach leaves behind the cautiously 
and painstaking negotiation that the members underwent to reach agreement in 
some algid areas of trade. On the other hand a completely creative interpretative 
solution is not logical and also unacceptable as the WTO operates under a system of 
Rule of Law. An acceptable interpretation is one that offers coherence between the 
internal text of Article XXIII and the rest of the agreements, especially in the section 
relating to Non-Violation complaints. Coherence within Article XXIII can be achieved 
by the clarification of the meaning of key concepts within the provision such as the 
concepts of benefit an objective of the agreement718.  
In other words, Article XXIII contains two classes of benefits: vested and legitimately 
expected benefits. The nullification and impairment of vested benefits is a breach of 
the WTO regime, it leads to a liability, it generally has other remedies within the 
normative text of the corresponding specific agreement, and it triggers the 
application of Article XXIII: 1a, without prejudice to other available remedies for the 
same situation. On the other hand the nullification and impairment of legitimately 
expected benefits, and the impediment to attain the objectives of the agreement 
trigger the application of Article XXIII: 1 b. Legitimately expected benefits include 
the customary obligations of WTO law, the general principles of international law, the 
consideration, at least, of the objectives and purposes of the WTO agreements and 
the actions that have raised expectations due to a specific course of performance by 
a member state. The objectives of the agreement are contained in the agreement 
itself and their interpretation has been explained above. The scope of Article XXIII: 1 
b, or Non-Violation complaints is extended to all the measures that are WTO 
consistent and non-discriminatory in their formal aspect, but that entice disguised 
discrimination or hidden protectionism. Non-Violation complaints are subject to 
increase as the scope of the WTO agreements expands in further negotiations. This 
would keep the coherence and harmony of the system internally and would ensure a 
more complete single undertaking. 
                                                          
718
 Supra KIM 2006 p. 297. 
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In relation with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the application of Article XXIII can be a 
useful tool to tackle the uses and practices of the Member States that undermine the 
actual objective of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and become a protectionist tool for 
the most powerful industrial consortia in the different regions. Indeed, recourse to 
Article XXIII can lead to the modification of practices that are formally acceptable, but 
substantially detrimental to free trade. Both acceptable dimensions of Article XXIII 
can be applicable to the anti-dumping practices of Member States. When the 
practice is WTO inconsistent as a breach, and provided that a nullification, 
impairment or impediment to attain the objectives of the WTO agreements is proven, 
Article XXIII: 1 b is applicable in virtue of the coherence that all the WTO 
agreements must have amongst themselves.  
The fact that Article XXIII provides a first possibility of a direct and amicable 
understanding for the parties is extremely valuable for trade partners who can 
address some of the issues encountered in anti-dumping in a pre-adjudicatory 
instance in a cooperative manner. Furthermore, in case of failure of the proposals 
offered by the affected party, Article XXIII provides a unique jurisdiction to the panels 
that are competent in this exclusive case to suggest creative alternatives to solve the 
dispute. This specific and rare recourse in Article XXIII can allow the parties to 
request some solutions from the panels which would otherwise be impossible in 
WTO adjudication, such as more transparency in the anti-dumping procedures, ex 
officio exercise of the power of subpoena to request relevant information, and the 
use of more favourable methods of value calculations. 
This could diminish the use of anti-dumping and increase target-tailored 
protectionism on the one hand and be used as a retaliatory measure on the other 
hand. The solutions proposed by the complainants may provide proven formulae that 
can lead to further negotiations on the restructuring of the regime on the basis of 
empirical evidence tailored by the contracting parties on a case by case basis. 
In the area of competition, it is clear that the Member States have decided to leave 
the issue out of the jurisdiction of the panels for different reasons. There is no doubt 
of the urgent need to include competition considerations in the WTO dispute 
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resolution framework; and also, there is clarity about the anti-competitive motivations 
of some countries use of anti-dumping. It seems clear that the parties are aware of 
the inseparable ties that anti-dumping and competition have which is proven by the 
fact that a number of them have included competition considerations in their bilateral 
free trade agreements.  
The Appellate Body has reiterated in the decisions related to the environment – 
Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle – that the adjudicating body of the WTO is not a 
creative authority but that it is bound to execute the existent norms as they are, and 
not as they should be. They also made a point to circumscribe the intervention of the 
WTO to facilitate, regulate and settle disputes of trade in goods and services only in 
the subjects that had been self-regulated by the membership in the different 
negotiation rounds.  
The application of an economic constitution as understood by the Freiburg scholars 
can only be possible in the scenario of the WTO once the Member States have 
agreed on the creation of an application of a comprehensive policy, which they, 
being the legislative body of the WTO, must craft and agree upon before it is 
available for the jurisdiction of panels and the Appellate Body. Also it must be taken 
into account that since the WTO system does not count on a strong institutional and 
overreaching structure, the economic constitution policy must be tailored to empower 
and, at the same time hold accountable, the domestic implementing authorities who 
are the ones interpreting and applying the agreements in the actual field.  
Therefore, it is not possible to justify under the terms of Article XXIII adjudication that 
takes into account competition considerations that the parties have expressly 
decided to leave out of the WTO structure. This stems from the very concepts of 
benefit, legitimate expectations and objectives of the agreement, which have been 
defined and cannot be extended by means of jurisprudence, but only by means of 
express agreement or course of performance which at this point is unlikely. 
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